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ABSTRACT: The thesis gives a brief introduction into the theoretical foundation 
of transnational criminal co-operation and the customary law status of "terrorism". 
Within this contextual background the thesis analyses twelve of the 13 international 
counter-terrorism instruments currently in force and the legal mechanisms provided 
hereunder, as well as their application. It illustrates that all the agreed instruments 
adopted to date essentially follow the same structure, first established in the Hague 
Convention, requiring the criminalisation of specific conduct, establishing a clear 
basis of extra-territorial prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction under international 
law as well as providing associated obligations of co-operation in relation the 
prosecution of the alleged offender. The thesis analyses the inherent weaknesses of 
the established regime focusing inter alia on the common principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare, the imperfection of the obligation to extradite, the normative status of the 
political offence exception and the influence of human rights principles. The study 
illustrates that although in formal terms the international accomplishments are 
considerable the analysed treaties have been inefficacious in obtaining their expressed 
aims of preventing and punishing international terrorism, and that their practical 
application has been negligible. The thesis, nevertheless, concludes that the 
established system represents the highest attainable level of international criminal co-
operation since the lack of common values prevent more effective transnational co-
operation. 
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Thesis 
The present thesis argues that the inherent weaknesses of the existing counter-
terrorism regime make it inefficacious in obtaining its expressed aim of preventing 
and punishing international terrorism. 1 This argument is based on a review of the legal 
instruments and analysis of the practice. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. 
The first Part gives a brief introduction into the theoretical foundation of 
transnational criminal co-operation and the customary law status of "terrorism". The 
purpose of this preliminary exercise is to illustrate that the term "terrorism" is not a 
legal term of art and that no international obligation arise simply because conduct is 
described as "terrorism". 
The second Part analyses 12 of the thirteen existing universal counter-terrorism 
instruments with the purpose of evaluating their scope and theoretical effectiveness. 
The third part provides an overview of the exiting counter-terrorism regime. It 
analyses the legal mechanisms availed within the instruments currently in force and 
comments on their there application. The thesis does not seek to evaluate the complex 
matter of causation between international treaties and terrorism as such, but merely 
seeks, from a legal theoretical point, to evaluate the suitability of the instruments to 
fulfil their objectives. 2 The thesis concludes that, despite its serious flaws and legal 
ambiguities, the current system represents the highest attainable level of international 
criminal co-operation. 
1 By regime is meant a "sets of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area ofintemational relations", S. 
Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', inS. 
Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (1983) 275. 
2 This seems to bee the motivation expressed in the preambles of all international counter-terrorism 
instruments. 
4 
Transnational Criminal Co-operation 
Despite strong demand for international justice and the clear benefits arising from 
the apprehension and prosecution of authors of international crimes, or even of 
transnational fugitive offenders, no customary rule exists to this effect. 3 The absence 
any of such rule derives from the so-called Lotus principle, elaborated by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus case, according to which 
"international law governs the relation between independent States" and consequently 
"rules of [international] law emanate from their own free will. 4 In other words, States 
are bound only by their express consent, or actions that can be interpreted as consent. 
Thus States are under no international obligation to prosecute or extradite any 
individual without a specific obligation requiring them to do so. Consent may, in this 
respect, either concern acceptance of a specific rule or principle emerging in 
international law or, in relation to new States, it may imply acceptance to the body of 
rules and the international system as a whole. Thus the overriding importance is in the 
presumption of the Lotus principle and its emphasis on consensualism, any aberration 
from this constitutional principles of international law requires the consent or 
acquiescence of a State. 5 Despite strong emphasis on consensualism States are not, 
however, free to do whatever they want. The PCIJ expressed this by stating that: "the 
first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-
failing the existence of a permissive rule - it may not exercise its power in any form 
in the territory of another State."6 Thus the powers of States are essentially limited by 
the territory of other States. The use of the word "exercise" has, however, lead to 
some debate because it seems only to refer to jurisdiction to prescribe.7 
In this respect a preliminary remark is necessary in relation to the terminology used 
throughout the thesis. The word "jurisdiction" is predominantly used to denote limits 
of legal competence or powers of a State, which is further categorised into three 
different types of jurisdiction: i) jurisdiction to prescribe, referring to the authority to 
legislate or prescribe legal rules; ii) jurisdiction to adjudicate, referring to the right of 
3 G. Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, (1998) 47. 
4 Case of the SS Lotus ,PCIJ Series A. No. 10 ( 1927). 
5 Cf. C. Warbrick, 'States and Recognition in International Law' in Evans (ed.) International Law, 
(2003) 231-232. 
6 Case of the SS Lotus, PCIJ Series A. No. 10 (1927). 
7 Cf. generally, V. Lowe, 'Jurisdiction' in M.D. Evans, International Law, (2003) 343-336. 
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courts to receive try, and determine cases referred to them; iii) jurisdiction to enforce, 
referring to the application of the law by State authorities, e.g. arrest and detention etc 
(the later will often be implied in jurisdiction to prescribe unless otherwise stated). 
All three heads of jurisdiction must be satisfied if an undertaking is to conform with 
the requirement of international law. 
Thus the use of the word "exercise" by the PCIJ is important because it may be 
read as an indication that it is only jurisdiction to exercise, i.e. jurisdiction of 
enforcement, that is territorially limited under international law. This is highly 
contested.8 It suffice to say that there is no uniformly accepted understanding on how 
far a State may extend its criminal prescriptive jurisdiction beyond its own territory 
although there is agreement that States may not exercise enforcement jurisdiction in 
any territory of another State. In relation to jurisdiction to prescribe some authors 
demand a connecting factor, such as nationality, but even this is disputed.9 In relation 
to so-called terrorist conduct there seems, however, to be a growing consensus that 
Stats may prescribe offences extra-territorially, 10 and within the counter-terrorist 
instruments, as illustrated below, they may even obliged to do so. 
Various treaties provide for quasi-universal jurisdiction and an obligation to 
prosecute a variety of international crimes, the repression of which is generally held to 
be of universal interest. 11 Even within such systems, however, prosecution is 
noticeably lacking. This is most striking in relation to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 'grave breaches' regime which, 12 despite providing jurisdiction and creating a 
clear obligation to bring war criminals to justice, has remained virtually 
8 Compare 0. Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanem International Court of 
Justice, (2005) 251 et seq and V. Lowe, 'Jurisdiction' in M. Evans International Law, (2003) 335 et 
seq. 
9 Cf. ibid., at 336. 
10 In 1986, for instance the U.S. Congress passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism 
Act (18 USC 1223), which gave U.S. courts jurisdictions over any killing of a U.S. national if it was 
intended thereby to coerce, intimidate or retaliate a governments or civilian population, §§ 2331 (a) and 
(e). See also cases mentioned below. 
11 The word "quasi-universal" is used because it only provides jurisdiction to the Contracting States, 
whereas universal jurisdiction, properly so called, allows for any State to assert jurisdiction over an 
offence, cf. R. Higgins, Problems and Process, (1994) 64. 
12 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field ( 1949), Articles 49-50; Geneva Convention ll for the Amelioration of the 
Conditions of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea ( 1949); Articles 
50-51; Geneva Convention Ill Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ( 1949), Articles 129-130; 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of War (1949), Article 146-
147; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Articles 85-86. 
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unemployed. 13 Only after the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have some States started to 
make use of the repression system within these instruments. A similar pattern emerges 
in relation to other international crimes for which there are both jurisdiction under 
international law and an explicit obligation to ensure prosecution. 14 The establishment 
of the Internatiomil Criminal Tribunals for the former Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda may have signalled the arrival of a new era of international criminal justice. 
The co-operation of States is, however, still a prerequisite to the effective functioning 
of any international system of criminal justice. 15 Without the assistance of States to 
ensure the apprehension of offenders and the collection of evidence, no international 
court can fulfil its role. With regard to "terrorism", no international court has at 
present jurisdiction over any conduct as desribed as "terrorism" falling short of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes and, as a result, States still retain complete discretion 
over the exercise of their jurisdiction. 16 States have, however, been reluctant to 
exercise any such jurisdiction, this despite a number of treaties providing States with 
far-reaching jurisdiction to prosecute so-called terrorist crimes. International law, in 
addition, generally leaves States a wide measure of discretion to extend and apply 
their laws and adjudicative jurisdiction to acts occurring outside their territory, limited 
only by certain prohibiting rules. 17 Very few such rules exist and three broad bases of 
jurisdiction to prescribe are generally accepted under international law: the territorial, 
personal and protective principles. 18 Notwithstanding countless declarations of 
goodwill and the use of concepts such as 'civitas maxima' or the 'international 
community', State practice clearly demonstrates that little communal spirit exists. 
States have remained mostly indifferent to crimes committed outside their territory 
and have confined themselves to instituting criminal proceedings against crimes 
committed within their territory or against residents and those who have acquired 
nationality. 19 This may include international terrorist acts, even though most States 
13 Cf. A. Cassese, 'On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law' 9 European Journal of International Law I (1998) 2-17. 
14 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ( 1948), Article 1. The 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman of Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), 
Article 7. 
15 Cf. A. Casses_e,lntemationaf Criminal Law, (2003} 348-360. 
16 Cf. ASIL Insight 1998 available at <www.asil.org/insights/insigh20.htm>. 
17 Case ofthe SS Lotus, PCIJ Series A. No. 10 (1927). 
18 See generally, V. Lowe, 'Jurisdiction' in M.D. Evans, International Law, (2003) 329-355. 
19 Cf. A, Cassese, International Law 2nd ed. (2005) 451-453. 
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have unequivocally condemned these as criminal and unjustifiable and characterised 
them as a threat to the international community.20 
Terrorism as a legal term 
Before starting analysis of the existing counter-terrorism regime some remark must 
be made about the term "terrorism" and its legal significance. 
There are at present 13 so-called counter-terrorism instruments with universal 
application. Even so, there is no universally accepted definition of "terrorism", nor do 
any of the instruments adopted at the global level contain a comprehensive definition 
of the concept. Certain acts, such as hostage taking, aircraft hijacking and 
indiscriminate bombing, are nevertheless commonly identified as acts of "terrorism", 
an especially unacceptable form of crime.21 This brings to mind the famous quote of 
Justice Potter Stewart when trying to define 'obscenity' under U.S. law: "I shall not 
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced ... 
[b Jut I know it when I see it. .. "22 This, "know it when I see it position", is clearly, 
from a legal point of view, unsatisfactory; since an ad hoc definition of terrorism 
provides no legal certainty. The definition of "terrorism", furthermore, cannot only 
rely on references to acts committed, but also on other factors as well, such as the 
motive of the offender and the context in which the conduct takes place.23 There is at 
present no international consensus on these other factors and the concept of terrorism 
is, in the words of Rosalyn Higgins: "a term without legal significance."24 
There are, nonetheless, those who see an emerging consensus on certain elements 
of the definition of the concept of terrorism. Professor Cassese, for instance, takes the 
20 See for instance General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994 UN Doc. A RES/49/60, 
1994. 
21 See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism ( 1999), Article 
2(1 )(a). 
22 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). The first definition of obscenity by the U.S. Supreme 
Court was set forth in Roth v. United States ( 1957). This standard was later changed in Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15,24-25 (1973), which is more or less still in effect today. 
23 R. Higgins, 'The general intemationallaw.of terrorism', in R. Higgins and M. Flory (ed.), 
International law and Terrorism, ( 1997) 15. 
24 Ibid., at 28. For an opposite view see Suresh v. Canada (Minister of citizenship and education) para. 
96," We are not persuaded, however, that the term "terrorism" is so unsettled that it cannot set the 
proper boundaries of legal adjudication", in 41 l.L.M. (2002) 954, p. 82. 
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position that the agreement laid out in General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 
December 1994 "sets out an acceptable definition of terrorism". 25 
Terrorism as a norm of custom 
Before analysing the proposition made by Professor Cassese, a brief comment must 
be made on the special requirements to the establishment of a customary norm, 
especially a norm creating individual criminal responsibility. 
From a legal point of view, the term "terrorism", as a practical concept, has to meet 
certain qualitative requirements. This, first of all, includes some degree of certainty in 
application, at least if it is to serve as a basis for criminal prosecution. This derives 
from the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, a general principle of justice.26 The 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has specified that any definition of a 
crime must be: 
"Classified and described in precise and unambiguous language that narrowly defines the punishable 
offence, by providing a clear definition of the criminalised conduct, establishing its elements and the 
factors that distinguish it from behaviours that are either not punishable offences or are punishable by 
other penalties."27 
The principle of legal certainty was also early acknowledged by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) which, in Kokkinakis v. Greece, pronounced: 
" ... that Article 7 para. I of the Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application 
of the criminal law to an accused's disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that 
only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the 
principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused's detriment, for instance 
by analogy; it follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined in law. This condition is 
satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, 
with the assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable." 
Thus the protection by fair trial against arbitrary or oppressive use of the criminal law 
25 A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed., (2005) 449. 
26 Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular Terrorism, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.l, para. 62-7. 
27 See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/ser.L!V /11.116, Doc. 5 rev. l corr., 22 October 
2002, "Recommendations", No. lO (a). 
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follows on the proper identification of the conduct that constitutes the crime. This 
enables the defendant to know what has to be proved against him consequently 
allowing him to prepare his defence. Predictability is fundamental to this process. 
In addition, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) specifically 
provides that any interference with the right to 'liberty and security' (Article 5), 
'freedom of conscience and religion' (Article 9), 'freedom of expression' (Article 10) 
and 'freedom of assembly and association' (Article 11) explicitly necessitates that the 
respective interference is "prescribed by law". In the Sunday Times case the ECtHR 
clarified that the "prescribed by law" requirement entails not only accessibility to the 
law in question, but also that the law is formulated with sufficient precision that the 
individual, to some degree of reasonableness, will be able to predict the consequence 
of a given act. 28 With regard to 'liberty and security', the interference must not only 
be prescribed by law; it must also follow a lawful procedure. 29 In Winterwerp v. The 
Netherlands this was interpreted not only to mean that the relevant procedure 
followed had to be in conformity with municipal law and the "general principles" 
contained in the Convention, but also that the relevant rules should ensure that no one 
be arbitrarily deprived of his liberty.30 
Underlying principles thus exist to protect against exercise of arbitrary power, 
which is fundamentally in opposition to the principle of fair trial. The safeguard 
against arbitrariness is above all ensured by clarity and predictability. Thus 
international human rights law sets a high threshold before an international prescribed 
conduct can serve as foundation for a criminal prosecution. This was to some extent a 
problem for the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, set up after the Second 
World War to secure the prosecution of the major war criminals, but it is no longer 
disputed. 31 
Bearing this in mind, we may now analyse Professor Cassese's proposition, 
according to which "terrorism" is defined as: 
"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a State of terror in the general public, a group of 
28 See ECtHR Sunday Times Case, Judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A, Vol. 30, para. 49. 
29 Cf. generally, D. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ( 1995) 104. 
30 ECtHR, Winterwerp v. Netherlands ( 1979) 2 EHRR 387, para. 37. 
31 Cf. A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 143 and R. Cryer, Prosecuting International 
Crimes (2005) 232-288. See further below p. 14. 
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persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that 
may be invoked to justify them"32 
This definition, according to Cassese, contains the three main requirements: firstly, 
"the acts must constitute a criminal offence under national legal systems" The use of 
the plural form implies that at least two jurisdictions have criminalised the conduct in 
question. If, however, the relevant conduct is to be regarded as a norm of customary 
status, then this requires widespread practice. According to the requirement 
established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, a customary rule of international law consists of two elements. First of all, 
a material element consisting of State practice, and secondly a psychological element, 
opinio juris, which is the belief that a norm is binding as law. There are several other 
variations in the literature, but these are the main ingredients in the formation of a 
customary norm under internationallaw.33 This was explicitly stated by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases: 
" ... -for in order to achieve this result [the establishment of a customary norm], two conditions must be 
fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice. But they must also be such, or 
be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation."34 
Practice in itself is therefore not enough; we also need to know why this practice 
occurred. In other words, it is not enough that a large group of States has criminalised 
specific conduct in their national legislation: for this practice to be relevant in the 
process of formation of a customary norm, this also has to be done in the conviction 
that this was required by international law. This presents a serious obstacle for 
Cassese's proposition. Numerous States have by now criminalised many acts 
generally considered "terrorist" offences. Most such offences, however, existed long 
32 UN Doc. A RES/49/60, 1994, para. 3. 
33 Ian f!rowlllie ~uggest for instance four elements: (a) duraJion, (b) uniformity, consistence of practice, 
(c) its generality, but not universality; and (d) opinio juris necessitates, in Principles of Public 
International Law 4th ed.), p. 4-11. Anthony A. D' Amato suggest a whole new system in The Concept 
of Custom in International Law, (1971) 73-98 and 270-272. 
34 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Case, I.C.J. Reports (1969), para. 77. 
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before any serious consideration was given to the concept of terrorism, e.g. the crime 
of murder, criminal damage and other violent offences. They may also have come 
about as part of the implementation procedure of specific treaty obligations. It is, 
however, uncertain whether this practice can be relied on as evidence of customary 
international law, at least without further considerations.35 In relation to terrorism, one 
very important consideration is the varying degree of participation within different 
counter-terrorism treaties. Before the SC called upon States to "become parties as 
soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism" many counter-terrorism instruments only had a modest number of 
ratifications.36 The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, for 
instance, had at that time only been ratified by two States. 37 This seems to imply that 
is was the SC that incentivated States to become parties to the counter-terrorist 
instruments since ratification was not previously seen as being rendered obligatory by 
the existence of a rule of law requiring it. Although the relevant part of the SC 
resolution was not legally binding this may weaken any customary argument since it 
is questionable whether State practice in such circumstances satisfies the subjective 
element referred to as opinio juris. Additionally, as will be illustrated below, 
relatively little State practice exists that may sustain an argument that a customary 
norm exists defining and criminalising so-called terrorism. The difficulty of acquiring 
information, and not least verification, of the prosecution or other dispositions in such 
cases, further confuses the matter. This is so despite the relatively high number of 
terrorist attacks. The lack of any definition of" terrorism" further complicates the 
identification of the relevant practice. Even if national legislation, implementing 
certain counter-terrorist obligations, were to be relied on as a source to establish a 
customary norm, then this could still not sustain the definition proposed by Cassese 
because it contains elements that are not present within these instruments. 
The second element suggested by Cassese, that the act "must be aimed at spreading 
terror among civilians with a view of intimidating, coercing or influencing the policy 
of a government", does not correspond with the text adopted by the General 
Assembly. There is no requirement that the group be civilian; neither does the text 
35 Cf. R. Baxter, 'Multilateral treaties as evidence of customary international law', 41 British Yearbook 
of International Law 275 (1965) 275. 
36 Security Council Resolution 1373, 28 September 200 I. 
37 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (7 March 200 I) and Uzbekistan (9 July 
200 l ). See <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter_xviii/treaty !!.asp>. 
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specify the purpose of the criminal act, other than that it has to be political, which is 
entirely open-ended. 
Nor, likewise, does the third element recommended by Cassese, that the act "be 
politically or ideologically motivated", seem to correspond to the text. 38 The text 
approved by the General Assembly lists different forms of motive, but significantly 
ends with the words "or any other nature" which makes it non-exhaustive. 
Consequently, it cannot be concluded on the basis of this text that any act of terrorism 
has to be politically or ideologically motivated. This is also sustained by the lack of 
political or ideological motive requirement in existing counter-terrorism instruments. 
Thus according to the definition prepared by the General Assembly, it is not only 
politically or ideologically motivated acts that cannot be justified, but all criminal acts 
intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public. Accordingly, 
acts with a pure economic or other motive also fall within the definition. 
It is furthermore noteworthy that the definition suggested by Cassese is almost 
identical with that he earlier identified.39 In the late eighties, Cassese described 
terrorism on the basis of 109 definitions identified by the American political scientist 
Walter Laqueur, as: "any violent act against innocent people intended to force a State, 
or any other international subject, to pursue a line of conduct it would not otherwise 
follow". 40 None of the suggested definitions contributes anything significant to the 
legal workability of the concept of "terrorism" because they do not satisfy the 
qualitative requirements and thus serve no legal purpose. No matter how 
optimistically one views this possible convergence of common perceptions of 
terrorism, it cannot override the forceful criticism that terrorism is dysfunctional as a 
legal concept. The ever-expanding meaning given to the "terrorism" and subjective 
bias only works to reinforce this opinion.41 As expressed by Judge Higgins: 
"Terrorism is a term without legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to 
activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the method 
used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both ... [T]he term is at once a shorthand to allude to a 
38 A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed., (2005) 450. 
39 Cf. Also the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which never came 
into force: "criminal acts directed against a State and intended to calculate or to create a State of terror 
in the minds of particular persons, or group of persons or the general public". 
40 A. Cassese, Terrorism Politics and Law, (1989) 5-6 (emphasis original). 
41 For the concept of the speaker-oriented bias see T. Kaptain, 'The Terrorism of "Terrorism"' in J. P 
(ed.) Terrorism and International Justice, (2003) 49. 
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variety of problems with some common elements, and a method of indicating community 
condemnation for the conduct concerned".42 
Similarly Professor Baxter: 
We have cause to regret that a legal concept of "terrorism" was ever inflicted upon us. The term is 
imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose."43 
Despite of this, some authors still take the position that some of the conduct 
prescribed within the counter-terrorism regime gives rise to legal obligations, also for 
non-Party States. Bassiouni, for instance argues that the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle, which is common to all the counter-terrorism instruments subsequent to the 
Tokyo Convention, applies to all international crimes however prescribed; 
considering twenty different acts, including hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats and 
hostage-taking, he states that: 
"That system [of international crimes] is predicated on the assumption, by each signatory State to an 
international criminal law convention, to enforce its provisions under its national criminal laws and to 
cooperate in the prosecution and punishment of such offenders ... Under such a scheme, international 
crimes established by conventional or customary international law must be enforced by the national 
criminal laws of the States"44 
Bassiouni seems, in other words, to imply that all international crimes, irrespective 
of whether they are established as a result of treaty or under customary international 
law, contain an obligation to co-operate and ensure prosecution of the alleged 
offender. There are several flaws inherent in this argument. Firstly, the position taken 
by Bassiouni seems to rely on a very broad conception of "international crime". He 
thereby overlooks the very important distinction, pointed out by Neil Boister, between 
international criminal law strictu sensu and transnational criminal law; the former 
covering so-called core crimes of international concern that are directly criminalised 
under international law and the latter providing for indirect criminalisation through 
the obligation to establish crimes under domestic law. Transnational criminal law 
42 R. Higgins, The general international/ow of terrorism, in R. Higgins/M. Flory (ed.), International 
law and Terrorism, ( !997) 28. 
43 R. Baxter, 'A Sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism', Ark on Law Review 7 ( 19973/74) 388. 
44 M. C. Bassiouni, 'The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law', 15 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law ( 1983) 29. 
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offences are thus not international crimes strictu sensu, but conduct that international 
law prescribes, with binding effect, that States must criminalise within their domestic 
criminal system. 
Transnational criminal law offences may therefore not comply with the principle of 
nullum crime sine lege without first having been implemented into a domestic legal 
system. The principle of nullum crime sine lege entails inter alia that criminal 
offences may normally only be established in written law enacted by parliament. This 
is based on the principle of strict legality, which is to be found in most civil law 
jurisdictions. Although variations exist within the domestic application of the doctrine 
its essential purpose is to safeguard individuals against arbitrary interference from the 
State. International law is far less restrictive in regard to the application of the 
doctrine of strict legality then domestic jurisdictions.45 Although is growing 
importance is reflected in the fact that it has gradually replaced the more relaxed 
principle of substantive justice.46 This is among others expressed in various human 
rights instruments.47 The International Military Tribunal, established after the Second 
World War, adopted the principle of substantive justice by focusing on the obvious 
knowledge of the wrong.48 This was partly due to the lack of clearly enunciated 
international crimes at the time. The principle of nullum crime sine lege is by now, 
however, a well-established principle of international criminal law. This is for 
instance sustained by the Secretary-General's report pursuant to SC resolution 808 
(1993) establishing the ICTY, where the Secretary-General stated: 
"In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires 
that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond 
any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific 
conventions does not arise".49 
45 See for instance H-H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrecht- Allgemeiner Teil ( 5.ed.), (1996) 133 et 
seq. 
46 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law 2nd ed., (2003) 138. 
47 See for instance ICCPR, Article IS; ECHR, Article 7, ACHR, Article 9. 
48 
"The maxim 'nullum crimen sine lege' is not a limitation of sovereignty but is in general a principle 
of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have 
attacked neighbouring_States without warning is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the 
attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be 
unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished." IMTFE Judgment (English Translation) Chapter 
II, The Law, pp.25-26. 
49 UN Doc. S/25704 ( !993). 
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The principle was later acknowledged by the ICTY itselt_5° The principle is also 
contained in the Rome Statute.51 Transnational criminal law does not fulfil the 
requirements of strict legality under international, let alone domestic legal systems, 
because of its inherent lack of precision. The lack of precision, as will be illustrated 
below, is the result of a desire to ensure rapid conclusion and broad agreement of the 
counter-terrorism instruments. Thus counter-terrorist instruments were never intended 
to define international crimes, they merely seek to establish an minimum agreement 
on the illegitimate use of force by prescribing certain conduct which State are obliged 
to criminalise. 
The principle of strict liability is often is considered redundant in relation to 
international crimes because of a tendency to focus on the most heinous crimes where 
the relationship between the individual and the State is easily forgotten. 52 Although 
the ever expanding scope and application of international law, its growing influence 
on individuals especially in the area of counter-terrorism and the trend to rely on 
international law as a source of legitimacy for repressive actions increasingly 
necessitate a doctrine of restrictive interpretation, i.e.favor rei (in favour of the 
accused). Thus the doctrine has not lost its importance. On the contrary, the doctrine 
of strict legality is becoming ever more important as the influence of international law 
penetrates the domestic sphere. 
In regard to Bassiouni's proposition, that all international crimes imply an 
obligation to co-operate and ensure prosecution of the alleged offender, it should 
further be kept in mind that "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent." 53 This, the so-called principle of pacta tertiis, can be 
seen as a logical consequence of the Lotus principle. Consequently there can be no 
obligation on non-contracting States to comply with the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare: that is, unless this principle has crystallized as a norm of customary 
international law. Given the nature of international law, i.e. a system of independent 
States where rules emanate from their own free will, 54 one should always be careful 
about implying obligations. There might be a right to prosecute international crime, 
50 ICTY, Prosecutor v Milomir Stakic, Judgment of Trial Chamber II (IT-97-24-T), 31 July 2003, para. 
411. 
~ 1]'he_Rome_Statute, Article 22. 
52 See for instance, J. Keegan, 'Saddam deserves the fate of the Nazis', Daily Telegraph 20 October 
2005. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34. 
54 See Case of the SS Lotus, PCIJ Series A No. 10 (1927). 
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even a mandatory obligation under certain instruments, but there is no clear evidence 
of any customary norm requiring compulsory prosecution. The most one could argue 
is that where treaties provide such an obligation, a corresponding customary rule may 
have emerged or be in the process of crystallising. 55 
The counter-terrorism instruments 
The first Part of this thesis argued that the term "terrorism" is not a legal term of 
art and that no international obligation arises with respect to the conduct so described. 
This is important to understand the context of the present analysis because the nature 
of the international system does not presuppose obligations on States. The 
establishment of the counter-terrorism regime was therefore innovative, creating 
novel obligations. The purpose of the second part of this thesis is to provide an 
overview of these new obligations and analysis the individual instruments scope and 
theoretical efficacy. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate that, although in 
formal terms the international accomplishments are considerable, their efficacy is 
limited and their practical application has been negligible. 
The first international attempts to deal with the problem of terrorism took place as 
early as the late 1920s and 1930s under the auspices of international conferences for 
the unification of penallaw.56 Later, the Council of the League of Nations took the 
initiative, as a result of the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the 
French Foreign Minister Barthoru in 1934, to establish a committee with a view of 
drafting an international counter-terrorism convention. 57 This resulted in 1937 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. This Convention was a 
"complete failure". 58 The Convention was signed by 24 States but was only ever 
ratified by India. 
Despite the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism in international 
law, an increasing number of counter-terrorism instruments, sometimes referred to as 
55 A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed., (2003) 264. 
56 S.M. Finger, 'International terrorism and the United Nations', in Y. Alexander (ed), International 
Terrorism, ( 1976) 323. 
57 Ibid. 
58 A. Cassese Terrorism, Politics and Law, (1989) 9. 
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11 suppression conventions 11 , have been agreed. 59 These have gradually expanded the 
list of conduct that could be considered terrorist acts. The following provides and 
overview of the instruments currently in force. 60 
The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board an 
Aircraft 
The first international instrument related to the prevention and suppression of 
terrorism was the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board and Aircraft [Hereinafter the 'Tokyo Convention'].61 Sometimes referred to as 
the "catalyst" of a serious of multilateral conventions concerning problems of 
offences committed against civil aviation.62 It is the first of the so-called counter-
terrorism instruments. 63 1t was not, however, strictly speaking, intended as a counter-
terrorist instrument. In fact, the Convention originates from a question concerning the 
"legal status of aircraft" presented by the Mexican representative at the Sixth Session 
of the legal Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 
1950.64 
The problem concerning aircraft was that many States had not extended their 
criminal jurisdiction to cover these when flying abroad.65 This left open a considerable 
jurisdictional problem, especially over the high seas, where aircraft were literally 
"flying oases of lawlessness".66 The original purpose of the Tokyo Convention was 
59 For the term "suppression conventions" seeN. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression 
Conventions', Human Rights Law Review, (2002) 199-227. 
60 Thus the analysis does not encompass the most recent instrument, the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which opened for signature on 14 September 2005. 
61 The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board and Aircraft, signed on 14 
September 1963, in force 4 December 1969. 
62 A. E. Evans, 'Aircraft and Aviation Facilities', in A. E. Evans and 1. F. Murphy, Legal aspects of 
International Terrorism (1978) 3. 
63 It is the first instrument to be listed in the UN compilation of global and regional instruments on 
terrorism, International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International 
Terrorism, (200 I). 
64 ICAO Document 7035-LC/128, p. 10, referred to by R.P. Boylet and R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air 
Law and Commerce ( 1964) 307. 
65 For case concerning the diffi<::uhies of jurisdiction of crimes committed on board an aircraft sec for 
instance. R. v. Martin [ 1956] 2 QB 272 or USA v. Cordova U.S. District Court E.D. New York, 1950. 
89 F.Supp. 298 
66 B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Airtransport- The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at 
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thus not to establish international jurisdiction nor to define an international crime, but 
to overcome jurisdictional problems by the recognition of the entitlement of States to 
establish jurisdiction of their courts under nationallaws.67 This was not strictly 
necessary since international law leaves States a wide measure of discretion to extend 
and apply their laws and jurisdiction to acts occurring outside their territory, which is 
only limited by certain prohibiting rules.68 The undertaking of the Tokyo Convention 
nonetheless proceeded, primarily establishing obligations for Contracting States to 
establish and assert jurisdiction to prescribe over aircraft of their own registration and 
not so much creating obligations towards other States, with the notable exception of 
Article 11, which deals with hijacking.69 This provision was a last-minute amendment. 
In fact it was not before several years of drafting had elapsed that in March 1962 the 
notion of hijacking was introduced. 70 The proposal to include hijacking in the 
Convention was presented by the United States and Venezuela who viewed the Tokyo 
Convention as an appropriate vehicle to combat this evolving threat. 71 The proposal 
was sponsored by a growing insecurity in civil aviation due to the rise in hijacking 
incidents occurring in the early 1960s.72 
The work on the Tokyo Convention was concluded in 1963. None of the 
obligations in the Convention are onerous and yet the Convention did not attract 
enough ratification to enter into force before 1969.73 That it took six years for the 
Convention to enter into force, ironically with the ratification of the United States, 
which was the most affected State and a most active contributor during the drafting 
process, might, at least to some extent, be explained in a broader perspective of the 
serious events that occurred in the early part of the 1960s, i.e. the Cuban missile crisis, 
extension of the Sino-Soviet rift, the India-China border hostilities, the Cyprus 
International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of Air and Space Law 
(1997) 25. 
67 Cf. .P. Boylet and R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce ( 1964) 317. 
68 Case of the SS Lotus, PCIJ Series A. No. 10 (1927) at 18-19. 
69 B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Airtransport- The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at 
International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of Air and Space Law 
(1997) 25. 
70 P. Boy let and R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed 
on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1964) 325. 
7I/bid.,_CLG. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, International 
Conciliation', (1971) 4 7. 
72 For a Statistic overview of hijacking see A. E Evans, 'Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done', 
American Journal of International Law (1973) 643. 
73 The Tokyo Convention, Article 13(3). 
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dispute, the assassination of President Kennedy, the international war in Yemen, 
among others.74 
Aim and object 
The aim of the Tokyo Convention was twofold. Firstly, it aimed to ensure that in 
the case of offences against penal law on board an aircraft the State of registration 
would always have jurisdiction and, secondly, to authorise the aircraft commander 
and other specified persons to take certain measures to secure the safety of the 
aircraft. 75 This was established through the penal legislation of the Contracting States 
and their discretion in the interpretation of acts, which may jeopardize aviation 
safety.76 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Tokyo Convention, which bears the title of "Convention on offences and 
certain other acts Committed on Board an Aircraft" [emphasis added], offers no 
general definition of any offence. 77 Neither does it offer any guidance as to the 
establishment of an international crime or the concept of terrorism. The only provision 
with any connection to terrorism is Article 11, which provides: 
"When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof an act of interference, 
seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be 
committed, Contracting State shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its 
lawful commander, or to preserve his control of the aircraft." 
This provision establishes the requirement of certain conditions that must be fulfilled 
before "hijacking" is committed, within the meaning of the Convention.78 
74 Cf. N.D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crimes, (1974) 132. See Also A. Abramovsky, 
Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part 
1: The Hague Convention, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1974) 389-91. 
75 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Offences and certain other Acts committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo 
Convention"of 1963', Canadian Yearbook of International Law (I 964) 192. 
76 The Tokyo Convention, Article l(b). 
77 
emphasis added. 
78 For the notion of "hijacking" under the Tokyo Convention seeS. Shubber, 'Is hijacking of aircraft 
piracy in international law, British Yearbook of International Law (1968-69) 194-202. 
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Firstly, the provision clearly narrows the potential group of hijackers, i.e. the 
persons taking control or interfering with the aircraft, to people on board the aircraft. 79 
Secondly, any attempted interference or control has to be unlawfully committed. 
The question of what constitutes unlawful control or interference will according to 
most commentators have to be determined either by reference to the law of the State 
of registration, or the territorial State in whose airspace the plane might be in flight. 80 
Thirdly, an indispensable element of hijacking is the use of force, or threat thereof. 
This naturally implies physical violence but as Sami Shubber argues that it would 
constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the Convention if it did not also entail 
non-physical violence such as for instance the use of certain forms of drug. 81 Shubber 
emphasizes that Article 11 deals specifically with the crime of hijacking even though 
this crime is covered by the general scope of Article l(a). With this in mind, he 
concludes that it cannot reasonably be argued that an act having all of the 
characteristics of hijacking, except the means mentioned in the provision, is not to be 
regarded as an unlawful seizure of an aircraft. 82 This is also concordant with the 
statement made by the Australian representative at the drafting of the Tokyo 
Convention, who stated that 
" ... what the conference was concerned with in the particular case under consideration was the end 
result and not the means by which it had been accomplished. Hijacking of an aircraft might be 
accomplished in many ways other than by violence"83 
This is obviously true for the concept of hijacking, but it does not at first sight seem to 
be coherent with the popular perception of terrorism. 
It is furthermore notable that the Tokyo Convention does not require any specific 
political motive on behalf of the offender. In other words, whether the hijacking is 
intended for political purposes or mere extortion of money, like the incident 
concerning D.B. Cooper, is irrelevant in relation to the fulfilment of the intent (mens 
79 Ibid., at p. 195. 
80 R. P. Boyle and P. Roy, 'The Tokyo Convention on offences and Certain other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft', Journal of Air law and Commerce, 30 (1964) 345. 
81 S. Shubber, 'Is hijacking of aircraft piracy in international law', British Yearbook of International 
Law ( 1968-69) 196. 
82 Ibid., at p. 197. 
83 International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo August-September 1963, vol. I, Minutes, I.C.A.O. Doc. 
8565-LC/152-1, p. 325, paragraph 97. 
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rea) requirement.84 Although it is open for each Contracting States to apply their own 
domestic standards since the Convention does not, unlike later instrument, require the 
criminalisation of the described conduct. 
Jurisdiction 
The spatial application of the Tokyo Convention is restricted by several factors. 85 
The convention only applies to "acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered 
in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight86 or on the surface of the high 
seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State"87 hereby excluding any 
external interference such as sabotage on the ground. Nor does the Convention apply 
to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.88 
The first restriction, limiting the application of the Tokyo Convention to acts 
occurring outside the territory of any State, is a natural result of the aim of the 
Convention, to secure jurisdiction, which is evidently superfluous within the territory 
of a State. 89 Anything further was viewed as an unnecessary intrusion into the purely 
domestic affairs of a Contracting State.90 
The second restriction, the exemption altogether of military or law-enforcing 
agencies, was at that time viewed as a continuation of the customary principle 
applying to piracy, 91 i.e. that States maintain exclusive jurisdiction over their military 
vessels or it was attributed to the fact that the military incidents of hijacking were 
nominal compared with the rising number of commercial offences and consequently 
international attention was only given to the latter.92 This might have been the case at 
that time, but it is worth noting that this so- called "military carve-out" is continued in 
all the so-called counter-terrorism instruments, a feature that will be examined below. 
84 The D.B. Cooper incident concerned a hijacking of a U.S. passenger plane in 1971 where the hijacker 
demanded a parachute as part of his ransom. This was later used to escape the airplane. Cf. generally D. 
Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage since 1930, (1997) 100-10 I. 
85 The Tokyo Convention, Article 1(2-4). 
86 Ibid., Article I (3). 
87 Ibid., Article I (2). 
88 Ibid., Article 1(4). 
89Compare with the Montreal Conventi()!l, A_rticle ~(1). 
90 ci P. Boyl~t·a~d R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1964) 332. 
91 N. D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crimes, (1974) 130. 
92 Ibid. 
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Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Tokyo Convention closely regulates the powers of the aircraft commander. 
Other than that, the Convention obliges contracting States, when "circumstances so 
warrant", to secure the presence of any person suspected of hijacking. 93 Detention or 
other measures must, according to the Tokyo Convention, only be continued for "such 
time as is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be 
initiated."94 Thus the Tokyo Convention specifically provides an obligation of due 
process similar to those contained in human rights instruments.95 
The Tokyo Convention also provides for consular representation. Article 13(3) 
specifically provides that "Any person in custody ... shall be assisted in 
communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of 
which he is a national." This is in all probability not an individual right and 
consequently does not have direct effect in nationallaw.96 Even so, it does create an 
obligation of the State where that person is in custody to assist with communication. 
A literal interpretation of the phrase "be assisted in communication", on the face of it, 
does not require that communication be actually established. Nevertheless, this would 
probably be too literal an interpretation given modem circumstances and the ease of 
communication we enjoy today. A more reasonable interpretation would doubtlessly 
entail a quite far-reaching obligation to ensure that lines of communication were in 
fact established. Any other interpretation would seem to go against the aim and object 
of the provision, effectively rendering the provision redundant. It is important to 
stress, however, that the right to consular communication is a right of the State.97 Thus 
the benefits to the individual from communication may vary significantly depending 
on the domestic law of the detainee and the will of the national authorities. 98 It is 
93 The Tokyo Convention, Article 13(2). 
94 Ibid. 
95 C.f. e.g. ECHR Article 5(3) or ICCPR Article (14). 
% ICJ, La Grand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 200 I. 
97ILC Fifty-sixth Session (3 May to 4 June and 5 July to 6 August 2004), UN Doc. A/CNA/536, Chap. 
7, p. 28. 
98 In Germany for instance the Federal Constitutional Court in the Rudolph Hess case accepted that the 
Federal Republic were~ under a constitutionaLduty to provide diplomatic protection to German 
nationals. Rudolph Hess (Case number 2 BVR4 19/80), 90 International Law Reports 386. Whereas in 
the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeals in the Abassi case held that it could only order the 
Government to give due consideration to the facts of a given case. Beyond this, the Court did not 
believe it possible to make any general proposition. [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, para. 104-105. 
23 
furthermore uncertain, from the wording, whether the provisions require the detaining 
State to initiate communication if the detainee refuses such communication. 
The obligation to establish communication between the detained person and the 
State of nationality is further contained in Article 13(5), which provides that when a 
State has taken a person into custody, then the respective State is under an obligation 
"immediately to notify the State of registration of the aircraft and the State of 
nationality of the detained person". There can therefore be no doubt that the arresting 
State is under an obligation to inform the national State of the person in custody of its 
actions. The Tokyo Convention contains a further commitment, qualified by the 
words "if it [the State holding the person] considers it advisable", to contact any other 
interested State of the respective persons in custody and of the circumstances 
warranting the detention." 
The Tokyo Convention contains no obligation to extradite. In fact, it clearly rejects 
the latter in that Article 16(2) provides "nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to 
create an obligation to grant extradition." Nevertheless, Article 16(1) specifies that 
any offences committed on an aircraft registered in a Contracting State shall be 
treated, for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been committed not only in the 
place in which they have occurred but also in the territory of the State of registration 
of the aircraft. Article 9 further provides the aircraft commander with powers to 
deliver, to the competent authorities in the territory of which the aircraft lands, any 
person whom the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe has 
committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his opinion, is a serious offence 
according to the penal law of the State of registration of the aircraft. In other words, if 
an aircraft is registered in State A and flies between State B and C, then the aircraft 
commander may deliver a person of nationality X to State C (the State of landing) for 
any serious offence in violation of the penal laws of State A (the State of registration), 
provided that the acts in question were committed on board the aircraft. Any 
contracting State to which a person is delivered or in whose territory a hijacked 
aircraft lands shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts of the 
case.99 
The Tokyo Convention contains no express human rights provisions, with the 
possible exception of the obligation to ensure due process for any person taRen into 
99 The Tokyo Convention, Article 13(4). 
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custody. 100 The Convention does, however, contain protection against persecution. 
The Convention neither authorises nor requires "any act in respect of offences against 
penal laws of a political nature or those based on racial or religious grounds." 101 This 
is puzzling when viewing the Convention as a counter-terrorism instrument, because 
this provision might deny the Convention any scope of application in terrorist cases, 
since a successful offender may be received in a third State as a political refugee. 102 
This was for instance the case in 1983, when an Iran Air flight, with 400 people on 
board, on its way from Shiraz to Teheran was hijacked. The hijackers wanted to fly to 
Iraq but agreed instead to go to Paris, where they subsequently surrendered. They 
were sentenced to prison terms, but these were later suspended and they were granted 
political asylum by the French authorities. 103 This was despite French ratification of 
the Tokyo Convention in September 1970. 104 
Despite the Tokyo Convention's lenient wording, there is evidence to suggest that 
States view their obligations as somewhat stricter than the wording would lead one 
too expect. This is apparent in some of the documents released under the 30-year 
rule, 105 giving an insight into the consideration of the UK government during the 1970 
Black September incident. On the 6th of September 1970, four airliners were seized 
by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). They demanded the 
release of Fedayeen (members of the Palestine movement) imprisoned in Germany, 
Switzerland and Israel. Two of the hijacked aircraft were forced to land at the Dawson 
Field airstrip in Jordan and another was taken to Cairo Airport. The fourth hijacking 
failed when the terrorist were overpowered. One was killed while another, a woman 
named Leila Khaled, was arrested. The plane was diverted to Heathrow where Khaled 
was taken into custody. The PFLP demanded Khaled's release. To emphasise their 
demands, the group hijacked another plane a few days later. The PFLP held the all the 
hijacked passengers and crew, more than 400 people of whom 65 were of British 
nationality, as hostages in Jordan. On the 9 of September the Security Council 
adopted a resolution calling for the immediate release of all hostages. 106 The UK 
100 Ibid., Article 13(2). 
101 Ibid., Article 2. 
102 N. D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crimes, ( 1974) 131. 
103 D. Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage since 1930, ( 1997) 81. 104-- -- - - - -
See <www.icao.int/icao/en/lebffokyo.htm>. 
105 Section 5( I) of the Public Records Act 1958, as amended in 1967. Partly replaced by the Freedom of 
Information Act 2005. 
106 Security Council Resolution 286, 9 September 1970. 
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government was faced with a difficult decision. The release of the person in their 
custody, Leila Khaled, was an essential part of the demands made by the PFLP. 
During a cabinet meeting on the 9th of September 1970, officials considered the pros 
and cons of her release. The advantages were - "We should get her out of our area of 
responsibility and should be seen to have fulfilled the PFLP demands and thereby 
saving the lives of the United Kingdom Nationals." The disadvantages on the other 
hand were that, " The pilots and the airlines share the view that that there should be no 
capitulation to blackmail" and in relation to the legal obligations of the UK, "We 
should also be throwing overboard our previously declared attitude on hijacking and 
should lose all credibility in international civil aviation circles. We should also be in 
breach of the Tokyo Convention of 1963."107 Since the Tokyo Convention does not 
provide for any obligation either to extradite or to prosecute this Statement on the law 
seems overstated. It does however provide a rare insight in to the legal obligations felt 
by the UK Government. 
Conclusion 
The Tokyo Convention had several inadequacies as an effective instrument against 
the then growing international problem of aircraft hijacking. 108 It only obliges States 
to take such actions that are "appropriate" thereby leaving a considerable margin of 
appreciation to the Contracting States. Such inadequacy makes it difficult to consider 
the Tokyo Convention a proper counter-terrorist instrument. This is especially true 
because of its very broad political exception clause. 109 It is furthermore doubtful 
whether the Tokyo Convention falls within the category of so-called "suppression 
conventions", i.e. multilateral treaties that oblige States to criminalise certain forms of 
conduct and to provide legal assistance in order to suppress these treaty crimes. 110 
This is so because it does not oblige States to criminalise any conduct. On the 
107 See CM (70) 13th Conclusions, 9th September 1970, Document reference CAB 128/47, Emphasis 
added. 
108 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
(Ofl.Vg_ntiOI], ( 1990) ~ 1. 
109 Article 2. Cf. generally R. P. Boyle and P. Roy, 'The Tokyo Convention on offences and Certain 
other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft', Journal of Air law and Commerce, 30 ( 1964) 333. 
110 N. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions', Human Rights Law Review, 
(2002) 199. 
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contrary, the Tokyo Convention relies to a large extent on already existing penal 
legislation of the Contracting States and only obliges these to take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction as the State of registration over 
offences committed on board an aircraft. 111 Article 11 clearly avoids any attempt 
either to define any crime under international law .112 Thus the line between legitimate 
and illegitimate force, according to the Tokyo Convention, is to be established on the 
basis of domestic law. Neither does the Tokyo Convention establish an obligation to 
extradite. Considerable emphasis is put on the safe return of the aircraft and the 
powers of the commander. Little consideration is, however, given to the obligation 
towards the offender. To refer to the Tokyo convention as a "counter-terrorist 
convention" might thus seem exaggerated. This is at least so, if the term "counter" 
entails anything that refers to deterrence. The Tokyo Convention entails no punitive 
prevention device and only Article 11 directly relates to the phenomenon of terrorism. 
The draft convention did originally contain more potent measures dealing with 
punishment and extradition, but these were taken out early on. 113 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
During the late 1960s the face of hijacking changed from a relatively crude and 
amateurish affair to more violent and highly organised offences. 114 This was partly 
due to the transformation of hijacking into a political weapon. Political fronts started 
to use hijacking as method of international 'blackmail', 115 e.g. extorting money from 
governments, forcing them to consent to the release of prisoners or simply as a way of 
achieving publicity for their demands. 116 The transformation of hijacking, coupled 
111 The Tokyo Convention, Article 3(2). 
112 R. P. Boyle and P. Roy, 'The Tokyo Convention on offences and Certain other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft', Journal of Air law and Commerce, 30 (1964) 345. 
113 See Documents of the Legal Committee, Fourteenth Session, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8302, LC/150-2 at 71 
(1963). 
114 See Address made by E. Me Whinney in the Proceedings of the American Society of International 
law 65th annual meeting concerning the New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: The 
Control of Aerial Hijacking, pp. 71-75. 
115 See Address made-by- K. E. Malmborg in the Proceedings of the American Society of International 
law 65th annual meeting concerning the New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: The 
Control of Aerial Hijacking, pp. 76. 
116 For a listing of such instances see, A. E Evans, 'Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done', American 
Journal of International Law (1973) 644. 
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with the obvious shortcomings of the Tokyo Convention, created a sense of 
"urgency". 117 As a result, the ICAO was in 1968 requested to initiate a study to 
resolve the problem of unlawful seizure of aircraft. 118 This study resulted in the 1970 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [Hereinafter the 
'Hague Convention']. 119 The rapid acceptance and conclusion of the Hague 
Convention may to some extent be attributed to the before mentioned PFLP Hijacking 
spree in September 1970. 120 This was the most dramatic hijacking ever seen and the 
event that signalled the arrival of international terrorism. 121 
At the time of the drafting of the Tokyo Convention there was general consensus 
that the aim was to patch up an existing lacuna in international law. The Hague 
Convention on the other hand was by many seen as a codification of customary 
internationallaw. 122 It is, however, questionable whether at the time of its conclusion 
there was sufficient State practice to sustain this proposition. 123 
Aim and object 
As expressed in the preamble of the Hague Convention, unlawful acts of seizure 
or exercise of control of aircraft in flight jeopardize the safety of persons and 
property, seriously affect the operation of air services and undermine the confidence 
of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation. The Hague Convention was 
accordingly drafted with the purpose of deterring such seizure by providing an 
international obligation to provide for domestic deterrent systems ensuring the 
punishment of offenders. 
117 Ibid., at p. 648. 
118 ICAO Assembly Res. A 16-37, ICAO Doc. 8779 at 92 (1968). 
119 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Signed at The Hague on December 
1970 in force on October 1971. 
120 A. E Evans, 'Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done?', American Journal of International Law 
(1973) 652. 
121 C. Gearty, Terror, (1991) 53. 
122 Cf. Hague Conference, loc. cit., Voi.I, p. 41 paras 44-46. 
123 See Address made by A. E. Evans in the Proceedings of the American Society of International law 
65'h annual meeting concerning the New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: The 
Control of Aerial Hijacking, p. 90. Cf. generally S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague 
Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 700-703. 
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Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Hague Convention does not mention the word "hijacking" but instead 
provides that: 
"Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: 
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises 
control of, that aircraft, or attempts any such act, or 
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act 
commits an offence" 
The Hague Convention does not define an international crime. Nor does it even use 
the expression "unlawful seizure of aircraft". The Convention merely enumerates the 
constituent elements of the "offence", which are to be criminalised in the domestic 
law of Contracting States. 124 There are three essential components of hijacking within 
the meaning of the Hague Convention, which can only be committed while the 
aircraft is in flight. 125 
Firstly, the use of force or threat hereof. This requirement is similar to that of 
Article 11 ( 1) of the Tokyo Convention, and it evidently includes physical violence. 
The definition, however, is on the face of it, wider than that entailed in the Tokyo 
Convention, by virtue of the words "or any other form of intimidation". Sami 
Shubber, relying on the natural interpretation of the word "intimidation", argues that 
this phrase adds nothing to the provision because "it is very difficult to envisage any 
kind of situation on board an aircraft where people are being intimidated, for the 
purpose of hijacking of the aircraft, without the use of force or threat thereof in one 
124 For the concept of hijacking in the Hague Convention see, S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the 
Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', lnternational and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 
689-699. 
125 Flight is defined in Article 3(1). The definition of"flight" within the Hague Convention is wider 
than that entailed in the Tokyo Convention, because it the closure of the external doors and not the 
take-of that is the decisive moment for the commencement of the Convention's application. (Compare 
The Hague Convention Article 3(1) with Tokyo Convention Article I (3). Cf. generally S. Shubber, 
'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970 - A New Regime?', International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 696-699.) The flight, and the application of the Convention, ends 
when the external doors are opened, with the exception of forced landings where the flight is deemed to 
continue until the competent authorities take control of the situation. In comparison, the application of 
the Tokyo Convention ended when the landing runs ends. 
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form or another. .. " 126 Shubber nevertheless concludes that the provision must be 
interpreted more broadly than its normal literal meaning thus covering all forms of 
hijacking irrespective of the use of force or threat hereof. This conclusion is reached, 
despite rejection of a proposal to widen the scope of the provision to cover means 
other than those mentioned, 127 on the basis of reasonableness and the principle that a 
treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with its aim and purpose. 128 One has to agree 
with the conclusion, that hijacking also covers seizure or control over an aircraft 
without the use of force or threat hereof, but it is respectfully submitted that the 
interpretation applied by Shubber is incoherent and based on the false premise that 
intimidation excludes non-forcible measures. Intimidation is not exclusively a result 
of force or the threat hereof as it could be achieved in other ways for instance through 
the use of blackmail. 129 The definition of hijacking in the Hague Convention is 
therefore literally wider than the definition entailed in the Tokyo Convention because 
the wording entails non-forcibly measures. Its drafting history leaves some 
uncertainty as to whether this was the intention of the drafters. The original proposal 
to include "intimidation" was introduced by Japan, who suggested the inclusion of 
psychological force. 130 The Australian delegate supported this initiative and further 
suggested that the provision should read: "by force or threat thereof' as well as "in 
any other manner". 131 This proposal was rejected. 132 The reason for this rejection is 
open to discussion. Shubber views this rejection as a result of unwillingness in the 
parties to include non-forcible measures, 133 whereas Abramovsky suggests that the 
extension was viewed as unnecessary. 134 In any case, when interpreting the intention 
of the parties, it is the common intention of all parties and not the unshared intention 
126 Ibid., at p. 691. See also A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure and Interference With Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law (1974) 393. 
127 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 694. 
128 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 694. 
129 Cf. G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, International 
Conciliation (1971) 53. 
130 ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161 (1970), at. 26. 
131 Ibid., at 27. 
132 See Legal Committee, 17th Session, lac. Cit. P. 28 paras 39 and 41 see also supporting positions, 
ibid. p. 30, para 53. 
133 S. Shuj)b~r. 'Airc:raft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 692. 
134 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1974) 393. 
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of individual States that is in point, a factor that is increasingly difficult to determine, 
rising in proportion with the number of parties. Moreover, since this intent is the very 
goal of interpretation, it cannot exclusively be used as the means of attaining it. 135 One 
cannot therefore conclusively infer that inclusion of the word intimidation was not to 
cover non-forcible measures. 136 This also seems most closely to coincide with the 
meaning of the word "intimidation" and the aim and object of the Convention. The 
scope of the Convention is therefore wider then its predecessor which seems to imply 
that the drafter viewed the threat as more serious and thus were willing to concede 
greater obligations, although this is only a is tentative conclusion given the 
uncertainty of the intention of the provision. 
The second element in the definition of hijacking on the Hague Convention is the 
seizure or exercise of control over the aircraft. 137 Just like the Tokyo Convention, the 
Hague Convention is restricted in its scope to people on board the aircraft. The Hague 
Convention is nevertheless narrower in its scope because it does not include 
"interferences" .138 
The third element of hijacking under the Hague Convention is the requirement that 
the use of force or threat thereof must be "unlawful". The inclusion of "unlawfully" 
serves to emphasis that the conduct must be without legal excuse or justification. 
Consequently, the conduct defined does not include preventive action from the police 
or other governmental forces, for instance in an attempt to regain control of an aircraft 
seized by hijackers. 139 This is a similar to the Tokyo Convention. There is no guidance 
according to which legal system the reference to lawfulness has to be solved. Some 
argue that, similar to the Tokyo Convention, it is the law of the competent 
jurisdiction, i.e. the law of the State of registration, State of landing or the State where 
the alleged offender is found. 140 Pragmatically, and this holds true for the Tokyo 
Convention as well, one could add that it would always be the State of custody that 
would have the final say. 141 This uncertainty may significantly undermine the 
135 Cf. M. koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument, 
(1989) 298. 
136 For an opposite view see I. Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law (2003) 24. 
137 Article I (a). Cf generally, S. Shubber, Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970 - A New 
Regime?, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 694-696. 
138Jhe TQkyo C<>_nvention Article .11 (I). 
139 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 48. 
140 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970 -A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 696. 
141 See below the Lockerbie incident, p. 52. 
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effectiveness of the system because hijacking, within the meaning of the Convention, 
per definition would always involve more than one legal system and a State 
sympathising with the offender may refer to "lawfulness" of the most lenient system 
to avoid prosecution. It should moreover be emphasised that similar to the Tokyo 
Convention, the Hague Convention does not require that the criminalised conduct be 
performed with any particular ideological or political motive. 
Jurisdiction 
In an attempt effectively to combat hijacking the Hague Convention seeks to 
provide jurisdiction for as many States as possible. 142 The Hague convention thus 
attributes jurisdiction to prescribe to any State where an aircraft is registered and the 
State where the aircraft lands, if the hijacker is still on board. 143 Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction may furthermore be based on the lease of an aircraft without crew to a 
person whose principal place of business or residence is in a Contracting State. 144 
More importantly, however, is jurisdiction to prescribe based on the mere presence of 
the offender within the territory of a Contracting State. 145 Thus, potentially, the Hague 
Convention provides concurrent jurisdiction to three, even four States, without any 
priority. 146 
The first, and most uncontroversial, base of jurisdiction is that bestowed the State 
of registration. This is similar to the notion of 'flag State' jurisdiction, which applies 
to ships on the high seas, which is an extension of the territorial principle. 147 Thus a 
State may have jurisdiction to prescribe over an act of hijacking even though it 
142 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1974) 395. 
143 The Hague Convention, Article 4( I )a. 
144 Respectively Article 4(1) (a-c). Cf. generally S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague 
Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 705-716. 
145 The Hague Convention, Article 4(2) "Each contracting State shall likewise take such measures as 
may be !1es:essary_ tQ establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is 
presellf in the territory and does not extradite him ... " 
146 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference 
with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law ( 1974) 396. 
147 Cf. P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International law (7'h ed.), ( 1997) 185. 
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occurred outside its airspace and only involved foreign nationals by the mere 
certification of registration. 148 
The State of landing is also ascribed prescriptive jurisdiction. This jurisdictional 
base is broader than the territorial principle because it may also provide jurisdiction to 
prescribe over an offence that might not have occurred within the territory of the 
prosecuting State. This was in fact the purpose of its inclusion. 149 This jurisdictional 
foundation was inserted to provide a base of jurisdiction where the hijackers would be 
overpowered before entering the territory of the State of landing. In such 
circumstances, and without any other link to the crime, the State of landing would 
have found itself without any authority under traditionally recognised principles of 
jurisdiction to prescribe. 150 This very broad jurisdictional scope, described by Shubber 
as "extra-territorial", did not receive unanimous approval. 151 It was nevertheless 
retained since it was viewed as essential to the aim of securing prosecution. The initial 
resistance does, however, give evidence of the reluctance of some States to exercise 
jurisdiction over events occurring outside their territory or against persons not of their 
nationality, even in relation to terrorism. Such resistance is, however, understandable 
because the Hague Convention applies to "any person on board an aircraft in flight", 
whereas the Tokyo Convention only applied to acts committed on board any aircraft 
"registered in a Contracting State". Hence the State of landing might arguably be 
required to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction of over an act of hijacking occurring 
outside the traditional base of prescriptive jurisdiction of any Contracting State, e.g. if 
the hijacking took place over the high seas, were committed by non-nationals and on 
board an aircraft registered in a non-Party State and the hijackers were overpowered 
before entering the airspace of the State of landing. Such a situation is highly unlikely 
but nonetheless theoretically possible. Likelyhood is moreover, inversely proportional 
to the number of State parties to the Convention. In other words, it was more likely to 
happen in the early years when the Convention had a small number of signatories. The 
reference to the "lawfulness" of the prescribed conduct might alleviate the State of 
landing of any obligation, but this is far from certain. 
I-ll! See the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, (Chicago Convention) Articles 13 and 17. 
149 /J.. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppressio_n of Unlawful Seizure ~md IItterference 
with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1974) 397. 
150 Ibid. 
151 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 709. 
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Jurisdiction based on the principal place of business or permanent residence of the 
lessee is a clear innovation of The Hague Convention and does not fall within any of 
the traditionally established bases of jurisdiction to prescribe. 152 Shubber provides an 
clear example of the wide scope of the provision: if an aircraft is registered in State A 
and leased without crew to a person whose permanent residence is State B, and the 
aircraft is hijacked over the high seas (or in State X) by nationals of State C, then, he 
concludes, there is "no connection whatsoever between State B and the crime"; yet 
State A might still have jurisdiction to prescribe under the Hague Convention. 153 In his 
example Shubber disregards the contentious passive nationality principle where it is 
the nationality of the victim, and not the offender, that is decisive. Previously this was 
anathema to most common law jurisdictions. 154 The theory has, however, increasingly 
been accepted in relation to terrorist acts. 155 
The most innovative and expansive base of prescriptive jurisdiction is that based 
on the mere presence of the offender within the territory of a State. There is no 
requirement of any link between the prosecuting State and the crime. On the contrary, 
the immediate proximity of the offender within the territory of the prosecuting State is 
enough to establish jurisdiction. Thus the offence may be committed by a foreign 
national against a foreign aircraft in foreign airspace, or over the high seas, yet the 
mere presence of the offender within the territory of a Contracting State would entitle 
it to exercise jurisdiction. Shubber regards this as a "new principle in the sphere of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction". 156 Unclear terminology has, however, meant that some 
view the non-existent nexus requirement between the act of hijacking and the 
jurisdiction of the State of detention as a form of universal jurisdiction. 157 This was for 
instance indicated in the Yunis case. 158 The case concerned the hijacking, by Yunis 
152 Ibid. at 710. 
153 Ibid., at 712. 
154 In one of the leading precedents, the Cutting case, the United States challenged Mexico's claim to 
jurisdiction under Mexican libel law to try an American citizen for a publication made in the United 
States. U.S.For.Rel., 1887, pp. 766-767. 
155 Cf. G. Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive offenders in International Law, (1998) lO I. 
156 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 712. 
157 See also the Counter Memorial of The United Kingdom of Belgium 28 September, at 3.3.36-41, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, para 59. For the different terminology see for instance 
A. Cassese, 'When May Senior Officials Be. tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo v. Belgium Case', European Journal of International Law (2002) 855 et seq. 
158 United States of America v. Yunis (No 3), ILR Vol. 88 at 176. In regard to the definition of universal 
jurisdiction see the Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijamans & Buergental, in the Arrest 
Warrant case, para 41. 
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and four others, of a Jordanian passenger plane from Beirut airport in June 1985. The 
hijackers took control of the aircraft shortly before departure and forced the pilot to 
take off immediately. They wanted the plane to fly to Tunis but were refused landing 
and consequently had to return to Beirut. After a press conference in Beirut, where the 
hijackers reiterated their demands of all Palestinians leaving Lebanon, the hostages, 
among them two United State nationals, were released and the plane blown up. Yunis 
was identified as the probable leader of the hijackers and the FBI was ordered to 
secure his arrest. In 1987 FBI agents lured him on board a yacht in the Mediterranean 
and arrested him in international waters. The agents then transferred him to the United 
States where he was charged with several offences. He was convicted of conspiracy, 
hostage taking and aircraft damage. 159 He appealed; stating inter alia that the court 
lacked jurisdiction and the purported exercise of jurisdiction had violated established 
principles of international law. Yunis had been tried under the 1974 U.S. 
Antihijacking Act, which inter alia was an implementation of the Hague Convention. 
The Antihijacking Act stated that persons prosecuted for air piracy must be "found" 
within the United States. 160 It was argued that this precluded prosecution of hijackers 
that were "brought" within the United States to stand trial. The Court of Appeals, 
however, rejected this "fact-specific" argument. They further stated that the relevant 
act had to be interpreted in accordance with the wording of the Hague Convention, 
"present within the territory", which did not indicate any voluntarism. According to 
the Court of Appeal, this was reinforced by the obligation of the United States to 
extradite or prosecute offenders in their custody. They therefore found that 
international law did not restrict the statutory jurisdiction of the Antihijacking Act, 
adding further that: 
"Aircraft hijacking may well be one of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations 
that States may assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the State has no 
territorial connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved."161 
It is important to note, however, that the Court of Appeals did not rely on universal 
jurisdiction but merely stated its availability. It might be added that the Government 
of the United St~tes in its appellate brief argued that "the universal and passive 
159 Respectively 18 U.S.C § 371 (1988), 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988) and 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (1988). 
160 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n). 
161 United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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nationality theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction together provided ample ground ... 
to assert jurisdiction over Yunis". 162 
This almost unrestrained base of jurisdiction to prescribe raises some obvious 
questions, especially in relation to non-State Parties. To draw a parallel, the single 
most problematic part of the Rome Statute for the United States was Article 12, which 
delegates territorial jurisdiction of State Parties to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), potentially also covering over nationals of non-Party States. 163 This was the 
main reason for which the United States objected to the establishment of the ICC, 164 
even though the United States several times has itself exercised adjudicative 
jurisdiction over a foreign national under legislation implementing an international 
treaty providing extra-territorial jurisdiction. This was so in the above-mentioned 
Yunis case. 165 Likewise in the Rezaq case the United States exercised extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, also this time under laws inter alia implementing the Hague Hijacking 
Convention. 166 Rezaq was a Palestinian national, but according to Madeline Morris 
this made little difference since the United States does not recognize the normal 
attributes of statehood in relation to Palestine. 167 Professor Michael P. Scharf has 
pointed to other inconsistencies in the U.S. position. 168 He mentions, among others, 
several cases in which the United States has asserted adjudicative jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Hostages Convention over Chinese, China not being party to the 
Convention. 169 The main difference between these cases and the ICC is, according to 
Madeline Morris, is that no State objected to the extra-territorial prosecution of the 
162 Brief for the United States at 32-43, United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d I 086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) United 
States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991 ). It might be added that the Court also referred to the 
draft of the Restatement, which mentioned that the theory "has been increasingly accepted when 
applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a State's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to 
assassinations of a State's ambassadors, or government officials." This was later adopted in the final 
version (Restatement (Third) Of the Foreign Relations of the United States § 404 (1987). 
163 Cf. David Scheffer (U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues), 'International Criminal 
Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, The Violence: Panel Summary: The Future of the International 
Criminal Court', Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. Proc. 69 (1999) 69. 
164 M. Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 64 LCP I (200 I) 14. 
165 Yunis was a Lebanese national but Lebanon never objected to his prosecution in the United States. 
This might have been because Lebanon was a Party to the Hague Convention. Ibid. at 63. 
166 United States .v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
167 M. Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 64 LCP I (2001) 63. 
168 M. P. Scharf, 'The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: S Critique of the U.S. 
Position', 64 Law & Contemporary Problems. 67 (Winter 200 I) 99. 
169 See United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F. 3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Ni Fa Yi, 951 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Chen De 
Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Cf. United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
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conduct criminalised under the counter-terrorist conventions. 170 The jurisdictional 
provisions of the counter-terrorism treaties have thus been accepted, or acquiesced to, 
whereas the objection by the United States to the Rome Statute prevents persuasive 
consensus, thus precluding it instant customary status. 171 
The Hague Convention provides not only for distinct bases of jurisdiction to 
prescribe and adjudicate it also obliges each Contracting State to "take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him ... " The 
obligation to establish jurisdiction was, according to Judge Guillaume, a "conscious 
turning point in the combating of hijacking." 172 From this point on, the obligation to 
prosecute was no longer conditional on the existence of jurisdiction, but rather 
jurisdiction itself had to be established in order to make prosecution possible. 173 The 
broad jurisdictional scope of the Hague Convention can be seen as an expression of 
the intentions of the drafters to close all possible gaps and therefore also the 
seriousness with which the threat of hijacking was viewed, as illustrated by the UK 
delegate at the Hague Conference, who stated, 
"that normally his country did not accept the principle that the mere presence of an alleged offender 
within the jurisdiction of a State entitled that State to try him. In view, however, of the gravity of the 
offence ... he was prepared to support ... [the proposal on mandatory jurisdiction on the part of the State 
where a hijacker is found]" 174 
This clearly testifies to the seriousness with which the threat was viewed and the 
lengths to which States were willing to go to eradicate the menace of hijacking and to 
create an effective transnational criminal regime. 
170 M. Morris, 'High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States', 64 LCP I (2001) 62. 
171 Ibid., at 60. 
172 S_ep(lr(ltt: <minion of President Guillaume, Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of I I April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 14 February 2002, para. 7. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Quoted in S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 712. 
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Obligation of criminal co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Hague Convention borrows heavily from the Tokyo Convention but also goes 
further than the latter, e.g. by extending the scope of application, requiring each 
Contracting State to provide a basis of prosecution - regardless of where the hijacking 
occurred, requiring States to submit the case to the competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution and by providing for the notion of an accomplice. 175 The most 
important development introduced by The Hague Convention, in relation to criminal 
co-operation, was the introduction of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, 176 
according to which: 
"the Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not 
extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed 
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
serious nature under the law of that State." 
The Hague Convention thereby builds on a on a principle similar to that applied to 
grave breaches within the Geneva Conventions. 177 Importantly, it does not amount to 
an obligation to prosecute per se but merely obliges the respective State to present the 
case to the competent prosecuting authorities. 178 These then have to proceed in a 
manner consistent with normal practice, acting within the law applicable to criminal 
offences of a similar serious nature. In other words, States are required to treat 
terrorism as ordinary but serious crime. Thus if the evidence available does not 
establish a prima facie, case and this under normal circumstances prohibits the 
initiation of proceedings, then there will be no breach of the Convention if 
175 Article 1(b). The term accomplice only covers people on board an aircraft. Cf. generally A. 
Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with 
Aircraft Part 1: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1974) 394. 
176 This system is predicated on the maxim of Hugo Grotius (See H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 
Book II, Chapter XXI,§ IV(1) (1624) in The Rights of War and Peace (A. Campbell trans. 1901) aut 
dedere aut pun ire, which was re-phrased by Bassiouni as aut dedere aut judicare (See M.C. Bassiouni, 
llltematior)al Extradition and World Public Order (1974) 7. 
177 See below p. 65. 
178 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1974) 398. 
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prosecution is not undertaken. 179 Even though the obligation under the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle is not absolute, some still regard it as a success because it has been 
copied in other instruments. 180 The introduction of the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle can, according to Lissitzyn, be viewed as a reflection of State's willingness 
to overcome the impediment, inherent in the existing diversity, and to develop an 
effective international criminal system. 181 It might further be added, that it also gives 
some insight into how far States are willing to acquiesce to international obligations in 
relation to an acknowledged international problem. 
To facilitate extradition, Article 8 of the Hague Convention includes hijacking as 
an extraditable offence in present and future extradition treaties, thereby establishing a 
principle facilitating the prosecution of the alleged offender similar to the provisions 
of the Genocide Convention and the four Geneva Conventions. 182 Shubber takes the 
position that this excludes hijacking from the political offence exception. He writes: 
"According to Article 8, para.!, all Contracting Parties undertake to consider hijacking of aircraft an 
offence the perpetrator of which can be extradited. This means that, if previously some States could 
claim hijacking was a political offence and as such was not covered by extradition treaties, this plea in 
183 
no longer" 
On the face of it, this argument seems persuasive, but a more thorough analysis of the 
provision leads to an opposite conclusion. Article 8 reads in full: 
"I) The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty 
existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offence as an 
extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 
179 D. Costello, 'International terrorism and the development of the principle of Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare', Journal oflnternational Law & Economics (1975) 487. 
180 B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Airtransport- The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at 
International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of Air and Space Law 
( 1997) 33. Mentioning the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
internationally Protected Persons ( 1973) and the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
(1977). 
181 Cf. Address made by 0. J. Lissitzyn in the Proceedings of the American Society of International law 
651h annual meeting concerning the New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: The 
Control of Aerial Hijacking. 
182 Respectively, Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide ( 1948) 
Article VII, Geneva I, Article 49, Geneva II, Article 50 Geneva III, Article 146, Geneva IV, Article 
150. 
183 S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1973) 718. 
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2) If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at 
its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. 
Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 
3) Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall 
recognize the offence as an extraditable offence between themselves subject to the conditions provided 
by the law of the requested State." 
Shubber's argument is convincing in relation to subparagraph 1. However, both 
subparagraphs 2 and 3, makes it clear, at least in relation to extradition in the two 
mentioned scenarios, that Article 8 does not require any modification of the existing 
law. Instead, extradition is subject to the conditions of the requested State, which may 
or may not provide for extradition. This leads to the conclusion that also subparagraph 
1 does not exclude the political offence exception. Any other interpretation would 
mean that the Contracting States were under different legal obligations depending on 
their prior commitments in relation to extradition. 184 States, which enter into or have 
entered into extradition treaties, are would therefore be more restricted than States 
with no prior obligation, at least according to the interpretation suggested by Shubber. 
This is so despite the fact that these general extradition treaties might have no relation 
to the Hague Convention. The interpretation suggested by Shubber is therefore 
unreasonable and does not conform to the principle of reciprocity, which is a general 
principle of international law .185 FitzGerald writes that Article 8 was the outcome of a 
"labyrinthine drafting process." He further writes that: 
"In 1969, at the first session of the ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 
United States had proposed that the alleged offender be surrendered but the State in which he was 
present to the State of registration of the aircraft even in circumstances where the hijacking had taken 
place for political motives. Nevertheless, in the Subcommittee, a majority of nine members against 
184 This would for instance mean that a Contracting State under the Hague Convention, whose national 
law provides for the political offence exception, could rely on this exception when it was requested to 
extradite an offender to another State with which it did not have an extradition agreement. The same 
State could not, however, rely on the same political offence exception if it were requested by another 
Contracting State with which it already had,an extradition treaty, despite the fact thatthe treaty might 
explicitly provide for a political offence exception; whereas, States that generally do not require any 
extradition treaties are in a position where they may rely on the political offence exception if this is a 
condition provided for in the law of the requested State. 
185 See mutatis mutandis Norwegian Loans case, P.C.I.J. Reports 1957, p. 9. 
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three believed that any State, whether or not it was the State in the territory of which the offender left 
the aircraft, may refuse extradition of the alleged offender in accordance with its national law - for 
example, when the offender was its own national, or was seeking asylum from persecution, or acted 
from political motives. The minority, including the United States, took the view that the existence of 
political motives should not be a basis for refusal of extradition. After this session, the minority view 
never received serious support in any of the bodies discussing extradition' .186 
The Convention is conspicuously silent on the matter of the political offence 
exception, especially when compared with other instruments facilitating extradition. 
For example, the 1948 Convention for the Prevention of Genocide specifically 
provides in Article 7 that: "Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall 
not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition." Similarly, the 
1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid States in Article IX(l) that: "Acts enumerated in article II of the present 
Convention shall not be considered political crimes for the purpose of extradition." 
One vital difference exists between these instruments and the Hague Convention, 
since the former established crimes under international law whereas the Hague 
Convention merely obliges States to criminalise the relevant conduct under its 
domestic law. Nevertheless, the clear wording of these other instruments is in stark 
contrast to the Hague Convention. This is despite the formulation in the Genocide 
Convention being drafted before the Hague Convention and generally well known. 
There can accordingly be no doubt that if the drafters had wished to exclude the 
political offence exception, then the wording would have been more unambiguous. 
Thus Article 8 does not exclude hijacking from the political offence exception, but 
merely amends the list of extraditable offences, which simply means that aircraft 
hijacking is one of the crimes for which extradition may be granted. 187 Thus a State 
may refuse extradition on the basis of the political offence exception. Importantly, 
however, it would still be obliged to present the case to the relevant authorities in 
accordance with the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. 
This rather vague provision can, according to Lissitzyn, be attributed to the large 
opposition to a mandatory extradition provision. He writes, that a large proportion of 
186 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', ll}temational 
Conciliation ( 1971) 60. 
187 See, however, the 1977 European Convention on The Suppression of Terrorism, which provides that 
defined terrorist activities shall not be regarded as a political offence so as to prevent extradition, 
Article I. 
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drafting States was not prepared to deprive hijackers escaping from totalitarian 
regimes the protection of due process of law if retumed. 188 This was despite 
supporters of a mandatory provision including such powerful countries as the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 189 The effect of the discretionary wording of the 
extradition provision is enhanced by the fact that the State of custody de facto has sole 
discretion as to whether the conduct falls within the political offence exception. 190 This 
might seriously undermine the effectiveness of the Hague Convention and of the 
whole system of national prosecution of terrorist offenders. 191 The system established 
by the Hague Convention does therefore provide a loophole allowing States not to 
prosecute or extradite, at least for as long as the case is presented to the competent 
authorities. 192 This legal ambiguity of the aut dedere aut judicare principle is also 
present in the 1984 Torture Convention. A fact that may have been exploited by the 
Danish authorities in relation to the prosecution of the former Israeli Ambassador 
Gillon for admitted acts of torture. 193 
Similar to the Tokyo Convention the Hague Convention also provides for an 
obligation to take the alleged offender into custody. 194 Article 6(1) provides that: "The 
custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of the State but may only 
be continued for such time as is necessary to enable criminal or extradition 
proceedings to be instituted." 195 The alleged hijacker must therefore be treated in 
accordance with domestic law, as any other criminal, and the proceedings must be 
conducted with due process. This includes that the detention must not be 
188 See address made by 0. 1. Lissitzyn in the Proceedings of the American Society of International 
law 65'h annual meeting concerning the New Developments in the Law oflnternational Aviation: The 
Control of Aerial Hijacking, p. 84. 
189 Cf. A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part 1: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
( 1974) 400-405. A number of countries have accede to bilateral or multilateral treaties requiring 
extradition regardless of motive, Cf. V. Epps, 'Abolishing the Political offence exception', M. C. 
Bassiouni (ed.), Legal Response to International Terrorism- U.S. Procedural Aspects. 
190 M. C. Bassiouni, 'Ideologically motivated offences and the political offence exception in extradition 
-a proposed juridical standard for an unruly problem', De Paul Law Review ( 169) 222. 
191 SeeR. I. R. Abeyratne, 'Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for the 
Management of the Offence of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation', Transport law Journal 
(1998) 118-119. 
192 Cf. A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part I: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(1974) 399. For an opposite view see, S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 
1970- A New Regime?', International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 717-719. 
193 Cf. 1. Hartmann, 'The Gillon Affair', 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) 745-
755. 
194 The Hague Convention, Article 6( 1 ). 
195 Ibid., Article 6(1 ). 
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disproportional in length when compared to its aim, i.e. enabling criminal or 
extradition proceedings to be instituted. 
The Hague Convention also contains a provision on consular protection, identical 
with that contained in the Tokyo Convention. 
In relation to criminal co-operation, Article 10 requires that Contracting States 
shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought in connection with conduct falling within the scope of the 
Convention. The Convention does not specify what this obligation might entail. 
Neither, however, does it specify any grounds on which co-operation may be refused. 
It is therefore difficult to conceive any specific obligation that may born out of this 
rather amorphous provision other than a general requirement of good faith. 
Conclusion 
The Hague Convention was the first proper counter-terrorist convention and model 
for subsequent instruments. It was the first counter-terrorism instrument to introduce 
the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, which was not only copied into latter counter-
terrorist conventions but also other instruments, such as the UN Torture 
Convention. 196 The Hague Convention was also the first in a series of instruments 
containing an enumerative formula of separate offences which contracting States 
consent to criminalise in their national legislation. It is therefore the first of the so-
called "suppression conventions". 197 Like its Tokyo counterpart, the Hague 
Convention does not require any specific motive. The lack of any such requirement 
means that the Convention applies to all acts of hijacking. This has led to some debate 
concerning the importance of motive in relation to terrorist crimes. Joseph J. Lambert, 
in his commentary on the Hostages Convention, quotes Axel P. Schmidt who in his 
extensive work, 'Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data 
bases, and literature' criticised the enumerative method applied in most counter-
terrorist instruments, including the Hague Convention, saying that "[t]he nature of 
I% For a list of intruments see ILC Preliminary report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute ("aut 
dedere aut judicare"), 7 June 2006, UN Doc. A/CN .4/571. 
197 N. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions', Human Rights Law Review, 
(2002) 199. 
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terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself' .198 In response hereto, Lambert 
argues that simply because a hijacker is not really a "terrorist" in the sense that he is 
trying to instil "terror" does not mean that his act not reprehensible. He continues: 
"With respect to the hijacker or hostage taker who is trying to escape a repressive or terroristic regime, 
as a moral or legal matter it may be queried whether even an oppressed person should be given the 
right to take hostages or hijack a civil aircraft in order to gain his freedom. As a practical matter, an 
explicit exception on that basis would be so subjective as to be unworkable: who would decide what 
States are terror regimes? ... Any international co-operation on the subject would break down 
immediately. The decision to make all such acts illegal, regardless of the underlying motivation, was 
the only way to achieve and keep any sort of international consensus" 
Despite the Hague Convention's unqualifying criminalisation of hijacking, it does not 
exclude the application of legal justifications and excuses, even in the scenario 
painted by Lambert. This was in fact illustrated in the Safi case. 199 The case concerned 
the hijacking of an aeroplane from Afghanistan to England. During the hijacking the 
plane landed in several places, including in Moscow, before finally landing at 
Heathrow, England, were the hijackers surrendered after three days of negotiation. 
The hijacker was later prosecuted inter alia on the count of hijacking under the 1982 
Aviation Security Act s.1(1). The first jury to try the case was unable to agree on a 
verdict and a re-trial was ordered where the hijackers were convicted. The case was 
appealed on grounds of a material misdirection of the jury. The hijackers had argued 
the defence of duress because, as they submitted, they had no other way of escaping 
death or serious injury at the hands of the Taliban Regime, then in Power in 
Afghanistan. 
The defence of duress, although available, was highly questionable since the 
hijackers landed in several countries before reaching the United Kingdom. The 
possibility of the defence of duress was in relation to hijacking was first established in 
the Abdul-Hussain case. 200 Here, the hijackers were Shiite Muslim fugitives from the 
Saddam regime living in Sudan. Fearing return to Iraq in 1996 they hijacked a plane 
and flew to Stansted, England. They believed that they would face the death penalty if 
returned to Iraq. The judge ruled that the defence of duress should not be left to the 
-
198 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law- a Commentary on the Hostages 
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jury because the threat of death was insufficiently close and immediate. The Court of 
Appeals forcefully overturned this ruling.201 In the Safi case the Court of Appeals 
likewise overturned the lower court's decision since the judge had directed the jury to 
apply an objective, as apposed to a subjective test, for the defence of duress. Both 
cases thus allowed for the defence of duress. 
The availability of the defence of duress or other exculpating defence may 
seriously hamper the effectives of the counter-terrorism regime. The Convention itself 
is silent on the matter. The forms of conduct defined in the counter-terrorism 
instruments are not, however, crimes in or against international law but national 
crimes and as such subject to domestic criminal law and procedure. Diverse legal 
systems therefore allow for a variety of distinct legal defences, potentially creating 
great uncertainty of application in the system as a whole, 202 especially if the judiciary 
is influenced politically or by other considerations. As correctly pointed out by 
Lambert: "who would [or should, it might be added] decide what States are terror 
regimes". 
This is not the only uncertainty it relation to the counter-terrorism system initiated 
by the Hague Convention. There are other serious flaws that allow States legitimately 
to evade the underlying obligation of securing prosecution or extradition, especially if 
the prosecution authorities are not immune to political influence. The system 
nonetheless represents the highest attainable level of transnational criminal co-
operation available at the time. 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation 
Even before the work on the Hague Convention had been completed, its 
deficiencies were already evident. The Hague Convention only covered the unlawful 
201 In the word of Vice President Rose: "If Anna Frank had stolen a car to escape from Amsterdam and 
been charged-with-theft, the tenets of English law would not, in our judgment, have denied here a 
defence of duress of circumstances, on the ground that she should have waited for the Gestapo's knock 
on the door." Ibid. 
202 For an overview of the defence of duress in different jurisdictions see Prosecutor v. Drazen 
Erdemovic, Judgment of 7 October 1997, Case No. IT-96-22-T. 
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seizure of aircraft and only while the aircraft was "in flight" and it did not therefore 
address the growing problem of unlawful interference not committed from within the 
aircraft, such as sabotage. 203 The ICAO Assembly therefore adopted a resolution 
directing the ICAO Council to convene a legal committee for the preparation of a 
draft convention on acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation 
other than those covered by the draft convention on unlawful seizure of aircraft. 204 
This culminated in the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [hereinafter the 'Montreal Convention'].205 
Aim and object 
The objectives of the Montreal Convention and those of the Hague convention are 
identical. Their primary concern is a multilateral response ensuring deterrence and 
punishment of unlawful acts against international civil aviation. There common aim is 
evident from their identical preambles and the extensive copying of provisions from 
The Hague to the Montreal Convention. In fact, the only difference is the nature of the 
offence targeted because otherwise the mechanism that is used in the Montreal 
Convention is identical with that of the Hague Convention. 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The problem facing the drafters of the Montreal Convention was to choose 
between a short abstract formula, which would cover the substantial number of 
offences intended to come under the convention or an enumerative formula containing 
separate definitions of the offences concerned.206 No short comprehensive formula 
could be agreed upon and the following list of enumerative offences of unlawful 
interference with aircraft was adopted: 
203 P. S. Dempsey, 'Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism', Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law (2003) 657. 
204 Cf. I.L.M 9 (1970) 1183. 
205 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Concluded in 
Montreal on 23 September 1971. In force 26 January 1973. 
206 Cf. G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
Conciliation ( 1971) 67. 
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"Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that 
act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or 
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders 
is incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or 
(c) places or causes to be places on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, 
a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage 
to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely 
to endanger its safety in flight; or 
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if 
any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or 
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the 
safety of and aircraft in flight." 
The scope of the Convention was further extended in 1998 by a supplementary 
Protocol, further including any act of violence against a person at an airport serving 
international civil aviation, which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death 
as well as any act that destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving 
international civil aviation if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at 
that airport. 207 
The list of criminalised conducts entailed in the Montreal Convention is far more 
comprehensive than those of previous instruments and a more detailed examination is 
required. 
The Montreal Convention lists five offences all of which have the dual requisite of 
unlawfulness and intent, also applicable to attempts and complicity.208 As with the 
Tokyo and Hague Conventions the inclusion of the term "unlawful" serves to exclude 
conduct that is legally justifiable.209 It is noteworthy that all the described offences 
have a minimum threshold incorporated at the end of each paragraph so that only acts 
207 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation(1988) Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation Done at Montreal on 24 February 1988 
208 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
Conciliation (1971) 67. 
209 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 80. 
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that are "likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight" fall within the scope of 
Article 1. 
Subparagraph (a) covers acts of violence against a person on board an aircraft in 
flight. This naturally covers any physical use of force intended to hurt or kill a person 
on board the aircraft so long as this act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft 
in flight. The requirement that the act must endanger the safety of the aircraft does 
however create some uncertainty as to the scope of this provision. It is evident that not 
all acts of violence are covered. A scuffle between unruly passengers, for instance, 
might not fulfil this requirement. Abramovsky goes so far as to suggest that even the 
intentional killing of a passenger on board an aircraft might not fulfil the requirement 
of endangering the safety of the plane, unless the tumult and panic caused by such an 
act would constitute the necessary threat. 210 Violence against the pilot or navigator, on 
the other hand, would undisputedly endanger the safety. It is more uncertain whether 
violence against the stewards/stewardess would fall within the scope of Article 
l(l)(a). This might be seen as an over legalistic discussion but violence on board civil 
aircraft is far from uncommon. 211 Violence against the stewards/stewardess might not 
sine qua non endanger the safety of the aircraft, but since the training of the 
stewards/stewardess is vital in emergencies, an argument could be advanced that any 
obstruction of their functions is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft. 212 
Fitzgerald further argues that the term "violence" may also be interpreted to mean not 
only an armed attack or physical assault, but also cover the administration of 
poison/13 including from outside the aircraft since the Convention, unlike the previous 
conventions, has no requirement that the offender is on board the aircraft. If, 
however, as suggested by Abramovsky, the intentional killing committed by a person 
on board is not enough to fulfil the requirement of endangering the safety of the 
aircraft, then neither would poisoning, unless of course the poisoned person is the 
210 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
14 (1975) 285. 
211 SeeS. R. Ginger, 'Violence in the Skies: The right Rights and Liabilities of Air Carriers when 
Dealing with Disruptive Passengers', Air and Space Law, Vol. XXlll Number 3, 1998, p. 106. 
212 A. t\bram_Qvsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
14 (1975) 285. 
213 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
Conciliation ( 1971) 68. 
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captain or some other essential personnel. Since it is not a prerequisite that the 
offender is on board the aircraft, then actions committed from the ground, e.g. 
shelling, could also fall within the ambit of Article l(l)(a) provided that is causes 
harm to an essential person on board the aircraft. This would, however, also fall 
within the scope of Article 1 ( l )(b). One should further add that any violence 
committed on board the aircraft serious enough to pass the minimum threshold of the 
Montreal Convention would also, in most instances, fall within the scope of the Hague 
Convention. 214 
Subparagraph (b) covers any act that destroys, damages, renders the aircraft 
incapable of flight or is likely to endanger its safety in flight. Firstly of things to note 
is the wide temporal scope of this paragraph, because it not only covers the aircraft 
"in flight" but also whilst "in service". 215 There is no requirement that the offender be 
onboard the aircraft. The provision therefore covers attacks from the ground, such as 
shelling and the use of shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, which have been 
used on a number of occasions to bring down commercial aircraft. 216 Nor is it a 
prerequisite that there be any threat, injury or death of passengers. In fact, 
subparagraph (b) is not intended cover acts against passengers or crew. Instead, its 
scope is aimed at acts directed at the aircraft itself. 217 The lowest threshold is the 
causing of damage that is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight. This 
could be damage to inexpensive but vital parts, such as wiring.218 This is so for any act 
committed from beginning of pre-flight preparation until 24 hours after landing.219 
Subparagraph (c) covers the use of bombs or other incendiary or destructive 
devices or substances, likely to destroy or damage the aircraft. The method of 
bringing the device on board is left open ended by the insertion of the words "by any 
means whatsoever", including, sending luggage with a bomb on a plane, as allegedly 
214 See Hague Convention, Article I (I )(a). 
215 For the definition of "in service" see the Montreal Convention, Article 2(b). 
216 J. S. Szyliowicz, 'Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27 
(2004)55. 
217 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
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218 Ibid. 
219 The Montreal Convention, Article 2(b). 
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happened in the Lockerbie incident. The broad scope of this paragraph attempts to 
encompass all possible situations involving explosives or other destructive devices. 220 
Subparagraph (d) covers destruction, damage or interference of air navigational 
facilities, but only if these are used in international navigation. 221 The term "air 
navigation facilities" is based on Article 28 of the 1944 Chicago Convention222 and 
refers to such facilities as airport control towers and radio and meteorological 
services. 223 
Subparagraph (e) concerns the situation where a person knowingly communicates 
false information to an aircraft and thereby endangers the safety of the flight. The 
threshold of "effect on the safety of the flight" is higher than in the previous 
paragraphs. The use of "thereby" indicates that the danger must occur as a result of 
the communication and not, as in the preceding paragraphs, be "likely" to occur. The 
provision was introduced to deal with the issue of bomb hoaxes. 224 There was some 
discussion during negotiation whether the respective provision should refer to 
extortion or diversion, but this was nonetheless left out. 225 The aim of any hoaxer is 
therefore irrelevant provided that he fulfils the requirement of unlawfully and 
intentionally communicating the false information. The provision thus has very wide 
potential scope and could cover situations that were not thought of at the time of 
drafting, e.g. so-called cyber terrorism.226 
220 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
14 (1975) 286. 
221 The Montreal Convention, Article 4(5). 
222 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944. 
223 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, International Conciliation 
(1971) 69. 
224 Ibid., at p. 70. 
225 Ibid. 
226 A 'terrorist' could potentially hack into an air traffic control system where he would add false 
information for.instance about the aircraft location, altitude and speed etc. Thereby causing the air 
traffic controller to give the pilot falls information. This might not cause a midair collision; since pilots 
routinely double-check such information with their own data, but it would arguable endanger the safety 
of aircraft in flight. See J. S. Szyliowicz, Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 27 (2004) 49. 
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It is apparent that the Montreal Convention has very broad scope of application 
despite not applying to aircraft used in military, customs or police services. 227 The two 
previous conventions were mostly applicable in relations between individuals and a 
State, because of the prerequisite that the act in question take place on board an 
aircraft, which in most cases would not involve a State actor. The Montreal 
Convention, on the other hand, has no such limitation. This means that civilian 
airliners that are shot down by military forces either because they are mistaken for 
military aircraft or the victims of faulty judgment may fall within the scope of its 
operation. This is not uncommon.228 For instance, in 1999, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) brought an application before the ICJ in which it sought to 
establish jurisdiction based on the compulsory jurisdiction clause in Article 14 of the 
Montreal Convention, alleging that in 1998 a civil aircraft had been shot down by the 
forces of Rwanda, Uganda or Burundi. The DRC later discontinued proceedings but 
reserved the right to invoke new grounds of jurisdiction.229 In 2002, the DRC again 
instituted proceedings, this time against Rwanda, for "massive, serious and flagrant 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law". The DRC inter alia 
relied on Article 14 of the Montreal Convention to establish jurisdiction and asked the 
Court, as its third submission, to declare that by shooting down a Boeing 727 owned 
by Congo Airlines on 9 October 1998 in Kindu, Rwanda had violated the United 
Nations Charter and other international instruments but also the Hague Convention 
and the Montreal Convention. The assertion made by the DRC that there should be 
jurisdiction on the basis of the Hague Convention is highly questionable. The 
application of the Montreal Convention on the other hand, on the face of the 
allegations, is undeniably correct. The Court made its final judgment on the 19th 
December 2005.230 No specific considerations were made about the shooting down of 
their passenger plane or the Montreal Convention. This is not, however, the only case 
to reach the ICJ. In 1989 the Islamic Republic of Iran instituted proceedings against 
the U.S. for the destruction of an Iranian airplane and the killing of 290 passengers, on 
3 July 1988. This application was likewise based inter alia on the Montreal 
Convention. 
227 The MQntte~tl Conventio_n, Article_.4( 1). 
228 See D. Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage since 1930, ( 1997) 104-117. 
229 I.C.J. Yearbook 2000-2001, Vol. 55, p. 286. 
230 ICJ, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005 
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The case was later settled out of court and the case discontinued in 1996.231 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdictional scope of the Montreal Convention is in many respects similar to 
that of its predecessor and counterpart the Hague Convention.232 The former entails a 
further jurisdictional base because it also entails a mandate to prescribe based on 
territorial jurisdiction,233 which is essential, given its aim of covering acts of sabotage 
on the ground, but not necessary under international law. In conformity Tokyo and 
Hague Conventions the Montreal Convention further establish jurisdiction to 
prescribe for conduct committed on board aircraft in the State of registration.234 
Identical with the Hague Convention, the Montreal convention further confers 
jurisdiction to the State of landing. 235 Significantly, the Montreal Convention also 
obliges States to establish jurisdiction, with the exception of the destruction of 
navigation facilities or communication of false information, in the case where the 
alleged offender is present within the territory. 236 
Obligation of criminal co-operation and human rights limitations 
As mentioned above, the Montreal Convention contains a provision establishing a 
duty to secure the effective exercise of jurisdiction over the alleged offender, identical 
to that in the Hague Convention. This provision further provides that if an alleged 
offender is within the territory of a Contracting State, then that State has a duty either 
to present the case to its competent authorities or to extradite, i.e. the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare. 237 This provision was the focal point of the Locker hie case. On 
231 Order of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 1996 case of Aerial incident of 3 July 
1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). 
232 Cf. generally A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
and Interference with Aircraft Part I I: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law (1975) 268-300. 
233 Tile Montreal Convention, Article 5(1 )(a). 
234 The Montreal Convention, Article 5( I )(b). 
235 Ibid., Article 5(1)(c). 
236 Ibid, Article 5(2). 
237 Ibid, Article 7. 
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the 21 December 1988 a bomb exploded on board the Pan Am flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland. All of the 259 passengers were killed as well as 11 people on the 
ground. As a result of subsequent police investigations, the Lord Advocate of 
Scotland issued an arrest warrant against two Libyan nationals on the 14 November 
1991.238 The same day the Attorney General of the United States issued a similar 
arrest warrant against the two Libyan nationals. France also issued an arrest 
warrant. 239 A tripartite declaration was made on the 27 of November 1991 in which 
the United Kingdom, United States and France called upon the Libya, inter alia, to 
hand over the two Libyans for trial in Scotland or the U.S. and to satisfy the 
requirements of French justice240• Libya's response was not to comply with the request 
but to take steps to prosecute the accused in its own courts in accordance with Article 
7 ofthe Montreal Convention.241 Following Libya's refusal to comply with the request 
for extradition, the three parties took the case to the Security Council, which passed 
Security Council resolution 731 on January 1992, which, inter alia, urged Libya to 
comply with the request for extradition.242 Libya claimed it had complied fully with its 
obligations under the Montreal Convention and instituted proceedings before the ICJ 
against the United States and United Kingdom. The proceeding concerned the 
interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention. Libya asked the Court to 
declare that (i) it had complied with its obligations under the Montreal Convention by 
taking the required steps to investigate the case and prosecute the two Libyans and (ii) 
the United Kingdom had breached the Montreal convention by seeking to force Libya 
to return the alleged offenders and not providing assistance for the Libyan 
proceedings. Libya further applied for provisional measures. These were, however, 
rejected because of a subsequent resolution by the Security Council.243 This later 
resolution was adopted under Chapter VII on the basis of Libya's failure 
238 The two Libyans were accused of conspiracy, murder and an offence under the Aviation Security 
Act 1982. 
239 The two Libyans were accused of being involved in the in a 1989 explosion of UTA Flight 772 over 
Niger. 
24
° Fr51n~e did not demand that the Libyans whom the sought be extradited; French law like most civil 
law systems, does not provide for the extradition of nationals. 
241 Both the United States, the United Kingdom and France were parties to the Montreal convention. 
242 Security Council Resolution 731, 21 January 1992. 
243 Lockerbie provisional measures Paras 39-41. 
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"to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure 
to respond fully and effectively to the request in Resolution 73 I (I 992) constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security". 244 
The Court did not find that Libya' claim was without object as a consequence of the 
subsequent Security Council resolutions. Instead it found, despite claims of the 
opposite by the United States and United Kingdom, that a dispute existed between the 
two States and Libya as to whether the destruction of the Pan Am flight was governed 
by the Montreal Convention. The Court further considered that there was a more 
specific dispute concerning the interpretation and application of Article 7 of the 
Montreal Convention and Article 11. As known, the case was discontinued in 2003.245 
The two Libyan nationals were, after years of negotiations and sanction against Libya, 
handed over to Netherlands where a Scottish court was set up in the former U.S. 
military base known as "Camp Zeist". 246 The Court delivered its verdict on the 31st of 
January 2001, finding one of the two defendants not guilty, upon which he was 
immediately retuned to Libya. The second defendant was found guilty of murder and 
was sentenced to a minimum of 20 years imprisonment. The verdict was 
unsuccessfully appealed. Libya later compensated the families but still denies any 
involvement.247 The whole incident added little to the interpretation of the Montreal 
Convention or to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. 248 It did however 
demonstrate the problems inherent in the vague formulation of the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle and inadequacies of sanctions intended to secure prosecution. It 
might even be the first step of a neutral venue principle to solve any future disputes 
concerning existing extradition/prosecution provisions. 249 
Identical to the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention requires that any 
alleged offender be taken in to custody and the case treated with due process. 250 A 
further duplicate is the obligation to ensure consular protection.251 In relation to 
244 Security Council Resolution 748, 3 I March I 992, preamble. 
245 See ICJ press release 2003/29 of 10 September 2003. 
246 Cf. generally A. Aust, 'Lockerbie: The Other Case', 49 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2000) 278-296. 
247 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk _ news/politics/3515589.stm. 
248 Ses: ICJ Pr_ess Release 2003/49, JO S_eptem.her 2003. 
249 Cf. generally M. Plachta, ' The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the 
Principle of Aud dedere Aut Judicare', 12 European Journal of Intemationa Law (2001) 125-140. 
250 The Montreal Convention, Article 6( I). 
251 Ibid., Article 6(3). 
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criminal co-operation the Montreal Convention contains the same broad provision as 
its predecessor obliging the Contracting States to "afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance" in connection with criminal proceedings falling within the 
scope the Convention. The Montreal Convention also contains an obligation to take 
preventive measures. Article 10 specifies that, "Contracting States, in accordance with 
international and national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for the 
purpose of preventing the offences mentioned in Article 1." 
Like to the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention does not specify what 
measures are required in relation to criminal assistance, but only that "Contracting 
States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with 
criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences. "252 
Conclusion 
The scheme established by the Montreal Convention is identical with that provided 
by the Hague Convention. The later adoption of the Montreal Convention is generally 
either attributed to of the jealousy of States of their sovereign powers,253 or to 
concerns of delaying work on the Hague Convention, which had not been adopted at 
the time when the work on the Montreal Convention commenced.Z54 There is, 
however, one crucial difference between the two. In fact, the Montreal Convention is 
atypical also when compared with all the later counter-terrorist instruments in that its 
scope of application does not entirely exclude acts committed by military or other 
Governmental services. Article 4(1) specifies that the Convention "shall not apply to 
aircraft used in military, customs or police services". This military carve-out, 
common to all counter-terrorist instruments in one form or another, does not provide a 
general exclusion. Neither does the exemption in the Hague Convention, but the 
decisive difference, when compared with its predecessor, is that the Montreal 
Convention also covers acts committed outside the aircraft, as in the two cases 
252 Ibid., Article II. 
253 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference 
wiJh Aircraft Part II: The Montreal ConvenJion', CpluiDbia Journal ofTransnati_Qnal Law (1975) 279. 
254 B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Airtransport- The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at 
International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of Air and Space Law 
(1997) 36. 
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mentioned above.255 The Montreal Convention is thus not only applicable in relations 
between individuals on board a civilian aircraft, which in most cases would not 
include military forces, but it also, potentially, includes acts committed from outside 
the aircraft, which are more likely to be attributable to a State under international law. 
Hence the Montreal Convention opens up for even broader interpretation of the term 
"terrorism", including the even more contentious and politically loaded notion of so-
called "State terrorism". 
Despite the broad scope of application and the large number of signatories, little 
accessible practice exists in relation to prosecution or extradition under laws 
implementing the Convention. Extensive copying from the Hague to the Montreal 
Convention, moreover, meant that many of the flaws of the Hague Convention were 
incorporated in the Montreal Convention, and the Lockerbie case clearly illustrated 
how an uncooperative State can bring the whole international criminal system to a 
halt. 
The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
InternationaUy Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
The use of violence for political ends has not been restricted to attacks on civil 
aviation. A principal catalyst for the adoption of The Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents [Hereinafter, the 'New York Convention'], was the raid on the 
Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, by the Palestinian Group 'Black 
September', in March 1973. Several diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador, Cleo 
Noel and Charges d'Affaires George Curtis More were held hostage and subsequently 
killed. Thus like previous counter-terrorism instruments, the New York Convention 
was the product of an ad hoc response to an emerging threat.256 The work on the 
255 ICJ, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005. Order of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 1996 case 
of Aerial incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). 
256 F.or a Iis~.of ~ttacks see A. B. Green, '~9!es- C:o_11Yt::lltion ()I! th5! Prev~ntion and Pl)nishment of 
Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis', Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 14 (1973-1974) 704, L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN 
Convention, ( 1975) 2-27. 
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Convention was originally initiated in 1970 by a letter, from the United Nations 
representative of the Netherlands, concerning the need to ensure protection and 
inviolability of diplomatic agents in view of the increasing threat.257 This was 
communicated to the International Law Commission (ILC), via the President of the 
Security Council. This led the ILC to agree in its 23rd session, in 1971, that it should 
consider the possibility of producing a set of draft articles regarding attacks on 
persons entitled to special protection under internationallaw.258 The course of events 
that lead to the completion of the draft articles is summarised in the Commission's 
1972 report?59 1t is enough here to say that the Sixth Committee debated the issued 
whether ILC should be requested to submit such draft articles to the General 
Assembly and that some of the following observations were made. 
In the Sixth Committee some representatives acknowledged the problem of an 
increasing threat to diplomatic agents?60 It was even pointed out that these attacks 
could endanger international peace and security. Opponents of a treaty pointed out 
that adequate protection was afforded under general international law. The General 
Assembly nonetheless, by resolution 2780 (XXVI) of December 3, 1971, requested 
the ILC to prepare a set of draft articles concerning offences committed against 
diplomats. The ILC debated the need for a special convention?61 In this forum, 
supporters stressed that not only would such a convention strengthen the international 
juridical order, but also that it was of vital importance for the maintenance of world 
peace. Opponents, on the other hand, questioned the effectiveness of yet another 
international counter-terrorism instrument. After their preparation, both in the Sixth 
Committee and in the ILC, the draft articles were adopted by the General Assembly in 
resolution 3166 (XXVIII) of December 14th, 1973. 
The drafters of the New York Convention found inspiration for their work in many 
contemporary conventions.262 They made especially extensive use of the Hague and 
257 L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: 
Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 4 7. 
258 I Yearbook ILC (1971 ), 3 ( l087th meeting, para. 38), quoted in L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. 
FitzGeral, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An 
Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 4 7. 
259 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fourth session, 2 May to 
7 July 1972 (A/8710/Rev .I,) pp. 88-90. 
260 L. M. Bloomfield,and G. F. FitzGerald, Cf"imes Against Internationally Protected Persons: 
Prevention and Punishmellt- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 4 7. 
261 See generally Ibid., at p. 49. 
262 Such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ( 1961 ), The Convention on Consular 
Relations ( 1963), The Convention on Special Missions ( 1969), the Organization of American States 
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Montreal Conventions. The New York Convention resembles these earlier 
conventions in many respects. They were not, however, used as the starting point for 
the New York Convention as the Sixth Committee's draft articles departed radically 
from these in many respects and many topics were discussed all over again. 263 
Aim and object 
The purpose of the New York Convention was to some extent similar to that of the 
general convention on terrorism, which had been initiated by the General Assembly in 
1972.264 The New York Convention, however, had an intended far more limited focal 
point and a narrower scope of application and was therefore presumed more effective 
in the fight against the specific threat against diplomats and other persons granted 
special protection under internationallaw.265 Unlike the previous instruments it does 
not concern all forms of attack but only those against so-called "international 
protected persons" as defined in Article l(l)(a-b). The term "international protected 
persons" was new and has no autonomous meaning outside the Convention.266 The 
reason for affording this limited group such special protection is related to their being 
considered of particular importance to maintenance of international friendly relations 
and co-operation among State. 267 
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons 
and Related Extortion That are oflntemational significance (1971 ). Cf L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. 
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Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The New York Convention sets out to ensure protection for a specially protected 
group of States representatives in accordance with Article l(l)(a). In doing so it 
obliges State to criminalise specific conduct committed intentionally against the 
protected group. The crimes in question are defined in Article 2, which provides: 
"I. The intentional commission of: 
a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an 
internationally protected person; 
b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the 
means of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his 
person or liberty; 
c) a threat to commit any such attack; 
d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and 
e) an act constituting participation as an accomplice; 
shall be made by each State Party a crime under its national law." 
The New York Convention, like its predecessors, had to choose between a short 
abstract definition and a longer list enumerating the conducts to be criminalised by the 
Convention. As had previous instruments, it opted for the latter. Importantly, it is also 
the first Convention not to rely on unlawfulness in national law as a qualification of 
the criminalised conduct. Instead, the New York Convention simply obliges States to 
criminalise the conduct described irrespective of its status under national law. This 
has to been seen in the light of the fact that the conduct criminalised under the 
Convention could never be lawfully committed by law enforcing officials and 
consequently there was no need to distinguish between unlawful and lawful acts. 268 
The first prerequisite for the commission of an offence within the New York 
Convention is the fulfilment of the condition of intent (mens rea). There are two 
requirements. 
Firstly, the perpetrator has to have knowledge that the attacked or threatened 
person belongs to the protected group. This was discussed during the negotiations 
zfis See for instance Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ( 1961 ), Articles 22( 1) and 27(5). 
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where some representatives rejected this viewpoint. The objection was not, however, 
sustained during the drafting. 269 The text, besides, leaves no other conclusion. 
Secondly, as with the Montreal Convention, the perpetrator must intend to fulfil the 
specific conduct described in the article, thereby ruling out recklessness, for instance 
as a consequence of an accident. 270 The ILC draft also included the words "regardless 
of motive" after "intentional commission". The Commission in its commentary 
explained this as follows: 
"While criminal intent is regarded as an essential element of the crime covered by article 2, the 
expression "regardless of motive" states the universally accepted legal principle that it is the intent to 
commit the act and not the reason that lead to its commission that is the governing factor ... As a 
consequence the requirements of the Convention must be applied by a State party even though, for 
example, the kidnapper of an ambassador may have been inspired by what appeared to him or is 
considered by the State party to be the worthiest of motives.'m1 
The words "regardless of motive" were later deleted. Bloomfield and FitzGerald infer 
from this that the extradition provisions of the Convention might be weakened since 
the motive of the alleged offender could be invoked as a reason for non-extradition.272 
Wood, on the other hand, says that the deletion does not affect the meaning of the 
paragraph.273 Both are probably right in that it does not seem to change the meaning of 
article 2. Nevertheless, it may make a difference to the overall application of the 
Convention since the extradition provision in the New York Convention is modelled 
on previous counter-terrorism instruments and, as seen above, it does not rule out the 
application of the political offence exception, but only amends existing extradition 
treaties. 274 Green takes a similar position. He States that when the deletion is taken in 
269 See generally L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 77. 
270 See the Commissions commentary, [1972] ILC Report, p. 95, quoted in M. C. Wood, 'The 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 (197 4) 802. 
271 [1972] ILC Report, p. 75, quoted in M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 ( 1974) 804. 
272 See generally L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 80. 
273 M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Jlrevention and Eunishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 
(1974) 804. 
274 See Article 8 and L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) I 08. 
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conjunction with the right to asylum in Article 12, definite erosion to the original ILC 
draft can be seen and the mandate providing for prosecution and extradition becomes 
hollow as the State in which the alleged offender is present can, if it deems the 
offence political, grant asylum. 275 It is important to stress, however, that even the 
grating of asylum would not alleviate a State from the obligation of presenting the 
case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution since nothing 
precludes prosecution of a person granted asylum. 276 
Subparagraph (a) offers nothing for the objective elements of the crimes mentioned 
except for their general name, i.e. murder and kidnapping. Interestingly, the New 
York Convention was the first, and so far the only, counter-terrorist instrument that 
specifically includes murder as a terrorist offence.277 The lack of guidance means that 
the objective and subjective elements (actus reus and mens rea) must be established 
on the basis of the national law of the State parties. 278 The precise scope of the 
individual criminalised conduct is therefore dependant on the legal tradition of 
respective States. It is questionable whether the lack of any specification of a result 
deriving from the acts delineated means that it must be categorised as a so-called 
conduct crime (sometimes referred to as act of commission) as opposed to a result 
crime. This is, however, unlikely to become a problem as most countries doubtlessly 
already have provision defining the crimes in question and only if the crimes had been 
defined as result crimes might this uncertainty come into conflict with the principle of 
favor rei (preference for the accused). 279 
The original draft Article both from the ILC and the Sixth Committee contained 
the phrase "violent attack" without enumerating specific individual crimes. The ILC 
preferred this more abstract approach because it found that it would be difficult to 
incorporate into national law a precise definition of the individual crimes to be 
covered by the Convention, which would lead to difficulties in reaching any 
275 A. B. Green, 'Notes- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic 
Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis', Virginia Journal of International 
Law, 14 (1973-1974) 714. 
276 1. 1. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law- A Commentary on the Hostages 
Convention /979, ( 1990) 329. 
271 The 2005 amendment Prot()col to the MaritLme Conventiorrlll~o includes mu[d~r. see below. 
278 M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 
(1974) 802. 
279 The principle has been endorsed in international law. See Rome Statute ( 1998), Article 22(2). 
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agreement on the matter. 28° Consequently, the ILC decided to leave it open for each 
individual State to use applicable criminal offences comprised within the concept of 
"violent attack". 281 By marked contrast, however, during negotiations in the Sixth 
Committee, some members found that the use of the excessively vague and imprecise 
term of "violent attack" would have implications for the future application, which 
again would make it difficult for States to participate. 282 Consequently the wording 
was changed to its present form. 
Subparagraph (a) originally contains the word "serious" limiting the scope to 
murder, kidnapping or other serious forms of attack. The term "serious" was deleted 
"since it restricted the scope of the Convention by introducing an element of 
uncertainty."283 The deletion apparently widens the scope of application since it sets a 
lower threshold to the provision's operation. In this regard, the United States 
representative to the United Nations stated in the General Assembly "obviously the 
words "other attack" mean attacks of a similar serious nature to those expressly 
mentioned". 284 
Subparagraph (b) contains the more abstract definition of "violent attack" without 
any further explanation as to the meaning of the term. It is arguable that when 
subparagraph (b) is read in its context and guidance is sought in the preparatory work 
that it includes several of the same acts as subparagraph (a). The difference being that 
where subparagraph (a) concerns attacks on the individual, subparagraph (b) concerns 
violent attack on the accommodation or transportation of the protected person. This 
means that the drafters of the New York Convention not only sought to protect 
persons but also facilities affiliated with them because if the first had been the sole 
object then this would have been adequately covered under the attempt provision in 
subparagraph (d). 
280 See generally L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
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Subparagraph (c) covers, similarly to Article 1 of the Hague Convention, threats of 
any of the above-mentioned acts. Like both the Hague and the Montreal Conventions 
the New York Convention also criminalises attempt and participation as accomplice, 
respectively by subparagraph (d) and (e). According to the view taken by the ILC, all 
the concepts of threat, attempt and participation are well-defined under national law 
and there was accordingly no need for any detailed explanation.285 Reference to these 
concepts would therefore have to be dealt with in the national law of the respective 
State. 
Jurisdiction 
With regard to jurisdiction, the New York Convention is modelled closely on the 
provisions of The Hague and Montreal Conventions, Article 4 and 5 respectively. The 
New York convention, firstly, establishes mandatory jurisdiction to prescribe on the 
basis of the territorial and nationality principles.286 Article 3(1)(c) further provides that 
States shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction when 
the crime is committed against an internationally protected person who enjoys his 
status as such by virtue of functions he exercises on behalf of that State. This is a 
novelty under international law. Wood argues that it might be thought similar to the 
passive personality principle. He further suggests the provision is somewhat akin to 
the provisions in the Hague and Montreal Conventions concerning the State of 
principal place of business or permanent residence of the lessee of the aircraft, Article 
4(1)(c) and 5(1)(d) respectively, or to the provision concerning the State of 
registration of the aircraft against which an offence is committed in Article 5( 1 )(b) of 
the Montreal Convention.287 
It should further be noted that during the drafting of the New York Convention, a 
number of States proposed that the Convention be inapplicable to national liberation 
movements. As a compromise, between those States that wanted to exclude acts of 
285 See generally L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prev(!ntion and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN CQnventiQ/1, ( 1975) 78. 
286 Article 3(J)(a) and (b). 
287 M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 
(1974) 808. 
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national liberation movements from the scope of the Convention and those who 
insisted that the Convention should allow for no exception, the General Assembly 
resolution to which the New York Convention is annexed recognises that: 
"The provisions of the annexed Convention could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the 
legitimate right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the purposes and principles 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial 
discrimination and apartheid." 
The final paragraph of the resolution further states that "the present resolution, whose 
provisions are related to the annexed Convention, shall always be published together 
with it". There can therefore be no doubt that the Convention has to be interpreted in 
agreement with the above quote. 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The New York Convention contains significant innovations when compared with 
its predecessors, especially with regard to the obligations to facilitate international co-
operation. Contracting States are not only obliged to take certain preventive measures, 
in accordance with Article 4, but are also obliged proactively to co-operate in the 
prevention of the conduct described. This obligation goes far beyond the timid 
obligations contained earlier instruments.288 It is, however, not a novelty in itself. 
According to the ILC, it is a well-established principle of international law that States 
must ensure that its territory is not used for the preparation of crime to be committed 
in other States.289 
This is, among others, is reflected in the General Assembly Declaration on Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 
where it is specifically stated that: 
288 The Montreal Convention, Article 10, 
289 Cf L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGeral, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: 
Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convellfion, ( 1975) 88. 
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"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces 
or armed bands including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil 
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat 
or use of force. "290 
The obligation entailed in the New York Convention goes further than this in obliging 
Contracting States to exchange information and to co-ordinate measure to prevent the 
commission of crimes. 291 This provision was based upon Article 8 of the 1971 
Convention of the Organisation of American States (OAS) Convention to Prevent and 
Punish the Acts of Terrorism.292 There is no corresponding provision in any of the 
previous analysed instruments. The New York Convention further obliges Parties to 
communicate to all other States concerned facts regarding the crime committed if 
there is reason to believe that the alleged offender has fled the territory. 293 This 
obligation is a clear innovation: as it has no predecessor in any on the previous 
analysed conventions or in the OAS Convention. 294 
The Principle of aut dedere aut judicare is contained in article 7: 
"The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, 
submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State." 
It is almost identical to its predecessors, although some minor changes have been 
made. Firstly, by introduction of the words "and without undue delay", which seems 
to require promptness in the handling of the case, although without implying any 
priority is given to the case. Secondly, the words "whether or not the offence was 
committed in its territory" has been omitted. This corresponds with the New York 
290 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution. 
2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/5217, at 121 ( 1970). 
291 The New York Convention, Article 4(2). 
292 The Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism 
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That are of International 
significance, ( 1971 ). 
293 The New York Convention, Article 5. 
294 See generally, Cf L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGeral, Crimes Against lntemationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 89-91. 
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Convention's not affording jurisdiction on the basis of the mere presence of the 
offender within the territory of the apprehending State. Thirdly, the last paragraph of 
the previous instruments, i.e. "Those authorities shall take their decision in the same 
manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that 
State." has been abbreviated to "through proceedings in accordance with the laws of 
that State." Essentially, however, both wordings convey the same idea that the 
conduct in question should be treated as an ordinary crime. 
Another innovation of the New York Convention of special interest to the present 
analysis is the inclusion of a guarantee of ''fair treatment" in Article 9.295 This 
provision is intended to safeguard the rights of the alleged offender during all stages 
of the proceedings. According to the ILC the expression ''fair treatment" was chosen 
because of its generality and it must therefore be interpreted more broadly than the 
standard expressions such as due process or fair trial. 296 This means that the 
obligation to provide fair treatment commences at an earlier stage. This seems to be 
the position taken by Bloomfield and FitzGerald, who State that the protection is 
intended to "safeguard the alleged offender form the moment he is found and 
measures are taken to ensure his presence until the final decision is taken on the 
case."297 Wood takes the position that an argument could be advanced that the 
provision has to be interpreted in accordance with Article 9 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).298 If this is correct, the New York 
Convention would be the first international counter-terrorism instrument to 
incorporate human rights protection. 
The right to a fair trial is by now also established as a norm under customary 
internationallaw,299 but one should not underestimate the importance of its inclusion 
at the time. The original ILC draft also included a reference to domestic statutory 
limitation in accordance with the rules under domestic law for the most serious 
295 The New York Convention, Article 9: "Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried 
out in connection with any of the crimes set forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all 
stages of the proceedings." 
2
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crimes. This gave rise to considerable debate. 300 Some members of the Commission 
found that the crimes in question and their effect on international relations were of 
such a serious nature that no limitation should be made upon the time within which 
prosecution could be brought; others found that statutory limitations were a necessary 
protection to ensure that innocent persons were not charged after the passage of so 
much time that no evidence could be obtained to present a defence.301 The provision 
concerning a statutory limitation was subject to severe criticism and was ultimately 
deleted. 302 Contracting States arguably may still rely on national statutory rules when 
complying with their obligations under the New York Convention. In other words, a 
Contracting State may refuse to extradite an alleged offender even without initiating 
prosecution if a statutory limitation under its domestic law has expired. This is based, 
firstly, on the fact that the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, contained in Article 7 
of the New York Convention, does not contain an absolute obligation to ensure 
prosecution and, secondly, the last paragraph of Article 7 specifies that proceedings 
shall be in "accordance with the laws of that State", which is broad enough to 
encompass statutory limitations. This is yet another uncertainty that might be 
exploded by an uncooperative State. 
The New York Convention further provides a right for the offender to 
communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of 
which he is a national, thereby ensuring the possibility of consular protection. The 
right to consular protection has developed significantly since the drafting of the New 
York Convention, most notably with the decision of the ICJ in the La Grand case. 303 
The case concerned two German nationals prosecuted in the U.S. for armed robbery 
having been denied the right of access to consular representation in accordance with 
Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 304 Germany contended 
that this constituted not only an infringement of the rights of Germany as a State, but 
that it also entailed a violation of the individual rights of the two German nationals. 305 
The United States, on the other hand, stated that rights to consular notification and 
300 See generally L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 113. 
301 Ibid. 
302J}Jid., at p .. j 1_4. 
303 The New York Convention, Article 6(3). See mutatis mutandis ICJ, LaGrand case, Judgment of 27 
June 200 I, para 77. 
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access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and not of individuals.306 The 
ICJ then delivered the following decisive paragraph: 
"The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph l (b), spells out the obligations the receiving State has 
towards the detained person and the sending State. [ ... ] Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the 
following language: "The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 
under this subparagraph" (emphasis added). Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph I (c), the sending 
State's right to provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised "if he expressly 
opposes such action". The clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. It 
follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply these as they stand ()307 
Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph I, creates 
individual rights, which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by 
the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case." 
The Court followed the line set out in the Advisory Opinion in Danzig Railway 
Officials emphasising the intention of the contracting Parties. In doing so, the Court 
stated that the clarity of the provisions, especially in the use of the words "his rights" 
leaves no doubt. The Court could thus not reach any other conclusion than that this 
was an individual right. In addition, such an individual right is, according to the 
Court, to be given "full effect" thus preventing the United States to relying on the 
national procedural default rule.308 The Court thereby affirmed that the right to 
consular representation, depending on its specific formulation might give rise to an 
individual right with direct effect in domestic law. It is noteworthy that the Court did 
not find it necessary to consider whether the right to be informed without delay in 
accordance with Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention assumed the character of a 
human right. 309 This leads to the conclusion that individual rights are not reserved to 
human rights instruments, even though these most commonly set out substantial 
individual rights. The precedent of the LaGrand case was followed in Avena and 
other Mexican Nationals thus sustaining the line of reasoning that treaties can 
306 Ibid., at para 76. 
307 PCIJ, (see Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J ., Series B, No. 7, p. 
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establish individual rights with direct effect in nationallaw.310 This precedent is 
directly applicable to Article 6(2) of the New York Convention, which provides: 
"Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph I of this article are being taken 
shall be entitled: 
a) to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is 
a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect his rights or, if he is a Stateless person, which he 
request and which is willing to protect his rights; and 
b) to be visited by a representative of that State. [emphasis added] 
Despite the clear differences between provisions of the Convention on Consular 
Protection and the New York Convention they both make use of the same decisive 
wording. Both provisions use the term "his right". The wording of the New York 
Convention therefore compels the same conclusion as the ICJ reached in the LaGrand 
case, i.e. the New York Convention provides any person that is taken into custody or 
against whom other measures are taken the right to consular communication. Thus 
even if no such right exist in the national procedural rules then this does not serve as a 
justification for not providing the individual with the right to communication, because 
under international law a State may not rely the provisions of its national law as an 
justification not to perform an treaty obligation,311 Not even constitutional provisions 
may be relied upon for non-compliance.312 The consequences of non-compliance with 
this obligation are nevertheless uncertain. Although any wrongdoing may give rise to 
a right of diplomatic protection by the national State. 
The New York Convention further heightens the standard of certainty with regard 
to the application ratione personae. Both the Hague and Montreal Conventions use 
the term "alleged offender" and in some provisions the term "offender".313 The Tokyo 
Convention use the expression "suspected offender".314 The New York Convention 
was, however, the first instrument to establish any definition of the concept. Article 
1 (2) defines an "alleged offender" as a person as to whom there is sufficient evidence 
310 ICJ, case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (2004), para. 40. In relation to the 
question of the hl)m!}n right_s !iffituJl of Articl~ 36(2) of the Vienna Convention s_ee para. 124. 
311 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 27. 
312 Cf. Qatar v. Bahrain (Jurisdiction on admissibility I) ICJ Report [ 1994] 112, pr. 24-25. 
313 The Hague Convention, Article 3(5) and 4(1); The Montreal Convention, Article 4(3) and 6(1). 
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to determine prima facie that he has committed or participated in one or more of the 
crimes set forth in Article 2. The original ILC draft followed the precedents of the 
earlier instruments applying the term "alleged offender" explaining in the comments 
that "to make clear that in order to set in motion the machinery envisaged in the 
articles against an individual there must be grounds to believe that he has committed 
one of the crimes to which the draft articles apply."315 This was later changed to 
include the above definition. This seems to imply a stricter requirement because the 
words "sufficient evidence to determine prima facie" sets a higher threshold than 
"grounds to believe".316 Bloomfield and FitzGerald points out that the second half of 
the definition is somewhat more flexible because the definition does not only concern 
persons linked to the commission of the crime but also with any participation.317 
Wood takes an even stronger position declaring the definition is somewhat 
unsatisfactory.318 It does not, however, seem to make any difference whether the 
person in question has committed or only participated in the commission of the 
respective act since the crucial factor is that the authorities in both cases have to 
present evidence that prima facie point to the implication of the alleged offender. In 
regard to Wood's comment, one could ask what more should be necessary. The 
ECtHR pronounced in the case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK on the meaning of 
"reasonable suspicion" for the purpose of Article 5( 1 )(c) of the ECHR. 319 The Court 
firstly acknowledged that the reasonableness of the suspicion on which an arrest must 
be based forms an essential part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention, 
and further that this presupposes facts or information which would satisfy an objective 
observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence.320 In the same 
breath, however, the Court pronounced that in this respect, terrorist crime falls into a 
special category.321 What the Court required in the end was bonafide evidence that 
enabled them to ascertain whether the essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 
315 [ 1972] ILC Report, p. 93-94, quoted in M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 (1974) 802. 
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5(1)(c) had been secured. Consequently the respondent Government has to furnish at 
least some facts or information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person 
was reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence. On the basis of 
this Statement by the ECtHR, it seems fair to conclude that the New York Convention 
provision concerning the requirement of prima facie evidence complies with general 
human rights standards. 
In relation to assistance, Article 10 to some extent clarifies the open-ended nature 
of this obligation when compared with previous instruments. The obligation to 
provide assistance reads in full: 
"States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal 
proceedings brought in respect of the crimes set forth in article 2, including the supply of all evidence 
at their disposal necessary for the proceedings." 
The obligation to assist therefore, at least, includes the supply of evidence. 
Subparagraph 2 further stipulates that the Article shall not affect obligations 
concerning mutual judicial assistance embodied in any other treaty. In other words, 
the Contracting State may have more far-reaching obligations to provide assistance 
depending on their existing international commitments. 
The New York Convention was also the first Convention to introduce a provision 
in relation to asylum. Article 12 specifies "the provisions of this Convention shall not 
affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption of 
this Convention". This provision, with a clear humanitarian inspiration appears, at 
least in certain situations, to create an exception to the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare. Nevertheless, the exception only applies to a very limited number of treaties 
that were predominantly in force among Latin American States, and as pointed out by 
Lambert, no provision of those treaties prevents the subsequent prosecution of a 
person granted asylum. 322 This is in line with the position taken by the International 
Commission of Jurists who has expressed the view that "asylum is intended to secure 
a person's safety from persecution rather than his impunity," which leads Lambert to 
322 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law- A Commentary on the Hostages 
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conclude that there appears to be no rule of international law which would preclude 
the prosecution of a person granted asylum.323 
Conclusion 
The New York Convention was the first counter-terrorism instrument to be 
adopted within the UN system. The relatively short time it took to be drafted and 
adopted demonstrates the serious concern with which States viewed the threat. 
Despite this, the Convention still incorporates several human rights provisions with 
the potential effect of seriously hampering criminal co-operation. The very broad 
obligation to provide "fair treatment" today seems almost redundant because of the 
extensive effect of human rights instruments in the sphere of criminal law. At the time 
of drafting, however, and given the seriousness with which terrorism was viewed, the 
inclusion of this requirement is a powerful indication of the importance of proper 
legal procedures, once again emphasising that not even terrorists are outside the law. 
The growing importance of human rights considerations is further reflected in the 
requirement to establish a prima facie case based on evidence before any action can 
be taken against an alleged offender, thereby increasing the protection of the 
presumed innocent. 
Notwithstanding the seriousness with which the threat was viewed, the New York 
Convention exhibits the same shortcomings as previous instruments thus allowing 
States to evade the ultimate aim of securing the prosecution terrorist. 
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 
By the late seventies the world saw the emergence of yet another terrorist threat. 
By then hostage taking had become a favoured tool in the terrorist arsenal allowing 
weak, often obscure, groups to exhort concessions from powerful governments.324 
323 Ibid. 
324 See generally J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law- A Commentary on the 
Hostages Conventionl979, (1990). 
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The Entebbe incident is a good example. On the 26 of June 1976 members of the 
PFLP hijacked an Air France aircraft departing from Israel. The more than 250 
passengers were taken to the Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where Israeli passengers 
were separated from the others and the latter released. The hijackers demanded the 
release of 50 Palestinians imprisoned in different countries. The most well known fact 
about this event was the subsequent rescue operation of the remaining passengers by 
an Israeli military commando on the 3rd July 1976. All of the hijackers were killed as 
well as some Ugandan and Israeli soldiers. The episode let to a heated debate in the 
Security Council where two draft resolutions were introduced.325 The resolution 
sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States condemned hijacking and 
inter alia called on States to prevent and punish all such acts while reaffirming the 
need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, whereas the draft 
submitted by Tanzania, Libya and Benin inter alia condemned Israel's violation of 
Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity and demanded compensation for 
damages to and destruction of Uganda's property and lives. The incident led the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to propose that the topic of the drafting of an 
international convention against the taking of hostages be included on the agenda of 
the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.326 This led to the adoption of the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages [Hereinafter the 'Hostages 
Convention']. 327 This was the first counter-terrorist instrument to name an offence. 
Aim and Object 
The aim and object of the Hostages Convention was to ensure friendly relations 
and co-operation among States by eradicating another manifestation of terrorism, 
hostage-taking. This was to be facilitated by ensuring the right to life, liberty and 
security of every person in accordance with the principles set out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Right and the ICCPR. Interestingly the preamble also reaffirms 
325 See 15 I.L.M. 1976) 1224. 
326 UN Doc. A30/242 ( 1976). Although the FRG proposal came two month after the Entebbe incident, 
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the right to self-determination; a right that is not directly related to the issue of 
hostage taking but intimately related to the concept of terrorism.328 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The objective element (actus reus) of the crime of hostage-taking is defined as the 
taking of any person with the purpose of compelling a third party, namely a State, an 
international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person or a group 
of persons, to do or abstain from any act. The Hostages Convention is thus the first 
Convention to have a political purpose as an element of the crime. The relevant 
provision reads in full: 
"Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another 
person ... in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental 
organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as 
an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages 
("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention." 
Like the New Y ark Convention, the Hostages Convention does not rely on 
unlawfulness when defining the criminalised conduct.329 The reason for this, similar to 
the New York Convention, is that law-enforcement officials are not expected to 
perform any of the acts that States are required to criminalise and consequently there 
is no need to distinguish between legal and illegal acts of hostage taking. 
The Hostages Convention is the first instrument to contain a political element 
within the definition of the crirninalised conduct, which is part of the intent (mens rea) 
requirement, i.e. the intent to compel the relevant third party to do or abstain from 
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostages. The 
Hostages Convention hence resembles the definition suggested by Cassese, and it fits 
better than any of the other instruments analysed with the popular perception of the 
term "terrorism". Even so, it does not require any particular political ideology of the 
328 See below p.75. 
329 SeeS. Shubber, 'The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages', 52 British 
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offender. In other words, any attempt to compel a third party would fall within the 
Convention. Including demands for ransom based on pure economic considerations. 
Jurisdiction 
During the negotiations of the Hostages Convention it quickly became clear that 
some States were very divided on many issues relevant to the proposed Convention.330 
This was especially so in relation to the definition and scope of hostage taking. Some 
delegations took the view that the convention should only prohibit the taking of 
"innocent" hostages. 331 Lambert argues that this suggests that "guilty" individuals, i.e. 
those connected with colonialism or foreign domination, could legitimately be taken 
hostage. 332 The proposal faded away rather quickly. However, another proposal, 
excepting any act carried out in the process of national liberation against colonial rule, 
racist and foreign regimes by liberation movements turned out to be a serious obstacle 
to the Convention.333 A compromise was achieved in the form of Article 12, which 
reads: 
"In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims or the Additional 
Protocols to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as 
States Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the 
hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the 
course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, 
including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes 
in the exercise of their right of self- determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." 
As clarified by Lambert, neither the wording nor the preparatory works of this 
provision give reason to conclude that this limits the application of the Convention, 
330 On the drafting see generally, J.J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A 
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either excluding acts of hostage-taking committed during armed conflict or excepting 
so-called "freedom fighters" from the scope of the Convention.334 On the contrary, the 
Hostages Convention is designed in such a way as to complement the Geneva 
Conventions to ensure that all acts of hostage taking, whether committed during peace 
time or in an armed conflict, result in the obligation aut dedere aut judicare. 335 Thus 
the Hostages Convention does not only apply in peacetime but also in times of armed 
conflict when the Geneva Conventions does not entail an obligation either to present 
the case for the relevant authorities or extradite. It may be recalled that the obligation 
of aut dedere aut judicare is contained in Articles 49-50 of the First Geneva 
Convention, Articles 50-51 of the Second Geneva Convention, Articles 129-130 of 
the Third Geneva Convention and Articles 146-147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
The identical provisions inter alia provide: 
"Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with 
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case." 
In other words, all grave breaches falling within the four Geneva Conventions are 
subject to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. The grave breaches regime, 
however, only applies to international armed conflict. In the case of an internal armed 
conflict the same violations are prohibited; they may even amount to war crime, 
nevertheless they are not grave breaches within the meaning of the Geneva 
Conventions.336 This is evident from the fact that the Geneva Conventions only apply 
to "cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties".337 
In this connection reference should be made to Article 3, common to the four 
Geneva Conventions. Article 3 inter alia prohibits the taking of hostages in internal 
334 Ibid., at pp. 264-265. 
335 Ibid., at p. 274. 
336 Cf. A. Cassese, International Criminal Law 2nd ed., (2003) 55-56. 
337 Article 2 of, respectively, Geneva Convention Ijor the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field ( 1949), Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of 
the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949), 
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ( 1949), Geneva Convention IV 
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of War ( 1949). 
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armed conflicts. Importantly, common Article 3 is not subject to the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare. Hence while it might be said that that common article 3 is 
"applicable" to an act of hostage taking, it does not impose any obligation to present 
the case for the relevant prosecutorial authorities or to extradite. Consequently, it does 
not fulfil the prerequisite, established by Article 12 of the Hostages Convention, that 
the State Party must be "bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the 
hostage taker". Thus it does not preclude the application of the Hostages Convention. 
Consequently, the Hostages Convention applies to acts of hostage-taking in internal 
armed conflicts, provided, in accordance with Article 13, that the offence is not 
committed within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offender are nationals of 
that State, and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State. Thus Article 
12 of the Hostages Convention does not limit the application of the Convention in 
relation to internal armed conflicts covered by common Article 3. 338 
Additional Protocol II, which likewise is applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts, repeats in Article 4 the prohibition against hostage taking. Similarly to 
common Article 3, however, it does not impose any obligation of extradition or 
prosecution. 
The critically important distinction between 'international' and 'internal' armed 
conflict might not, however, be so relevant in relation to grave breaches. In the Tadic 
case the Trial Chamber, at the International Tribunal for the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), held that the existence of an international armed conflict was not 
a requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction inter alia under Article 2 of the ICTY 
Statute, despite Article 2 covering grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions which 
therefore seemingly imply the existence of an international armed conflict. 
The Trial Chamber held that the existence of an international armed conflict was 
not a requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2, 3 or 5 of the ICTY 
Statute.339 The Trial Chamber understood that, despite its reference to grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions, Article 2 of the Statute did not confine the Tribunal to 
applying the grave breaches provisions of the Conventions but enabled the Tribunal 
to treat those provisions as declaratory of customary law and to try persons 
338 See on this issue thedecisionof the London Central Crimi11al Court (old Bailey) in R v Zardad 
(Ruling on th-e Taking of Hostages Act 1982), )udgment ofS -Oc-tober 2004. 
339 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/KIA "Dule" Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (rule 73), 
10 August 19950n the decision see generally C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the 
Tadic Case, 7 European Journal oflnternational Law (1996) 265-284. 
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committing the acts listed in the grave breaches provisions even in an internal armed 
conflict to which those provisions would not apply as treaty law.340 The protection 
against the infringement of sovereignty, which according to the Trial Chamber was 
the underlying motive for the distinction between international and internal armed 
conflicts, was not directly applicable to the Tribunal, given its status as an 
international court.341 In view of this, the Trial Chamber considered it unnecessary to 
determine the character of the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it 
noted that there were "clear indications" in the material before it that the conflict was 
an international one. 342 The by now widespread acceptance that the grave breaches 
regime is part of customary international law and the fact that this might give rise to 
an universal obligation of aut dedere aut judicare even in relation to violations 
committed during non-international armed conflicts, may however have little effect on 
the applicability of the Hostages Convention. 
Firstly because, the language of Article 12 of the Hostages Convention- "in so far 
as States Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions" - indicates 
that it will not be rendered inapplicable because a customary norm provides and 
obligates of aut dedere aut judicare but only when this obligation is contained within 
the Geneva Conventions themselves.343 
Secondly, even if a customary norm would preclude the application of the 
Hostages Convention, then such a norm would have to exist in the Geneva 
Convention as well. Given almost universal adherence to the four Geneva 
Convention, any such customary norm would add little to the already existing system. 
Moreover, a review of the four Conventions reveals that it is only Convention IV, 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, that makes any 
reference to hostage-taking while at the same time including it within the category of 
grave breaches, thereby making it subject to the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare. 344 The importance of this is limited by Geneva Convention IV only 
protecting civilians who are enemy nationals and only while in the hands of a State 
340 Ibid., paras. 46-52. 
•
141 Ibid., para. 52. 
342 Ibid., para. 53. 
343 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, ( 1990) 277 
344 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of War (1949). 
Geneva IV, Article 14 7. 
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Party.345 In other words, it does not include acts of non-State actors. This means that 
the Hostages Convention still covers acts of groups, commonly referred to as 
"terrorist", even if the alleged conduct is committed during an armed conflict, 
regardless of whether the conflict is international or national. 
The use of the word "power" in common Article 2, which denotes the area of 
application of the Geneva Convention, has led some commentators to conclude that 
this could refer to an entity another than a State, although a more traditional 
interpretation does not allow for such a conclusion. As observed by Cassese, "the 
whole context and wording of the various provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
make it clear that when they mention 'Powers' they intend to apply to States only"346 
This discussion is somewhat irrelevant for States Parties to the Additional Protocol 
I of 1977 (AP I), to which Article 12 of the Hostages Convention makes specific 
reference. This additional protocol, supplementing the 1949 Geneva Convention 
relation to the Protection of War Victims, created a whole new category of armed 
conflicts. 347 By Article 1 ( 4) international armed conflicts include: 
"armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." 
In accordance herewith, any armed conflict directed toward the achievement of self-
determination is now, at least for the signatories to AP I, regarded as an international 
armed conflict. One of the consequences of AP I is that an authority representing a 
people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type 
referred to in Article 1(4) may undertake to apply the Geneva Conventions and API 
345 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of War (1949). 
Geneva IV, Article 4, "Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in 
any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to 
the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. Nationals of a State that is not bound 
by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the 
territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected 
persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in 
whose hands they are." 
346 A. Cassese, 'Wars of National Liberations and Humanitarian Law', in Swinarski (ed.), Studies and 
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in honour of Jean Pictet, ( 1984) 
316. 
347 L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, (2000) 109. 
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in relation to that conflict by means of an unilateral declaration.348 Thus the 
prohibition of hostage taking and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare contained in 
Geneva Convention IV could theoretically apply to national liberation movements and 
as a result preclude the application of the Hostages Convention. Importantly, this 
could only happen after a unilateral declaration from the appropriate authority of the 
national liberation movement and only if the State against whom the struggle is 
conducted is a Party to API. However, neither API nor the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations makes any provisions for 
determining what constitutes a struggle for self-determination and thus qualifies as a 
national liberation movement within the meaning of Article 1(4). In fact, it seems that 
the decision as to whether the requirements of Article 1 ( 4) have been meet are 
completely subjective and within each State's discretion.349 Moreover, the class of 
groups that fall within the notion of liberation movements in this respect are only 
those fighting for self-determination against "colonial domination, and alien 
occupation and racist regimes", which, as pointed out by Lambert, is a very restricted 
group.350 In relation to the Hostages Convention, the critical question is whether a 
national liberation movement can bind itself to the Geneva Conventions in such a way 
as to bring them into application, thus engaging the application of the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle, which supersedes the equivalent obligation contained in the 
Hostages Convention. In this respect it is important to note that AP I apparently 
broadens the group of protected persons in relation to hostage taking thus widening 
the scope of application of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, thereby potentially 
limiting the application of the Hostages Convention. Article 85 provides: 
"Acts described as grave breaches in the Conventions are grave breaches of this Protocol if committed 
against persons in the power of an adverse Party protected by Articles 44, 45 and 73 of this Protocol, or 
against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of the adverse Party who are protected by this Protocol, or 
against those medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical transports which are under the 
control of the adverse Party and are protected by this Protocol." 
348 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1979), Article 96. 
349 L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, (2000) 63-64. 
350 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 235. 
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AP I thereby extends the definition of grave breaches in regard to anybody protected 
by the protocol, i.e., combatants and prisoners of war, any person who has taken part 
in the hostilities and to refugees and Stateless persons, as well as wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked, medical and religious personnel, medical units and transports under the 
control of an adverse party.351 Although the provision is not entirely clear, it seems to 
indicate that all grave breaches described in all four of the Geneva Conventions are 
grave breaches if they are committed against any of the listed categories of people.352 
If this interpretation were to be correct, then this would mean that the group of 
persons protected under the provision prohibiting hostage-taking would have been 
significantly broadened both in relation to liberation movements but also, more 
importantly, in relation to conflicts between Contracting Parties to API. Any 
expansion of the category of protected persons naturally implies wider application of 
the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare, affecting the potential scope of the Hostages 
Convention. 
Thus in relation to armed conflicts, Article 12 may preclude the application of the 
Hostages Convention. Since, however, Geneva Convention IV only protects a limited 
class of civilians, there is still a number of possible situations wherein the Hostages 
Convention would still apply. The widening of the group of protected persons 
between the Parties to AP I to some extent diminishes the importance of the Hostages 
Convention but it does not make it obsolete. Moreover, that acts of national liberation 
movements recognised under API and subject to the rules of international 
humanitarian law, thus excluding them from the scope of the Hostages Convention, 
does not change lex lata. On the face of it, Article 12 of the Hostages Convention 
might seem to contain an important statement about the relationship between 
terrorism and international humanitarian law. Some have even concluded that the 
Article recognises that the taking of hostages by national liberation movements is a 
legitimate means of their struggle. 353 Others have criticised the Article for providing 
for an argument that "the structure and language of Article 12 represents some 
measure of acceptance that members of national liberation movements are 
351 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts ( 1979), Articles 44, 45, 73 and 85(2). 
352 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, ( 1990) 298. 
353 Ibid., at 265. 
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combatants, not terrorists"354 While it is undeniably true that an act of hostage taking 
by a national liberation movement which falls within the ambit of the AP I in such a 
way as to impose an obligation of aut dedere aut judicare would also entitle the 
offender, as a combatant, to other benefits granted by Convention III relative to the 
treatment of prisoners of war and by AP I. As pointed out by Lambert, however, this 
situation is created by API and not by the Hostages Convention.355 It should further 
be added, that this would have been the result, even without the specific reference in 
Article 12 of the Hostages Convention, by application of the well-established 
principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali. 356 Additionally, national liberation 
movements are only exempt from the application of the Hostages Convention when a 
similar system of extradition/prosecution applies. Pragmatically therefore Article 12 
makes little difference. Moreover, one of the characteristics of national liberation 
movements is that they often fight within a single State against a government with 
which they share their nationality and as result their hostages are also likely to be of 
that same nationality. In other words, peoples fighting against colonial domination 
and racist regimes who in their struggle make use of hostage taking, might not even 
fall within the scope the Hostages Convention because their acts lack the necessary 
transnational element that is a prerequisite for the application of the Hostages 
Convention.357 The real importance of Article 12 is therefore that is the only provision 
within the existing counter-terrorism instruments that is directly related to the 
relationship between terrorism and international humanitarian law. 
As mentioned initially, the Hostages Convention was drafted in the aftermath of 
the Entebbe incident. As a result, there was a strong will among developing States, 
which had been highly critical of the rescue operation, to ensure that no such future 
actions would occur. 358 This resulted in another provision limiting the scope of the 
Convention. Article 14 provides that: "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed 
as justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
354 Ibid., at p. 266. 
355 Ibid. 
356 The lex specialis character of international humanitarian law has been authoritatively been stated on 
several occasion in relation to human rights law and the same finding would presumable also apply to 
international criminal law, see e.g. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 104-106. On the principle of les 
SJJecialis ~e(! gt:_nerally,J. P<l!JwelyJ1, (onjlic;t of N_orms in Pyi}lit; InttmtqJignal Lgw: Jl(JJV WTO J,aw 
Relates to Other Rules of International law, (2003) 385 et seq. 
357 The Hostages Convention, Article 13. 
358 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 314. 
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State in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations." Although the purpose of 
this Article was to prevent future actions like the Entebbe incident, the reference to 
the Charter of United Nations adds nothing new to the rules regulating the use of 
force. 359 Moreover, that it is only States in whose territory hostages are held that are 
obliged in accordance with Article 3 to "take all measures ... in particular to secure his 
[the hostages] release" does not mean that other States are prohibited from attempting 
rescue operations. 360 Although the legality of the use of force to rescue national in a 
foreign State without the consent of that States is highly contentious.361 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Hostages Convention is the first counter-terrorist instrument directly to refer to 
human rights. 362 Not only was the right to life and liberty among the considerations 
that initiated the legal steps aimed at eliminating this terrorist threat; it also provides a 
provision providing "fair treatment" of the alleged offender,363 thereby building on the 
protection first envisaged in the New York Convention but extending this by adding 
the words "including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees provided by the law of 
the State in the territory of which he is present."364 The obligation to ensure the 
presence of the offender, common to all of the counter-terrorist instruments, reflects 
other human rights considerations. The alleged offender must not only be treated as 
any other criminal in accordance with the law, but the time of detention must be 
proportional to the purpose of ensuring either prosecution or extradition, exactly as 
first envisaged in the Tokyo Convention.365 Moreover, the obligation to "immediately 
make a preliminary inquiry into the facts" further ensures that no one has their liberty 
infringed unnecessarily. 366 
Similar to the New York Convention, the Hostages Convention also includes a 
right to consular protection. Article 6(3) provides: 
359 Ibid., at 322. 
360 Ibid., at p. 323. 
361 Cf. C. Gray, International Law and the Use of force, (2000), 108-111. 
362 ihe Hostages Convention, Preamble. 
363 /bid., at Article 8(2) 
364 Ibid.: 
365 Ibid., Article 6(1 ). 
366 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 174. 
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"Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph l of this article are being taken 
shall be entitled: to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State 
of which he is a national or which is otherwise entitled to establish such communication or, if he is a 
Stateless person, the State in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;" 
The use of the words "any person" followed by the words "shall be entitled" led to the 
same conclusion as with the New York Convention: that the Hostages Convention 
provides any individual taken into custody or against whom other measures are taken 
with a right to consular communication. This conclusion is further strengthened by the 
fact that Article 6(5) directly reflects the language of Article 36(2) of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations by adding that laws and regulations applicable to 
communication and visit from a representative of the protecting State "must enable 
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 
of this article are intended." Moreover, the importance attributed to consular 
protection is evident in Article 9(1), which states that if communication with the 
alleged offender by the appropriate authorities of the State entitled to exercise rights 
of protection cannot be effected, then a request for extradition shall not be granted.367 
No comparable provision existed in any of the earlier counter-terrorism instruments. 
In addition to normal consular protection, the Hostages Convention also contains a 
provision according to which the International Red Cross (ICRC) may also be 
invested with the right to visit the alleged offender. This is "without prejudice" to the 
right of the State having a claim to jurisdiction. This provision is highly unorthodox 
and resembles the system envisaged under the Geneva Conventions. Rosenstock notes 
that it, 
"reflects commendable concern with the right to communicate with accused persons and a creative 
approach to facilitating communication in precisely the circumstances in which it may be most 
necessary, that is, when relations between States involved are such that no diplomatic or consular 
relations exist. "368 
Despite the strong commitment entailed in the Hostages Convention, to ensure 
communication with the alleged offender, one must not lose sight of the reality that 
367 See generally, J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the 
Hostages Convention, ( 1990) 222-223. 
368 Quoted ibid., at p. 182. 
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neither the State of nationality nor the ICRC is under any obligation to visit or 
communicate with the detainee. The protection is therefore only as strong as the 
determination of the State of nationality, a fact that was amply illustrated in relation to 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay.369 The exception to extradition contained in this 
provision exists to ensure due process and fair trial requirements.370 Nevertheless, in 
relation to consular protection it only applies where the "appropriate authorities of the 
States entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot be effected." Hence it is not any 
failure of lack of communication that prompts the protection against extradition, but 
only situations where the entitled State is prevented from providing consular 
protection. In other words, if a State refuses to make use of its access to a detainee or 
declines an invitation to do so, there would be no bar to extradition on that basis of 
lack of communication.371 
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is contained in Article 8 and is an exact 
reproduction of its forerunner in the Hague Convention, with the exception that the 
phrase "through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State "has been 
retained from the New York Convention. The effectiveness of the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare might nevertheless be significantly weakened by the obligation 
contained in Article 3 to ease the situation. Article 3(1) prescribes that: 
"The State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held by the offender shall take all measures it 
considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after 
his release, to facilitate, when relevant, his departure." 
The State in whose territory the hostage is being held is therefore free to take 
whatever measure it considers appropriate in order to secure the release of hostages, 
including the possibility of granting immunity to the hostage takers in return for the 
release of hostages. 372 The possible conflict between Article 3 and 8 was discussed 
during the drafting.373 According to Lambert, the debate ended with a statement of the 
FRG, according to which article 3 and 8 were of equal rank, but that Article 3 
369 See for instance the Abassi case [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 and the Al-Rawi case [2006[ EWCH 972 
(Admin). In the latter case the applicants were not a national but a resident. 
370 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in Internationall.aw. A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 223. 
371 Ibid .. 
372 Ibid., at pp. 112-114. 
373 See Second Report of the Hostages Committee, p. 72, para 18. 
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provided States a carte blanche to take the measures it deems appropriate. 374 Any 
decision to grant immunity would not however be binding on other States, which 
would still be under an obligation to ensure prosecution or extradition if the hostage 
takers were subsequently apprehended in the territory of another contracting State. 
Given that any grant of immunity would be inconsistent with the very object and 
purpose of the Convention, it goes without saying that States should only grant 
immunity as a last resort and only while in good faith. 375 
Despite this, the Achille Lauro affair amply illustrates how political considerations 
will often outweigh legal obligations. The facts of the case are not entirely clear, but 
an agreement was reached between the representatives of Egypt, Italy and the FRO to 
provide the hijackers, who in 1985 hijacked an Italian liner within the territorial 
waters of Egypt, with an assurance of "safe-passage". In other words, the signatory 
States promised not to initiate criminal proceedings and not to extradite the hijackers, 
if they released the hostages.376 This was despite both Egypt and the FRO were parties 
to the Hostages Convention. Italy, who had signed but not yet ratified the Convention, 
was under no obligation to comply with the provisions of the Hostages Convention. 
Although it was under an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the object 
and purpose of the Convention. 377 Italy was furthermore obliged under a 1983 bilateral 
extradition treaty to hand over the alleged mastermind of the whole incident, Abu 
Abbas. The decision by Italy subsequently not to extradite Abu Abbas was according 
to Cassese an "outright violation of Article 12 of the treaty." 
Similar to previous instruments, the Hostages Convention also modifies preceding 
extradition treaties and allows for the Convention to be used as a surrogate extradition 
treaty. 
Article 4 of the Hostages Convention, similar to earlier instruments, provides an 
obligation to prevent the commission of the criminalised conduct. 378 It is similar to the 
equivalent provision in the New York Convention. Although the language contained 
in the Hostages Convention is both stronger and more precise than its predecessor in 
374 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 114. 
j 75 Ibid.- . 
376 For a copy of the agreement see A. Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law, (1989) 44. 
377 Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties (1969) Article 19(1)(8). 
378 The Hostages Convention, Article 4. 
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the New York Convention and therefore also stronger than the Declaration of Friendly 
Relations among States. The obligation included: 
"taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the 
commission of those offences within or outside their territories, including measures to prohibit in their 
territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or 
engage in the perpetration of acts of taking of hostages;" 
Thus if a State is unwilling or incapable of preventing terrorist activities from taking 
place on their territories then this might give rise to a right of self-defence in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Traditionally such a right was 
dependent on the attributability of the acts in question to the respective State.379 Often, 
however, no clear link exists between terrorist groups and the official apparatus of a 
State. Thus except for cases of de facto control of the terrorist by the State such 
attributability would be a matter of degree. This lead to significant uncertainties as to 
how much assistance would suffice to establish a right of self-defence. 380 The attack 
on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, however, brought a "revolutionary 
challenge to the doctrine of self-defence and a reassessment of the law in this area". 381 
Despite the fact that the use of force against Afghanistan went far beyond what was 
permitted under the traditional doctrine of self-defence the actions of the United 
States and the United Kingdom found widespread acceptance.382 
The obligation to ensure co-operation further entails the requirement to exchange 
information and other administrative measures that may prevent commission of 
hostages taking. It thereby follows the somewhat amorphous nature of previous 
instruments in its ample lack of specificity in relation to co-operation. 383 
379 Cf. A. Cassese, "Legal" Response to terrorism, 64 Foreign Affairs (1986) 597-600. 
380 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) f1986]l.C.J Reports 14, 
pp. 103-104 
381 C. Gray, 'The Use of Force and the International Legal Order', in M. Evans, lntemational Law, 
(2003) 603. 
382 Ibid., at 604. 
383 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 128. 
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Conclusion 
The Hostages Convention follows the pattern established by previous instruments 
seeking agreement on the prohibition of certain specific conduct. It is the first 
instrument to regulate the relationship between terrorism and international 
humanitarian law and to restate the prohibition on the use of force found in Article 
2( 4) in the UN Charter. Both issues are nevertheless of little significance in relation to 
the application of the Convention. The protection of human rights is stronger than in 
the previous instruments and the underlining premise seems to be that the act of 
hostage taking is a crime. The prohibition on the taking of hostages can also be found 
in other international instruments, notably, as seen above, humanitarian instruments.384 
This has led Meron to conclude that the prohibition contained in the Hostages 
Convention' is maturing into a customary norm.385 In his words: 
" ... the taking of hostages has been solemnly prohibited by the International Convention on the Taking 
of Hostages ... and by other authorative Statements, such as treaties criminalizing hijacking of aircraft 
and resolutions condemning hostages-taking. I would therefore, submit that the norm tracking the 
prohibition started in Article I of the Convention of 17 December 1979 is maturing into customary 
humanitarian and human rights law. 
Even if correct, and such a customary norm has matured, then this would nevertheless 
not necessarily entail an obligation to prosecute hostage takers; since a right to 
prosecute international crime does not imply any obligation to do so. 
The Hostages Convention, like previous counter-terrorism instruments, contains 
serious flaws. In addition to the usual problems relating to the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle, the uncertainty relating to the applicability of the Convention in relation to 
international armed conflicts and national liberations movements, as well as the 
possibility to grant amnesty to hostages, may seriously hamper the effectives of the 
Convention. 
384 Cf. common Article 3 in the Geneva Convention, Article 75(2) of Protocol I and Article 4(2)(c) of 
Protocol II. 
385 T. Meron, War Crimes Coming of Age: Essays, ( 1998) 162. 
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The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was drafted to 
avert the risk experienced at the height of the cold war. 
Aim and Object 
The aim of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
[Hereinafter the 'Nuclear Convention']386 was to avert the potential dangers posed by 
the misuse of nuclear material. The convention therefore seeks to establish conformity 
in national laws relating to the protection of nuclear material by providing among 
others for an obligation to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of the 
conduct, which Parties are obliged to criminalise under domestic law in accordance 
with the Convention. 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Nuclear Convention is not so much concerned with criminalising a specific 
conduct as with providing rules for effective protection of nuclear material. 387 In doing 
so it provides for an obligation upon States to ensure certain preventive measures in 
regard to offences concerning nuclear material. It therefore criminalises the unlawful 
possession, use, transfer, etc. of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and 
threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or 
substantial property damage. The Convention further requires Contracting States to 
make these acts punishable and subject to the well know established system of 
prosecution and extradition. Article 7 obliges States to criminalise the following 
forms of conduct: 
"The intentional commission of: 
- - -
386 The- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board and Aircraft, signed on 
14 September 1963, in force 4 December 1969. 
387 The Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 
1979, in force on 8 February 1987. 
89 
a. an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, 
disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious 
injury to any person or substantial damage to property; 
b. theft or robbery of nuclear material; 
c. an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; 
d. an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of 
intimidation; 
e. threat: 
i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property 
damage, or 
ii) to commit an offence described in sub-paragraph (b) in order to compel a natural or legal 
person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act; 
f. an attempt to commit any offence described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); and 
g. an act which constitutes participation in any offence described in paragraphs (a) to (f) shall be made 
a punishable offence by each State Party under its national law. 
Each State Party shall make the offences described in this article punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account their grave nature." 
Subparagraph (a) covers any unlawful receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, 
disposal or dispersal of nuclear material, which causes, or is likely to cause death or 
serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property. The scope of this 
provision is evidently wide. Any unauthorised possession of nuclear material within 
the meaning of the Nuclear Convention is therefore per se obliged to be criminalised 
because of nuclear material's extremely harmful qualities. 388 Similar to the earlier 
counter-terrorism instruments, the Nuclear Convention is dependant on national law 
in the qualification of the criminalised conduct. The method applied in the Nuclear 
Convention is, however, far more wide reaching. This is so because past Conventions 
388 For a definition of "Nuclear Material" within the Nuclear Convention see Article I (I). 
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relied on the unlawfulness of the respective act, and therefore the qualification of the 
specific conduct as a crime under domestic law, whereas the Nuclear Convention 
takes the opposite approach, criminalising all forms of unauthorised control of nuclear 
material of potentially serious harmful effect. While previous instruments only 
required the criminalisation of specific conduct, the Nuclear Convention, arguably, 
obliges Contracting States to criminalise any conduct relating to handling of nuclear 
material unless authorised under national law. 
Subparagraph (b)-(c) reinforces the already wide scope of subparagraph (a). This is so 
because, evidently, any form of theft, robbery, embezzlement or fraud per se 
constitutes an unauthorised way of acquiring possession of the nuclear material. 
Contrary to subparagraph (a), however, the criminalised conduct in subparagraph (b)-
( c) is not qualified by any potential harmful effect. 
Similar in subparagraph (d) requires Contracting States to criminalise any demand to 
obtain nuclear material by force or threat thereof. Interestingly the Convention does 
not demand the criminalisation of inchoate demands.389 Most legal systems, however, 
contain individual provision criminalising attempt. Thus any attempt to demand 
nuclear material by force or threat may be covered by these. 
Subparagraph (e)(i) covers the threat to use nuclear material to cause death or serious 
injury to any person or substantial property damage. There no requirement that the 
person who threatens to use nuclear material is actually in possession of the material 
he threatens to use, only that the threat is intentional. Thus any threat of serious injury 
or destruction by the use of nuclear material within the meaning of the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is prescribed to be a criminalised offence. 
A parallel could be drawn between to criminalisation of bomb hoaxes under the 
Montreal Convention, Article l(l)(e). Both provisions cover, and draw within the 
ambit of international terrorism a wide range of acts. Subparagraph (e)(ii) further 
covers the threat of theft or robbery in order to compel any of the covered subjects to 
do or refrain from doing any act. 
389 Nuclear Convention, Article 7( I )(f). 
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Jurisdiction 
Like previous instruments, the Nuclear Convention covers acts committed within 
the territory of a Contracting State, including on board a ship or an aircraft. Other then 
that, the Convention is rather limited in its scope, including as the only other principle 
of jurisdiction to prescribe the active nationality principle. Article 8(3) potentially 
broadens the limited scope of jurisdiction by providing that the Convention "does not 
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law", thereby 
leaving the States free to choose whatever form of jurisdiction to prescribe and 
adjudicate their respective domestic system provides. Article 8(4) further provides 
jurisdiction "consistent with international law" to importing and exporting States. The 
provision is somewhat superfluous in view of the fact that if the jurisdiction has to 
conform to international law, then it must exist independent of the Convention. The 
reference to the importing and exporting State, nevertheless, reinforces the point that 
these could also have jurisdiction to prescribe, e.g. on the basis of the protective or the 
passive nationality principles. 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Nuclear Convention is essentially modelled on the same framework used since 
the Hague Convention. Article 5 deals with co-operation in some detail. This 
provision inter alia requires States to provide, to the maximum extent feasible, co-
operation and assistance to ensure the recovery and protection of nuclear material in 
the case of any unlawful taking of such material or any credible threat thereof. All 
other obligations entailed in Article 5 are qualified by the word "appropriate", which 
significantly diminishes the obligation to co-operate and leaves a considerable margin 
of appreciation to respective States. 
The obligation to "take appropriate steps" to inform other States of any unlawful 
taking of nuclear material, Article 5(2)(a), is not only qualified by the rather vague 
formulation but also by Article 6(2) which provides: 
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"States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not 
permitted by to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the 
State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material" 
This provision potentially removes from Article 5(1)(a) any scope of application 
because any unlawful taking of nuclear material, within the meaning of the Nuclear 
Convention, would arguably always constitute a threat to the security of the State 
concerned. This is presumably what is meant in the preamble to the Convention, when 
reference is made to the "potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking of nuclear 
material" and constitutes the whole basis for the existence of the Convention. The 
other provisions in Article 5 are of a similarly indefinite nature. 
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare, common to all of the counter-terrorism 
instruments, is contained in Article 10. Article 11 further provides that the Convention 
can be used as a surrogate extradition treaty. 
In relation to criminal proceedings brought in respect of the Convention, Article 13 
specifies that Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance, including the supply of evidence. Moreover, the Convention also 
specifically provides for the obligation to protect human rights among other by 
obliging Contracting States to ensure fair treatment for the alleged perpetrator. 390 
Conclusion 
The Nuclear Convention is in some respects atypical when compared with the 
other counter-terrorist instruments. It is primarily concerned with the physical 
protection of nuclear material and not so much with the crirninalisation of a specific 
conduct. Nevertheless, the Convention still sits comfortably within the so-called 
suppression convention because of Article 7, which requires the criminalisation of any 
unauthorised possession of nuclear material. 
The Nuclear Convention is more protective of national interest than previous 
instruments, as can be seen e.g. in Article 2, which concerns the scope of the 
390 The Nuclear Convention, Article 12. 
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Convention.391 Thus the Convention only applies to nuclear material used for peaceful 
purposes. Nuclear material used for military purposes is not covered by the 
Convention, neither is the use thereof. This is easily understandable when seen in light 
of realties of the cold war. It further fits within the pattern established by previous 
instruments generally exempting acts committed by State authorities. Ironically, 
however, this might mean that theft of or the threat to use, for instance, a ballistic 
nuclear missile may not fall within the scope of the Convention. The only reference to 
nuclear material used for military purposes is in the preamble, which recognises the 
importance of the physical protection of nuclear military weapons. 
The obligations under the Convention in relation to the recovery of nuclear 
material are far more comprehensive than any of the co-operation provisions in the 
previous instruments, although severely restricted by considerations of national 
security. Thus the potential efficacy is limited by their vagueness. 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation [Hereinafter the 'Maritime Convention'],392 was initiated after 
the Achille Lauro affair,393 which prompted the United Nations Security Council to 
condemn the terrorist acts and the General Assembly to request that the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) recommend appropriate action.394 
391 Cf. Article 2(3) specifies that: "Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties 
in the Articles covered by paragraph 2 with respect to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, 
while in domestic use, storage and transport, nothing in this Convention shall interpreted as affecting 
the Sovereign rights of a State regarding the domestic use, storage and transport of such material's also 
Articles 4(7), 6(2) and 14(3). 
392 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
done at Rome on 10 March 1988, in force on I march 1992. See generally G. Plant, 'The Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation', 39 lnternational and 
Comparative Law Quarterly ( 1990) 27. 
393 See generally A. Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law, ( 1989), T. Treves, 'The Rome Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of maritime Navigation', in Maritime 
Terrorism and lnterl)ational Law, N. Ronzitti (ed.), (1990) 69-90. 
394 At the 2618lh meeting of the Security Council on 9 October 1985, the president made a Statement 
saying inter alia, 'They [the members of the SC] resolutely condemn this unjustifiable and criminal 
hijacking as well other acts of terrorism including hostages/taking", UN Doc. Sf 17554. GA Resolution 
40/61 (1985). 
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Aim and Object 
The purpose of the Maritime Convention was to secure international peace and 
security. This was done in recognition of the innocent life lost in violation of 
international human rights by the escalation of maritime terrorism, which, according 
to the preamble, was of "grave concern to the international community as a whole". 
The aim of the Convention was to provide an instrument ensuring that effective and 
practical measures were taken for the prevention of such acts by providing that 
appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Convention essentially follows the pattern from the previous instruments 
requiring Contracting States to make it an offence unlawfully and intentionally to: 
a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; 
or 
b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship; or 
c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship; or 
d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is 
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their 
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or 
f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the s afe navigation of a 
ship; or 
g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any 
of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f). 
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Similar to the ICAO instruments concerning international aviation, the Maritime 
Convention needed to include the requirement of unlawfulness in the definition of the 
criminalised conduct to exclude the legally justifiable acts by police or other State 
agents, for instance when trying to gain control of a hijacked ship.395 
Subparagraph (a) covers the seizure or control of a ship and corresponds mutatis 
mutandis to Article 11(1) of the Tokyo Convention and Article l(a) of the Hague 
Convention. It consequently includes non-forcible measures such as 'blackmail'. A 
further similarity to these instruments is that the criminalised conduct is qualified by 
requirement of "unlawfulness". The determination of the lawfulness of the measures 
in question presumably has to be settled by reference to the law of the State of 
registration or the territorial State in whose territorial waters the ship might be 
navigating. It is worth noting that there is no requirement that the control or seizure 
actually endanger the safety of the ship, contrary to the subsequent provisions. 
Subparagraphs (b) covers violence against persons on board a ship and corresponds, 
mutatis mutandis, to Article l(a) of the Montreal Convention. The requirement that 
the act must endanger the safety of the navigation of the ship creates the same 
uncertainty as with what constitutes a danger to the safety of an aircraft in flight. It is 
evident that not all acts of violence are covered and the threshold is presumable higher 
in relation to ships than to aircraft because of the increased vulnerability of the latter. 
It would for instance be highly unlikely that a scuffle between unruly passengers 
would fulfil the requirement of endangering the safe navigation of the ship while it 
might endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight. 396 This would at least be the 
conclusion in relation to the normal use of the term "ship", i.e. a vessel larger than a 
boat for transporting people or goods by sea. However, for the purpose of the 
Maritime Convention the term "ship" means, "a vessel of any type whatsoever not 
permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, 
3~5A. Aust, Implementation Kitsfor the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 190. 
396 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
14 (1975) 283. 
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submersibles, or any other floating craft."397 This means that any ship, "navigating ... 
through or from the waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single 
State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States" except warships or 
other State-owned ships,398 would fall within the scope of the Maritime Convention. 
Hence any small recreational type of vessels could theoretically fall within the ambit 
of the Convention. Even a small dinghy crossing the territorial waters of an adjacent 
State could fall within the scope of the Convention. This was in all likelihood not the 
intent of the drafters. However the question concerning the dangers of a scuffle or 
even, as suggested by Abramovsky in relation to the Montreal Convention, the 
intentional killing of a passenger is highly dependant on the size and type of the 
vessel. There is, however, little doubt that violence against the captain or other 
indispensable crew would always endanger safe navigation. 
Subparagraphs (c) covers destruction or damage to a ship or its cargo and 
corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to Article l(b) of the Montreal Convention, with the 
exception that the Maritime Convention also includes destruction or damage to the 
cargo of the ship. Similar to the Montreal Convention, the main focus of subparagraph 
(c) does not seem to be passengers but cargo. There is no requirement that the 
destruction or damage be committed while on board the ship, only that it is committed 
unlawfully and intentionally with the likelihood of endangering the safety of the ship. 
This means also that intentional damage committed by others ships could fall within 
the scope of the Convention. It not clear whether this also includes damage as a result 
of acts of State-owned vessel e.g. naval ships. 
Subparagraph (d) covers the use of bombs or other incendiary or destructive devices 
or substances likely to destroy or damage the ship, its cargo, or to endanger safe 
navigation and corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to Article 1 (c) of the Montreal 
Convention. 
Subparagraph (e) covers destruction, damage or interference of maritime navigational 
facilities and corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to Article 1 (d) of the Montreal 
Convention. In fact, it is almost a verbatim copy of-the corresponding provision. 
397 The Maritime Convention, Article I. 
398 Cf. The Maritime Convention, Article 2(1) and 4(1). 
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Unlike the Montreal Convention, the Maritime Convention does not specifically 
require that the navigational facilities be used for international navigation. It may 
therefore, arguably, also include damage to lighthouses or national radio towers used 
for maritime navigation, as long as these were likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of a ship. The provision does not require any specific result but only that the act 
creates a dangerous situation. Since, however, the Convention only applies to 
transnational navigation, a minimum requirement seems to be that the act in question 
could potentially endanger international shipping. In other words, navigation facilities 
situated outside the reach of transnational navigation, such as in internal waters with 
no passage to international straits, would arguably not come within the scope of the 
Convention. 
Subparagraph (f) covering false communication to ships and corresponds, mutatis 
mutandis, to Article l(e) of the Montreal Convention. Analogous to the Montreal 
Convention, the Maritime Convention concerns the situation where a person 
knowingly communicates false information thereby endangering the safe navigation 
of the ship. The use of the word "thereby" indicates that the danger must occur as a 
result of the communication and not, as in the preceding paragraphs, be "likely" to 
occur. Unlike the Montreal Convention there is no requirement that the 
communication is unlawful. The aim of the communication is moreover irrelevant as 
there is no requirement of any specific motive. The provision thus has a wide potential 
scope and could, similarly to the Montreal Convention, cover situations that were not 
thought of at the time of drafting, e.g. so-called cyber terrorism. 
Jurisdiction 
Similar to the previous instruments, the Maritime Convention contains the so-
called military carve-out. Article 2( 1) clearly specifies that the Convention "does not 
apply to" warships and other State operated ships used for auxiliary purposes such as 
those of customs and police. It is not clear, however, whether this is an absolute 
exception or whether it only removes such vessels from the list of possible targets. In 
98 
this respect, a parallel might be drawn to the territorial scope of the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention and whether it applies to attacks on military facilities. 399 
In general the jurisdictional clause is broader than in previous conventions 
allowing not only to prescribe for the passive nationality principle, as does the 
Hostages Convention, but also acts committed in an attempt to compel a State to 
perform or abstain from a specific act, i.e. the protective principle.400 It further 
contains the extra-territorial principle, introduced by the Hague Convention, based on 
the mere presence of the offender within the territory of a State.401 The importance of 
the assertion of the otherwise contentions principle of passive nationality is somewhat 
attenuated by this latter, all encompassing, principle. 
The Maritime Convention has been amended several times, most notably by the 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf, which widened the scope encompassing "fixed 
platforms" on the continental shelf.402 The IMO adopted further amendments on 14 
October 2005.403 These significantly broaden the scope of the conduct States are 
required to criminalise so that it also, under certain circumstances, covers the 
transport of nuclear material, thereby creating an overlap with the Nuclear 
Convention.404 The latest amendments do not, however, come into force before it has 
reached the necessary number of signatures or ratifications. 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Maritime Convention resembles the previous instruments in providing for 
extradition and co-operation. The key provision, as in all previous instruments, is the 
obligation either to present the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of 
399 See below p.l 07. 
400 Ibid., Article 6(2)(c). For the protective principle see generally, I. Cameron, The Protective Principle 
of international criminal jurisdiction, ( 1994 ). 
401 The Maritime Convention, Article 6(4). 
402 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf, ( 1988). 
403 See www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 
404 Unlike the Nuclear Convention, however, the Maritime Convention is not restricted to nuclear 
material for peaceful purposes. 
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prosecution or to extradite.405 This provision was slightly modified from its original 
form by the change of the word "serious" to "grave".406 This modification, however, 
does not change the meaning of the provision. The Maritime Convention further 
contains the amendment first introduced by the New York Convention, that the case 
shall be submitted to the relevant authorities without undue delay. 
The aid provided by the Convention in regard to extradition, even though 
essentially based on previous provisions, also goes further in modifying all extradition 
treaties between Contracting States to the extent that they are incompatible with the 
Convention.407 
The Maritime Convention might be seen taking a step backward in regard to 
human rights protection, since it does not provide an exception from the obligation to 
initiate extradition if that extradition is founded on otherwise normally excluded 
grounds such as race, religion, and nationality. This, however, has been modified by 
the 2005 amendments.408 Thus it seems that States are still not willing to establish a 
system that provides for mandatory extradition. 
Conclusion 
The Maritime Convention resembles counter-terrorism instruments dealing with 
aviation security. In fact, many of the comparable provisions have been copied from 
these earlier instruments into the Maritime Convention. 
The 2005 amendments included several features first introduced in the Hostages 
Convention, such as the exclusion of the political offence. The exclusion of the 
political offence exception from the Maritime Convention may be read as yet another 
step facilitating international criminal co-operation. Importantly the increase in human 
rights protection excluding extradition also shows that States are still not willing to 
establish a system that provides for mandatory extradition, even in relation to 
terrorism. A further innovation in the Maritime Convention is the broadening of the 
scope of application so that it now also covers, in certain circumstances, the transport 
405 The Maritime Convention, Article 10. 
406 As a result the final paragraph of Article 10 reads: "Those authoritit;!s sbl!ll take their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.". 
407 Ibid., Article 10(7). 
408 Article llbis.The amendments were adopted on 15 October 2005 but have not yet entered into force. 
Cf. <www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686> 
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of nuclear material, thereby creating a clear overlap with the Nuclear Convention. The 
2005 amendments have yet to come into force, but even when sufficient ratifications 
have been made, the Protocol does nothing to address the inherent weakness of the 
counter-terrorism regime: i.e. that prosecution might be influenced by political 
motive. 
The Convention for the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection 
The Convention for the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
[Hereinafter the 'Explosives Convention'], 409 was drafted in the aftermath of the 
Lockerbie bombings. The Security Council specifically expressed their concern that 
plastic explosives could be used in terrorists' acts and further urged the ICAO to 
intensify work on the prevention of acts of terrorism.410 The Convention is similar to 
the Nuclear Convention in that it is not primarily intended to define criminal conduct 
but to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives. 
Aim and Object 
The aim of the Explosive Convention is to ensure some form of protection against 
plastic explosives, which are highly versatile and almost undetectable.411 The 
Convention therefore aims to ensure the prohibition domestically of unmarked plastic 
explosives for non-military use. 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
Unlike all the other instruments the Explosives Convention does not criminalise 
any specific conduct. Instead Article II provides: 
409 The Conve~tion for the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at 
Montreal on 1 March 1991 , in force on 21 June 1998. 
410 Security Council Resolution 635, 14 June 1989. 
411 C. Towsend, 'Terrorism -A very short introduction' (2002) 28. 
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"Each State Party shall take the necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the 
manufacture in its territory of unmarked explosives." 
It may be inferred from this provision, even though it is not stated directly, that the 
Convention obliges States to ensure that manufactures use a marking agent, i.e. a 
substance introduced into an explosive to make it detectable. 
The Convention further contains very strict provisions on the movement and 
possession of unmarked plastic explosives.412 In relation to the movement of 
explosives then these obligations do not cover "movements for purposes not 
inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention, by authorities of a State Party 
performing military or police functions". 413 The military and police are not completely 
exempt from the prohibition on possession, by virtue of Article IV (3): 
"Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that all stocks of those explosives 
referred to in paragraph I of this Article held by its authorities performing military or police functions 
and that are not incorporated as an integral part of duly authorized military devices are destroyed or 
consumed for purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention, marked or rendered 
permanently ineffective, within a period of fifteen years from the entry into force of this Convention in 
respect of that State." 
Notwithstanding the exception to the military carve-out it still represents a significant 
gap in the scope of the Convention, a gap that might significantly influence its 
efficiency. 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The only obligation incumbent on the Contracting States in relation to co-operation 
is a very timid obligation "if possible" to assist the Commission, establish pursuant to 
Article VI, to evaluate technical developments relating to the manufacture, marking 
and detection of explosives, to discharge its functions. There is no other obligation on 
inter-State co-operation. Neither is there any provision on detention or extradition. 
The latter might be explained by the fact that the Convention does not provide for the 
412 The Explosives Convention, Articles III-IV. 
413 Ibid., Article III (2). 
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criminalisation of any conduct. Although it does not explain why there are no 
provisions on co-operation. If, as expressed in the preamble, the marking of plastic 
explosives for the purpose of detection contributes significantly to the prevention of 
terrorist acts, i.e. the destruction of aircraft etc., then it seems reasonable to infer that 
also co-operating ensuring development and proliferation of such technology would 
enhance the stated objective. Nevertheless no such obligation exists. The above-
mentioned Commission only serves to "evaluate technical developments" not to 
promote or proliferate. The efficiency of the Convention may further have been 
strengthened by obliging Contracting States to co-operate in relation to the recovery 
of explosives, similar to the obligations within the Nuclear Convention. Especially 
when once takes into account that State are not obliged to mark explosives for 
military purposes thus potentially allowing for vast quantities of unmarked 
explosives. 414 
Conclusion 
The Explosive Convention is different from all other counter-terrorist instruments 
because it is not directed at the arrest and prosecution of terrorist. Instead it aims to 
ensure better control and detection of plastic explosives. It does not therefore fall 
within the category of so-called "suppression conventions".415 Aust, States that the 
only reason that the United Nations lists the Explosives Convention as one of the 
twelve (now thirteen) counter-terrorist instruments is only because of it importance 
for the continual fight against terrorism.416 It is therefore difficult to comment on it in 
relation to the efficiency of the counter-terrorism regime as a whole. Although, given 
the fact that explosives for terrorist purposes comes from varies sources, including 
stolen from military installations and extracted from landmines, the efficiency may be 
questioned since the Convention does not oblige the marking of all such explosives.417 
414 In might be recalled that more than 350 tons of plastic explosives apparently dissapeared in Iraq, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3950493.stm 
415 N. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions', Human Rights Law Review, 
(2002) 199. 
416 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 
Commonwealth Secretariat. 
417 M. Krausa and A. A. Reznev, Vapour and Trace Detection of Explosives for Anti-Terrorism 
Purposes: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, held in Moscow, Russia, 19-2, 
Moscow, Russia, 19-20 March 2003, (2004), 51. 
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The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
[Hereinafter the 'Terrorist Bombing Convention'],418 was initiated by the United 
States after the truck bombing attack on the U.S. military personnel in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia, in June 1996.419 
Aim and Object 
The preamble to the Convention notes that "terrorist attacks by means of 
explosives or other lethal devices have become increasingly widespread" and that 
"existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address these attacks". Thus 
testifying to the inefficiency of the previous instruments. The aim of the Bombing 
Convention was to establish a more effective instrument in the fight against 
international terrorism. 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Convention entails a comprehensive definition of an offence, which must be 
quoted in full. Article 2( 1), States: 
"Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and 
intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or 
against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an 
infrastructure facility: 
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such 
destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss." 
418 The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist B-ombings, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997, in force 12 January 1998. 
419 SeeS. M. Witten, 'The International Convention for the Suppression of terrorist Bombings', 92 
American Journal of International Law ( 1998) 774. 
104 
Similar to previous instruments the Terrorist Bombing Convention contains in the 
definition of the criminalised conduct the dual requirement of unlawfulness and 
intent. 
The requirement of "unlawfulness" was included to exclude the proper 
employment of explosives or other lethal devices by police or military forces. 420 This, 
however, leaves a considerable uncertainty regarding improper or excessive use of 
lethal devices by governmental agents.421 This is not just a theoretical question 
because the Convention also covers the use of toxic chemicals and potentially 
therefore also the use of tear gasses and other chemical agents employed by police 
forces. 422 In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that the Convention 
applies whenever one of the victims is a national of another State. The Convention 
could therefore be applicable to mass demonstrations where protesters are of different 
nationalities like the demonstrations during the G8 Summit in Genoa in July 200 l. 
Moreover, unlike previous instruments, unlawfulness cannot be established with 
reference to any State of 'registration'. The legality of the act must therefore 
presumably be determined by reference to the law of the territorial State where the 
event occurred. Although the term "unlawfully" is open to a broader interpretation. 
This ambiguity is a consequence of the significant development in the definition of 
the prescribed conduct that the Convention represents. Previous instruments have 
relied on an enumerative description of a narrowly defined conduct. In addition, there 
was a strong presumption that State agents would never carry out such acts or that 
States could have any legitimate interest in perpetrating these atrocities. The conduct 
prescribed by the Terrorist Bombing Convention, on the other hand, is very broad. 
The method of attack is wide, covering not only traditional explosive and incendiary 
devices but also attacks with toxic chemicals, biological agents, radioactive material 
or other lethal substances.423 This means that not only does the Convention overlap 
with other instruments, e.g. the Chemical Weapons Convention,424 the Montreal 
420 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 244. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Whether tear gases are to be considered as "lethal device" within the meaning of the Explosives 
Convention is uncertain. However under extreme circumstances the inhalation of tear gases in high 
concentration could lead to fatal pulmonary oedema. Thus, it could arguable be considered a lethal 
weapon. Cf. H. Hu. and otl'!ers, 'Tear gas- harassing agent or toxic chemical weapon?', The Journal of 
the American Medical Association 265 ( 1989) 5, pp. 660-663. 
423 Ibid., at p. 777. 
424 Cf. C. Hunt. 'Legal Assistance: The Chemical Weapons Convention and Complementary 
Agreements', in Yepes-Enriquez and L. Tabassi (eds.) Treaty Enjorcemellt and International 
105 
Convention and the Maritime Convention, but more importantly, it also covers 
activities that States normally carry out and have a legitimate desire to perform. This 
also justify the very explicit military 'carve-out', according to which: 
"The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under 
international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, 
and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, 
inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this 
Convention."425 
The geographical scope is also substantial, covering any "place of public use, a 
State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure 
facility". This was, according to S.M. Witten, chosen with a view to criminalise 
attacks in locations where terrorist would normally attack and civilians are at greatest 
risk.426 Although the Convention does not seem to distinguish between civilian and 
non-civilian targets. In fact, the scope of the Convention is broad enough to 
encompass attacks on military facilities since "State or government facility" includes 
any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied "by 
officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity", which may 
included military personnel.427 
Jurisdiction 
Similar to previous instruments, the Bombing Convention does not cover activities 
of military forces. Already in the preamble it is noted that: 
"[T]he activities of military forces of States are governed by rules of international law outside the 
framework of this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from the coverage of this 
Convention does not condone or make lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under 
other laws" 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters with Special Reference to the Chemical Weapons Convention (2002) 
29et seq. 
425 Terrorist Bombing Convention, Article 19(2). 
~26 S.M. Witten, 'The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings', 92 
American Journal of International Law ( 1998) 776. 
427 Terrorist Bombing Convention, Article I (I). 
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The exception of military forces is further re-stated in Article 19(2), quoted above. 
Similar to the Hostages Convention therefore, the Terrorist Bombing Convention does 
not apply in circumstances regulated by international humanitarian law. Thereby 
reiterating the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali. Given the very broad 
definition of the prescribed criminalised conduct, the exception provided covers a far 
wider area of activities than the parallel exception in the Hostages Convention. It is, 
however, noteworthy that the exception only includes "armed forces of a State" and 
"activities undertaken by military forces of a State", thus clearly not including so-
called liberation movements. To the extent that activities of liberation movements fall 
within the scope of international humanitarian law these, may however still be 
exempted from the jurisdiction of the Convention by application of the above-stated 
principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali. This would, however, only apply 
where there was a genuine conflict, i.e. overlap ratione materia.428 This would mean 
not only that the same acts would have to be covered but also that they would have to 
be subject to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. 
The potentially wide scope of application of the Terrorist Bombing Convention is 
further limited be reference to sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction. In this respect, 
Article 17 reaffirms the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 
States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs. In addition, Article 18 
ensures that: 
"Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the 
exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities 
of that other State Party by its domestic law." 
Thus the Convention clearly prohibits the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in the 
territory of another State. This is in conformity with international law. The exercise of 
extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction, such as arrest or kidnapping of an 
individual, are thus clearly not sanctioned by the Convention. 
428 J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules 
of International law, (2003) 367. 
107 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
The Convention is structured on the previous counter-terrorism instruments and 
includes the principle of aut dedere aut judicare similar to the modified provision in 
the Maritime Convention.429 The Bombing Convention further builds on the principle 
of aut dedere aut judicare allowing for the temporary transfer of an alleged offender 
for the purpose of standing trial in a country other than the State of custody. Article 
8(2) reads in full: 
"Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one 
of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State to serve the 
sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the 
person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this 
option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be 
sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph I of the present article. 
Thus the Terrorist Bombing Convention allows conditional extradition, reflecting a 
parallel development of international criminal law - primary repatriation -that in 
some case has become a feature of national law. The Bombing Convention thereby 
provides a greater room for manoeuvre while complying with the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare. 
In relation to extradition, Article 9( 1) modifies existing extradition treaties so that 
the conduct defined in Article 2 of the Convention is included as an extraditable 
offence in any existing extradition treaty in force between the parties. Article 9(2) 
further allows for the Bombing Convention to be used as a surrogate extradition 
treaty. Further, in relation to extradition, the Bombing Convention contains a series of 
innovations facilitating criminal co-operation. 
Several previous instruments explicitly stated that political motive could in no 
circumstances justify any act falling within their respective scope of application. This 
is followed up in Article 5 of the Bombing Convention where it is explicit stated that: 
"Criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated 
to provoke a State of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are 
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
429 The Bombing Convention, Article 8. 
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ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave 
nature." 
Hence not only is the conduct defined in Article 2 referred to as criminal and most be 
dealt with accordingly, but it is under no circumstances justifiable. Thus aiming at the 
substantive liability of the offender. One of the consequences is expressed in Article 
11, which clearly States that none of the offences within the Convention shall be 
regarded as a political offence for the purpose of extradition or mutual legal 
assistance. The relevant provision reads in full: 
None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual 
legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an 
offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal 
assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political 
offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. 
The Bombing Convention thereby took another step in facilitating international co-
operation, a step that previously had not been possible. This, nevertheless, does not 
impose an obligation to extradite where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that the request was made for the purpose of prosecution or punishing a person on 
account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.430 
Thus despite the fact that, by the time of drafting of the Bombing Convention there 
was an increased will to enable extradition, there was no desire to remove all 
safeguards. In fact the removal of the traditional safeguards associated with 
extradition has been coupled with an increased human right protection. The Bombing 
Convention thus limits the obligation to extradite to a request made in good faith. 
Article 14 provides: 
"Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford 
mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to 
such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request 
would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons." 
430 The Bombings Convention, Article, 12. 
109 
Humanitarian considerations are further evident in Article 19(1) according to which: 
"Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and 
individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and international humanitarian law." 
Thus the Bombing Convention indirectly affirms the application of human rights 
instruments. This would undoubtedly also has been the result without the reference.431 
Nevertheless, the mentioning of "rights ... of ... individuals" makes this claim 
irrefutable. 
The obligations of assistance are wider than those of previous instruments. Article 
10 contained the by now standard open-ended reference to the obligation to provide 
the "greatest measure of assistance" and the reference to comply in conformity with 
other treaties on mutual legal assistance. In addition, Article 13 relates to the possible 
transfer of detainees for the purposes of testimony, identification or otherwise 
providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of 
offences under this Convention. No similar provision exists in any of the preceding 
instruments. In relation to prevention of terrorist bombing, Article 15 makes reference 
to domestic legislation, the exchange of information and research into methods of 
detection of explosives. The reference to research is another clear innovation. 
Conclusion 
The Bombing Convention is the closest so far to a comprehensive counter-
terrorism instrument. Its scope of application is far-reaching and overlaps with many 
of the previous instruments. In further incorporates many of the advances developed 
since the Hague Convention. Importantly, it was also the first of the analysed 
instruments clearly to exempt terrorism from the political offence exception, thereby 
removing another yet another obstruction and facilitating better international co-
operation.432 The Bombing Convention builds on the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare by providing for the transfer of alleged offenders to stand trial in a country 
431 Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ( 1969), Article 31 (3)( c). 
432 See also the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977), Article 1. 
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other than the State of custody. Despite its many advances, it still suffers from many 
of the same problems as its predecessor, which might explain the limited number of 
extraditions and prosecution under laws implementing the Convention. 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Hereinafter the 
'Financing Convention'] is one the few instruments not intimately linked to a specific 
incident. 433 The Convention is not directed against specific terrorist activities but 
against the support and means facilitating such acts. The aim of the Convention is 
therefore preventive unlike most of the previous conventions that relied more on a 
deterrent effect of national criminal law, although the Financing Convention also 
encompasses deterrent elements. 
It was initiated by a request of France.434 The General Assembly decided in 1999 
that a previously established ad hoc terrorism committee should elaborate on a draft 
for an international convention for the suppression of terrorist financing to supplement 
related existing international instruments.435 Initially there was some resistance, 
especially among western States, against a new instrument covering the financing of 
terrorism since this would be covered by the ancillary offence of being an 
accomplice.436 It was further questioned whether the financing of terrorism was as 
serious an offence as the crime itself. Nevertheless, compared with previous 
instruments, negotiation of the Financing Convention went surprisingly fast. In fact it 
was negotiated in two two-weeks sessions in New York in 1999.437 The initial 
reluctance may, according to Anthony Aust, be attributed to "perceived domestic 
433 See generally W. Gilmore, 'International Financial Counterterrorism Initiatives', in C. Fijnaunt, J. 
Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against Terrorism- A Transatlantic 
Dialogue, (2004) 189. 
434 A. Aust, 'Counter-Terrorism- A New Approach', Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 5 
(2001) 286. 
435 C.M. Johnson, Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, 39 ILM (2000) 268. UN Doc. NRES/53/108, para. 11. 
436 A. Aust, 'Counter-terrorism- A New Approach', Max Plank Yearbook of International Law 5 
(2001) 288. 
437 Ibid., at p. 285. 
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problems in enacting the necessary implementation legislation" and not so much with 
the underling idea of the new convention. 
The unusually short drafting time is even more remarkable when one considers that 
in relation to the financing of terrorism it is not enough, as in previous instruments, to 
enumerate the constituent elements of specific conduct that needs to be criminalised. 
Instead, the conduct of financing has to be all-encompassing and a new offence of 
financing terrorism therefore had to be drafted. As will be seen below, this problem 
was essentially solved by listing the conduct States are obliged to criminalised in 
earlier instruments.438 Some representatives, however, argued that this approach was 
unsatisfactory since earlier instruments did not cover all forms of terrorist acts such as 
murder committed by shooting, stabbing, strangulation etc. This led to demands of the 
inclusion for a more general definition. The main opposition against this was based on 
the view that any discussion of an abstract definition would inevitably reopen the 
dormant debate on what constitutes terrorism, which would unavoidable have delayed 
the drafting of the Convention. These objections turned out to be wrong. 
Aim and object 
The preamble notes that the number and seriousness of acts of international 
terrorism depend on the financing and further that existing multi1atera1legal 
instruments do not expressly address this issue. The aim of the Convention, stated by 
France at the first meeting of the Sixth Committee's working group, was "to prevent 
the crime of terrorism and punish its financing." The Convention therefore seeks to 
enhance international co-operation among States in devising and adopting effective 
measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its 
suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators. Thus 
indirectly bearing witness of the deficiency of previous instruments. 
438 For a informal summary of the discussion in the Sixth Committee ·s working group see UN Doc. 
NC.6/54/L.2, pp. 55-83. 
112 
Definition of the criminalised conduct 
The Convention has an extremely broad scope of application and the definition of 
the offence is far more complicated than any of its predecessors. Article 2 reads as 
follows: 
"I. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, 
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they 
should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in 
the annex; or 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, 
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
The wide scope of application is further sustained by the fact that for an act to 
constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it is not be necessary that the funds were 
actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1.439 The Convention 
contains a further advance by enumerating different forms of accessory to the 
offence.440 The rather complicated definition is too extensive to be commented on in 
detail here.441 Some minor remarks are nevertheless necessary. 
Firstly it should be noted that the phrase "any person" in Article 2(1) refers not 
only to a private individual but also legal entities, such as companies. This is 
sustained by Article 5, which requires States parties to: 
"take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws 
to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in 
that capacity, committed an offence as set forth in article 2." 
439 The Financing Convention, Article 2(4). 
440 Ibid., Article 2(5). 
441 For a more complete commentary, see A. Aust, 'Counter-Terrorism- A New Approach', Max 
Planck Yearbook of International Law 5 (2001) 294-301. 
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Moreover, the phrase "by any means directly or indirectly" was adopted to prevent 
any loophole. Thus it does not matter how funds get to a terrorist as long as the person 
supplying the funds has the necessary intention or knowledge.442 
The Financing Convention, like previous instruments, also contains the 
requirement of "unlawfulness". This was discussed at length.443 Suggestions were 
made to delete the term since it was thought as redundant. The view was, however, 
also expressed that it would be useful to retain the reference to "unlawful" since it 
added an element of flexibility by, for example, excluding from the ambit of 
application of the draft convention legitimate activities, such as those of humanitarian 
organisations and ransom payments. 444 One of the points made in this respect was that 
law enforcement agencies might be needed to fund terrorist organisations in order 
infiltrate them or money might have to be paid as part of a ransom.445 
Similar reasons led to the inclusion of the word "wilfully" to emphasise that 
financing had to be deliberate, not accidental or negligent, although, as Anthony Aust 
remarks, the requirements of intention or knowledge would probably be sufficient.446 
In addition to the agreed formulation of "provides and collects funds", the original 
French working paper had also included the concept of "reception".447 Those that 
opposed its inclusion expressed the concern that it would cast the meaning of the term 
"financing" too broadly, criminalising a wide variety of activities beyond what was 
originally intended.448 Others expressed strong support for the inclusion of the 
reference to "reception" of funds so as to enhance the capability of States to counter 
the funnelling of funds through middlemen, who possessed the specific intention 
required by the draft convention, or through other similar complex financial 
arrangements used to finance terrorist acts. It was noted that, without a reference to 
"reception", the middleman who possesses the funds with the required intent, but 
declines to transfer them or is apprehended before he has transferred them might not 
fall within the scope of the definition of "financing" .449 
442 Ibid., at p. 294. 
443 Ibid. 
444 See UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2, p. 60, para. 67. The ICRC and the United Nations High Commissioner 
had such Concerns, see UN Doc. AI AC.252/1999/INF/2(1CRC) and A/C.6/54/WG.IINF/ I (UNHCR). 
445 A. Aust, 'Counter-Terrorism- A New Approach', Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 5 
(2001) 294. 
446 Ibid. 
447 See UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2, p. 60, para. 36-41. 
448 UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2, p. 60, para. 37. 
449 UN Doc. A/C.6/54/L.2, para. 38. 
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In relation to intent (mens rea) the view was expressed by the United Kingdom that 
for the purpose of the offence it should suffice that there was a reasonable suspicion 
that the fund would be used in for terrorist purposes, unless the suspect could prove 
otherwise.450 Some representatives opposed this since they felt that it shifted the 
burden of proof to the accused contrary, to fundamental human rights principles.451 It 
was also suggested that reference to intent of use should be deleted, since in practice, 
it would be difficult to prove the intention to use funds to commit an offence set forth 
in article 2.452 Furthermore, the view was expressed that while the reference to 
intended use was included in article 5, paragraph 1 (b), of the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 
1988, such a reference was not appropriate in the context of the current draft 
convention, since the possession of funds (as opposed to drugs) did not, per se, 
present any danger.453 
Despite absence of any general prohibition on the use of strict liability under 
human rights law, 454 there are serious fair trial concerns related to the use of the 
principle in criminal law. In fact, most civil law jurisdictions reject the notion of strict 
liability within the criminal sphere, at least for serious offences. Moreover, concern 
about the use of a strict liability principle in criminal cases is increased in relation to 
terrorist cases where the defendant might not always have access to the information 
on the basis of which he is accused. 
In a human rights context the accused must generally be allowed an opportunity to 
rebut evidence presented.455 The applicant's right to disclosure of evidence is, 
nonetheless, not absolute and may be balanced against competing interest, such as for 
instance national security.456 The combination of strict liability and secret evidence 
may, however, result in absurd situations.457 Nobody has the means to prove his 
450 A. Aust, 'Counter-Terrorism - A New Approach', Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 5 
(2001) 294. 
451 Ibid. 
452 UN Doc. NC.6/54/L.2, para. 213. 
453 UN Doc. NC.6/54/L.2, para. 213 
454 Cf. generally, D. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ( 1995) 243-244. 
455 Ibid., at 244. 
456 See e.g. ECtHR, Door son v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1996, para. 70 and ECtHR, 
Van Meche! en and Others v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 23 April 1997, para. 54. None of the cases, 
however, concern terrorism. 
457 See the exchange of words between the Guantanamo Bay detainee Mustafa Aid ldr and the President 
of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, which serves as a forum for detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 
The case is not directly applicable to the Financing Convention because it dealt with the status of 
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innocence without knowing the evidence on which an accusation is made. The intent 
requirement is therefore an imperative fair trial safeguard, especially since the funds, 
according to Article 3, do not have to be used to carry out and offence. In other words, 
there mere possession of funds is enough to constitute an offence. The general 
fungible nature of money would mean that virtually anybody could fall within the 
scope of the Convention if there was no specific requrement of intent (mens rea). 
Even more so, when one takes into account the very wide definition of the word 
"funds", within the Convention. 458 
Subparagraph 1 (a) lists the instruments that define the scope of application of the 
Financing Convention. It includes all of the above-analysed instruments with the 
exception of the Tokyo and the Nuclear Conventions. The exclusion of these 
instruments is understandable since neither directly deals with international terrorism. 
The Tokyo Convention only deals with hijacking when it is an offence "against the 
penal law", and the Nuclear Convention does not seek the criminalisation of any 
conduct. Their inclusion would therefore add nothing to the scope of the Financing 
Convention. The criminalised conduct referred to in the listed instruments include 
ancillary offences such as attempts and complicity. Subparagraph 2(a) allows States to 
make a declaration that a specific treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the list 
contained in subparagraph 1 (a), thereby decreasing the number of treaties and 
potentially limiting the scope of the Convention. Most conduct covered by earlier 
instruments would, nevertheless, undoubtedly be covered by subparagraph l(b). The 
prospective effect of any such declaration would therefore, in all likelihood, be of 
greater political than legal impact. 
Subparagraph l(b) is the first provision not exclusively to rely on an enumerative 
definition of a criminalised conduct. Instead it also contains an abstract "mini-
detainees as "enemy combatants" and not with the accusation of a criminal offence, as would be the 
case under the Financing Convention. Nevertheless, the exchange gives a rare insight into the realties 
of the secret world of counter-terrorism and the criticism of Mustafa Aid Idr strikingly captures the 
dilemmas involved in shifting the of burden of proof especially while relying on classified information. 
In Re: Guantanamo Detainee Cases, District Court of Columbia, Civil Action No. 2002-0299 
Memorandum Opinion issued January 31, 2005, p. 46-48. 
458 The Financing Convention, Article l (1): ""Funds" means assets of every kind, whether tangible or 
intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, 
including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited 
to, bank credits, travelers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and 
letters of credit." 
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definition" of terrorism,459 making it an offence to fund acts "intended to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in 
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act. "460 This was a 
substantial breakthrough in relation to the definition of terrorism. Importantly, 
however, it is not a comprehensive definition since its only scope of application is in 
relation to the financing of terrorism within Article 1 ( 1 ). The abstract definition 
contains both the military carve-out, which is common to all of the counter-terrorism 
instruments, and only covers injuries to persons "not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict". The provision also borrows from the 
Hostages Convention when it requires that the respective act, by its nature or context, 
is to "intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act." The category of relevant entities 
that can be compelled is however narrower than in the Hostages Convention since the 
latter also included "natural or juridical person, or a group of persons".461 The scope 
of the provision is nevertheless wide and covers conduct already criminalises by 
earlier instruments.462 
Obligations of co-operation and human rights limitations 
Despite the fact that the Financing Convention concerns a rather novel area in the 
combating of international terrorism, it still borrows heavily from previous 
instruments. The provisions directly related to the administration of terrorist funds, 
such as those relating to seizure of funds etc. in Article 8, are new and naturally have 
no counter-parts in earlier instruments. Many other provisions are, however, taken 
from earlier instruments. 
The common obligation to take into custody a person and to investigate any act, 
when the circumstances so warrant, exist in Article 9. Similarly, the right of the 
459 See W. Gilmore, 'International Financial Counterterrorism Initiatives', in C. Fijnaunt, J. Wouters & 
F. Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against Terrorism- A Transatlantic Dialogue, (2004) 
191. 
460 The Financing Convention, Article 2(l)(b). 
461 Ibid, Article 2. 
462 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 298. 
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detainee to consular communication, introduced by the Tokyo Convention, is 
expanded to include entitlement to be visited by State representatives and to be 
informed of the relevant right.463 As with the Bombing Convention, the detainee may 
also be visited by members of the ICRC.464 
The provision containing the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare is identical with 
the comparable provision in the Bombing Convention and includes the possibility to 
transfer the alleged offender to stand trial in another country than the State of 
custody.465 Articles 13-14 stipulate that none of the criminalised conduct within 
Article 2 shall be regarded either as fiscal or political offences for the purpose of 
extradition or mutual legal assistance.466 The removal of the traditional safeguards has 
been compensated by the introduction of the same human rights provisions as used in 
the Bombing Convention.467 Finally the fair treatment clause has been extended with 
the words "including treatment in conformity with applicable provisions of 
international law, including human rights law."468 
In relation to extradition, the Financing Convention resembles earlier instruments 
and provides for a system securing effective extradition by supplementing prior 
extradition agreements and enabling the Convention to be used as the legal basis for 
extradition. 
In regard to legal assistance, obligations are in substance the same as in the 
Bombing Convention. The Financing Convention, however, also deals with more 
specialised areas such as for instance bank secrecy. 
Conclusion 
Prior to the Financing Convention, most counter-terrorism instruments dealt with 
the criminalisation of specific conduct, such as hijacking, hostage-taking and terrorist 
bombings. All these instruments also criminalised attempt and, depending on national 
463 The Financing Convention, Article 9(3)(b) and (c). 
464 Ibid., Article, 6(5). 
465 lbid., Article 10. 
466 Traditionally fiscal offences are treated separately from other crimes and are generally excluded 
from the list of extraditable offences, see e.g. the European Convention on Extradition ( 1957), Article 
5. 
467 The Financing Convention, Article 15. 
468 Ibid., Article 17. 
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law and the underlying doctrine of attempt, could be very far reaching. The Financing 
Convention is focused only on the funding of terrorist acts. Hence it criminalises 
conduct that may take place before any of the acts contemplated in the previous 
instruments. The Convention thereby moves forward the moment of completion of the 
material elements of the crime (actus reus) for all of the instruments mentioned in 
Article 2(l)(a). In other words, before the Financing Convention, States were free to 
apply their own rules pertaining to the fulfilment and withdrawal from attempt in 
relation to so-called terrorist conduct. After the Financing Convention, however, the 
mere collection of funds in itself constitutes a complete 'crime', provided that the 
offender had the necessary intent (mens rea) and there is no requirement for the funds 
to have been materially used. The Convention further contains provisions regarding 
attempt, accomplices, organising and directing others to commit an offence and 
conspiracy. The last included both the civil law concept of association malfaiteur and 
the common law concept of conspiracy.469 
The Financing Convention is also the first instrument not only to engage States but 
also private actors.470 Indeed, private institutions have felt most of the impact of 
terrorist financing legislation.471 
The Financing Convention represents another sizable step in the fight against 
terrorism, a step that goes far beyond the traditional criminal approach to terrorism. 
The method applied is not unprecedented in international law but follows the 
approach taken in relation to money laundering. This conventional framework may 
not, however, be directly applicable to terrorism because of two significant 
differences. 472 Firstly, funds that finance terrorist offences might not have been 
obtained illegally. Most evidence indicates, on the contrary, that a large percentage of 
funds used in terrorist attacks derive from legal sources.473 This represents a problem 
in relation to money laundering because it is the criminal origin of funds that 
separates illegal from legal financial transactions and thus constitutes the offence of 
money laundering.474 Secondly, terrorism is not, unlike ordinary economic crimes, 
469 Ibid., Article 2(5)(a-b). 
47
° Cf. I. Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 91 American Journal of International 
Law (2003) 324. 
471 Ibid., at p. 330. 
472 On this issue see generally, W. C. Gilmore, Dirty Money (3rd ed.), (2004). 
473 See Special Report: Financing Terrorism, The Economist, October 22nd-28th 2005, pp. 81-83. 
474 M. Kilchling, 'Financial Counterterrorism Initiatives in Europe', in C. Fijnaunt, J. Wouters & F. 
Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against Terrorism- A Transatlantic Dialogue, (2004) 207. 
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profit orientated. In other words, the reason a terrorist might wish to conceal or 
disguise the origin of funds is not to evade the legal consequences of the criminal 
action that led to the proceeds of the crime. Instead terrorists follow money 
laundering-like methods to avoid detection of their terrorist activities. This means that 
the traditional framework for money laundering offences, requiring a specific intent 
(mens rea) to profit, may be not directly applicable to terrorism.475 There will, as 
pointed out by Mark Pieth, be a criminal intent, but it makes no sense to view the 
funds used to promote the terrorist cause as the "proceeds" of that criminal intent.476 
Thus, even this late convention does not provide a clear definition or obligations on 
Contracting States. Instead it seems to include even more conduct within the counter-
terrorism regime without making any substantive improvements; thus not repairing 
the fault of the regime. 
The Counter-Terrorism Regime 
Beginning with the Hague Convention, all of the instruments, with the exception of 
the Explosives Convention, are essentially modelled on the same limited framework. 
Many forms of conduct that the instruments seek to criminalise would doubtless 
already have been crimes under existing domestic law. It was, nevertheless, viewed as 
essential that all States criminalise the relevant conduct to ensure that there were no 
safe havens around the world. The approach taken throughout all these instruments 
has been enumerative, obligating States to criminalise one form of conduct after 
another. Not until the Financing Convention has it been possible to reach any 
agreement on an abstract definition "terrorism". All the agreed instruments essentially 
follow the same structure, first established in the Hague Convention, requiring the 
criminalisation of specific conduct, establishing a clear basis of extra-territorial 
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction under international law and providing 
associated obligations of co-operation in relation the prosecution of the alleged 
offender. This approach has been described as "sectoral", "segmental" or 
"incremental", which clearly indicates the problem of reaching agreement on a 
475 For a definition of money laundering see for instance the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime (not in force), Article 6(1). 
476 M. Pieth, Financing Terrorism, (2002) 56. 
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comprehensive definition of "terrorism" with the consequential focus on particular 
conduct, which most States agree constitutes a manifestation of an unjustifiable form 
of violence. The following will provide a short review of the legal instruments within 
this regime. 
Jurisdiction 
All of the Counter-terrorism instruments oblige Contracting State to establish 
jurisdiction in order to facilitate criminal prosecution. The requirements to the 
establishment of jurisdiction may be either discretionary or mandatory. 
Thus all of the above-analysed instruments oblige States to take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish jurisdiction based on territoriality and nationality. In 
relation to the ICAO instruments, territorial jurisdiction goes beyond the normal 
doctrine by obliging the State of landing and possibly the State of business of the 
lessees to establish jurisdiction. The Hostages Convention also obliges States to 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of the protective and passive nationality 
principles.477 Moreover, Contracting States are obliged to effectuate such jurisdiction 
in accordance with the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, i.e. they are obliged to 
present the case for their prosecuting authorities if they do not extradite the alleged 
offender. Most of the instruments further stipulate that they do not exclude any 
criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law or declare that 
Contracting States may exercise jurisdiction on jurisdictional theories going beyond 
the traditional jurisdictional principles, viz. the territorial and nationality principles.478 
These other bases of jurisdiction to prescribe are, however, expressed as entitlements, 
not as obligations. Thus States may rely on them but they are not obliged to establish 
criminal jurisdiction on these other bases of jurisdiction. 
The Conventions' mandatory obligations oblige Contracting States both to 
criminalise the respective conduct as well as exercise mandatory jurisdiction under 
certain specific circumstances, that is to say, they explicitly provide and oblige 
Contracting States to establish jurisdiction to adjudicate and to prescribe extra-
territorially. They do not, however, provide any extra-territorial enforcement 
jurisdiction. In other words, they do not allow States to arrest suspects or otherwise 
477 Hostages Convention, Article 5(c) and (d). 
478 See generally, V. Lowe, 'Jurisdiction' in M.D. Evans, International Law, (2003) 329-355. 
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enforce national laws outside the territorial State. The discretionary forms of 
jurisdiction provide the same entitlements but do not oblige States to exercise such 
jurisdiction. 
The most far-reaching jurisdictional principle contained in the counter-terrorism 
instruments, with the exception of the Tokyo, Explosive and New York Conventions, 
is that according to which States shall establish criminal jurisdiction on the mere basis 
of the presence of the offender within their territory, i.e. regardless of where the 
offence was committed, the nationality of the offender or the nationality of the 
victims. In other words the instruments provide for a form of extra-territorial or even 
quasi-universal jurisdiction. This is similar to the obligation of Parties to the Geneva 
Conventions to "undertake to enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions" for persons responsible for grave breaches.479 Despite the potentially very 
broad scope of application, in only very few cases have States exercised such 
jurisdiction. 480 
One of the few481 precedents where a State has exercised jurisdiction over a person 
with no other connection other than the mere presence of the offender within the 
territory of the prosecuting State is the Zardad case in which the English Central 
Criminal Court convicted an Afghan national for crimes committed in Afghanistan 
between 1991 and 1996 on the basis of the 1984 Torture Convention and the 1979 
Hostages Convention. 482 
Despite the counter-terrorism instruments' going beyond the traditional accepted 
forms of jurisdiction under international law, few objections have been made hereto 
by non State Parties. This, coupled with the fact that the jurisdictional principle has 
been copied in many other instruments, leads Aust conclude that, "its legality is 
479 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field ( 1949), Article 49; Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Conditions of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949), Articles 50; Geneva 
Convention Ill Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ( 1949), Article 129; Geneva Convention 
IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of War ( 1949), Articl 146 Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977. Article 85. 
480 Cf. A Cassese, International Criminal Law, (2003) 297. 
481 One could also mention the Belgian Genocide case and the Pinochet case. 
482 See in relation to the Torture Convention decision of the London Central Criminal Court (old 
Bailey) in R v Zardad (Judgment and Ruling pursuant to a preparatory hearing held under s.29 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996), Decision of 7 April 2004 and in relation to the 
Hostages Convention decision of the London Central Criminal Court (old Bailey) in R v Zardad 
(Ruling on the Taking of Hostages Act 1982), Decision of 5 October 2004. It should be noted that both 
the UK and Afghanistan were Parties to the Torture Convention whereas only the UK was a Party to 
the Hostages Convention at the time of the offence. 
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beyond reasonable doubt". 483 It is sometimes asserted that the obligation to establish 
jurisdiction prescriptive also entails an obligation to exercise such jurisdiction. This is 
wrong. The obligation to establish jurisdiction over the criminalised conduct within 
the counter-terrorism instruments does not provide for an obligation to exercise that 
jurisdiction. This is evident from the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 
The principle of 'aut dedere aut judicare' 
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare forms the underpinning of the counter-
terrorism regime.484 The obligation is phrased slightly differently in some of the 
instruments, but they all contain the same core obligation. According to this principle 
a Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it 
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not 
the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Thus the State in which an alleged offender 
is found has only two options: either it submits the case for the relevant prosecuting 
authorities or it extradites the alleged offender. It is important to note, however, that it 
does not require that the alleged offender is actually tried, but only that the relevant 
authorities take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary 
offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. Hence if a decision is taken not 
to initiate prosecution and this decision is taken in good faith then other State Parties 
are not entitled to demand extradition. 
During the drafting of the original provision in the Hague Convention some States, 
including the Soviet Union and the United States, insisted that cases of hijacking 
should result either in extradition or prosecution.485 Other States, however, viewed this 
as an impermissible trespass upon the discretion of their prosecuting authorities.486 
The dispute eventually resulted in the inclusion of the wording "for the purpose of 
prosecution", which was subsequently retained in all ofthe counter-terrorism 
483 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 6. 
484 On the principle see generally ILC Preliminary report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
("aut dedere aut judicare"), 7 June 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/571. 
485 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, ( 1990) 198. 
486 Ibid. 
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instruments with the exception of the Nuclear Convention, which contains no such 
obligation. It is therefore evident that there is no requirement that the alleged offender 
be tried or even that criminal proceedings be initiated. This to some extent reflects the 
problems of upholding domestic legal standards while at the same time ensuring 
effective international criminal co-operation. Malaysia for instance expressed the 
concern during the drafting of the Hague Convention that if prosecution were to be 
mandatory, then this would create certain constitutional difficulties.487 The Chairman 
of the ICAO Subcommittee, charged with the initial drafting of the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle, further stated that it was decided not to include an absolute 
requirement to prosecute when the alleged offender was not extradited since it "was 
not considered possible to trespass upon the jurisdiction of the [public prosecutor] in 
this regard".488 The discretionary provision further reflects certain humanitarian 
considerations,489 which to some extent mirror some of the underlying values in the 
principle of presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental human rights 
principle. 490 The Latin term aut dedere out judicare is therefore misleading because it 
seems to suggest a full trial.491 The true option open to States, as pointed out by 
Guillaume, is aut dedere aut prosequi (extradite or prosecute).492 But even this might, 
however, be overstated. 
It should further be noted, that unlike the European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism, the obligation in the counter-terrorism instruments is not dependant 
upon prior request for extradition.493 This is evident from the language of the 
instruments and from the fact that a proposal from France and the Netherlands to 
487 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
Conciliation (1971) 59. 
488 ICAO Doc. 8877-LG/161, p. 69 (1970), quoted in J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in 
International Law, A commentary on the Hostages Convention, (1990) 198. 
489 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, ( 1990) 198. 
490 ICCPR, Article 14(2); ECHR Article 6(2); ACHR, Article 8(2). See also the remarks by M. C. 
Bassiouni, International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, [ 1980] 
in the Proceedings of the American Society of International, (74Th Annual Meeting) 280. 
491 The term "judicare" primarily means to "to judge" or "to try" cf. M. C. Bassiouni and E. M. Wise, 
Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, (1995) 4. 
4n G. Guillaume, 'Terrorism et Droit International', 215 Hague Rec. 287 ( 1989-Ill) 371. 
493 Cf. J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law. A commentary on the Hostages 
Convemion, ( 1990) 196-197. For an opposite view see A. Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft Part 1: The Hague Convention, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1974) 395, S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague 
Convention 1970- A New Regime?', International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) 707. 
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make extradition contingent upon a request, during the drafting of the Hostages 
Convention, was discarded.494 
There may be many reasons why States do not extradite. States may refuse 
extradition because the alleged offender is one of it own nationals and its laws prevent 
their extradition. The requested State may not have confidence in the fairness of the 
legal system of the requesting State or human rights considerations may prevent 
extradition. There might be insufficient evidence, especially evidence admissible in 
national courts, to initiate criminal proceedings. In such circumstances the principle of 
aut dedere aut judicare would normally oblige States to present the case for its own 
prosecuting authorities. These may, however, exercise considerable discretion in 
deciding whether or not to prosecute the suspect. The requirement that the relevant 
authorities shall take their decision in the "same manner as in the case of any ordinary 
offence of a serious nature under the law of that State" or "through proceedings in 
accordance with the laws of that State" means, as noted above, that there a several 
circumstances in which the prosecution authorities may decide not to initiate 
prosecution. The most obvious is a lack of evidence. If the prosecution authorities, in 
good faith, decide that the evidence in a given case is not strong enough to justify 
prosecution, then this clearly falls within their discretion. Consequently, the decision 
not to prosecute would not constitute a breach of the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare and as a result other States could not demand extradition. The authorities 
might also decide not to charge a suspect on humanitarian grounds, e.g. on the basis 
that the suspect is incapable of standing trial. Likewise, charges may be dropped 
against an alleged offender in return for his agreement to testify against a co-
defendant or as part of an agreement securing the release of hostages. All these 
considerations appear to be permissible under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, 
as expressed in the counter-terrorism instruments. The permissibility of such a 
decision depends on whether such a decision is available to the authorities of the 
respective State in ordinary criminal cases of a similar serious nature and that the 
relevant decision is taken in accordance with the normal procedure and in good faith. 
According to Lambert, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare entails a serious 
weakness because of the broad latitude left to officials of each Party State and the 
494 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 197. 
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difficulties of proving that a decision not to prosecute was taken in bad faith. 495 He 
nevertheless recognises that it is unlikely that a better provision could have been 
drafted. Similarly FitzGerald notes that most States are reluctant to extradite or 
prosecute political offenders and that this impinges on a sensitive area of State 
sovereignty.496 The exchange between the political offence exception and the increase 
in human rights protection further testifies to the unwillingness of States to subscribe 
to an absolute obligation to extradite. Nevertheless, the remark made by the Irish 
Attorney General, Costello, in 1975, that the method favoured by the international 
community for bringing to trial fugitive offenders is that contained in the Hague 
Convention, still seems correct today. 497 This is evident from the principle's having 
been employed throughout all the counter-terrorism instruments and use in other 
instruments as well, most recently in the International convention for the suppression 
of acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 498 
Custody and inquiry 
To ensure compliance with the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, including 
facilitating the possibility of criminal prosecution, the counter-terrorism instruments 
all contain certain supporting obligations upon the State in whose territory the alleged 
offender is found. These include the obligation to ensure the presence of the alleged 
offender to enable subsequent prosecution or extradition. They further oblige the 
States to make a preliminary enquiry into the facts, to inform certain other States 
about these measures and to allow for consular communication with the suspect. The 
relevant provisions have become more complex and elaborate but they all contain the 
same core from which certain realities emerge. Firstly, the discretion left to 
Contracting States by the qualified initial wording of all of the relevant provisions -
upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant- indicates clearly that the 
States did not want to appear to bind themselves unequivocally to take measures 
495 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 203. 
496 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation', International 
Conciliation (1971) 57. 
497 D. Costello, 'International terrorism and the development of the principle of Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare', Journal of International Law & Economics ( 1975) 490. 
498 International convention for The suppression of acts of Nuclear terrorism (2005), Article 11(1). 
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against all alleged offenders, without being able to have regard to the surrounding 
circumstances.499 Secondly, they all seem to reflect certain human rights 
considerations by requiring that detention may only be continued for such time as is 
necessary to enable criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted. 
Extradition 
Extradition is probably the most significant instrument of international criminal co-
operation, as is clear from its predominate position within the counter-terrorism 
system. There is nevertheless no universal extradition system. Gilbert remarks that 
"extradition is an imperfect obligation and there is no general international duty to 
extradite or punish a fugitive." This means that extradition is either dependant upon 
the comity of States or prior arrangements in the form of extradition treaties. Without 
such agreements extradition of an alleged offender can be virtually impossible 
because of domestic law constraints on arresting and transporting suspects in the 
absence of a treaty. The Hague Convention and later instruments, attempted to solve 
this problem by extending the scope of existing extradition treaties and by providing a 
legal basis for extradition where no alternative extradition arrangement existed. The 
first was facilitated by a provision that stipulated that the conduct criminalised should 
be included in existing extradition treaties between the Contracting Parties where 
these did not already cover the criminalised conduct. All the counter-terrorism 
instruments, moreover, contain a provision that obliges States to include the relevant 
conduct criminalised as an extraditable offence in future extradition treaties. The later 
was achieved by inserting a provision enabling Contracting States to use the relevant 
counter-terrorism instrument itself as a surrogate extradition treaty in cases where a 
party makes extradition conditional on the existence of an extradition treaty. 
Likewise, in situations where a party does not make extradition conditional upon the 
existence of an extradition treaty, those parties shall, according to a common 
provision in the counter-terrorism instruments, recognise the relevant conduct as an 
extraditable offence. Further to ensure that extradition is facilitated in all possible 
scenarios, the instruments all contain a provision that provides that the conduct in 
499 J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, A commentary on the Hostages 
Convention, (1990) 170. 
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question may be treated, for the purpose of extradition between the parties, as if it had 
been committed not only in the place where it actually occurred but also in the 
territory of the Parties required to establish their jurisdiction over the offence. This 
legal fiction is intended to solve the potential problem where extradition is conditional 
upon the alleged offender's return to the State where he committed the offence. Since 
all states are obliged to criminalise the specified conduct no mention need to be made 
of the double criminality requirement which otherwise is standard in extradition 
arrangement. 
Thus it is evident that the counter-terrorism instruments seek to eliminate as many 
obstacles as possible to facilitate extradition within Contracting States. The 
extradition regime within the counter-terrorism instruments is, nonetheless, ultimately 
based on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, which, as seen above, is not 
absolute. 
Human rights and other protective principles 
There are several ways in which a regime may be appraised, among others by its 
ability to protect human rights. 500 This is not the intention of this thesis although the 
increased scope of the obligation of States to protect human rights during the 
implementation of these treaties necessitates some discussion, especially since the 
protection of human rights could substantially affect the efficiency of the system as a 
whole. 
It is evident from the above analysis that human rights protection within the 
counter-terrorism system has evolved significantly. The counter-terrorism instruments 
have created an ever-widening system of indirect suppression by obliging Contracting 
States to criminalise certain specific conduct under domestic law and to co-operate in 
order to suppress these terrorist crimes.501 The underlying foundation of this system 
has been a wide jurisdictional base and the principle aut dedere aut judicare. 
Early instruments implicitly contained some humanitarian safeguards inherent in their 
vague language, e.g. in their extradition provisions and in the political offence 
500 R. Cryer, Prosecuting Intemational Crimes (2005) 191. 
501 Cf. D. Freestone, 'The Principle of co-operation: terrorism', in V. Lowe and C. Warbrick (eds.) The 
United Nations and the Principles of International Law, (1994) 123. 
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exception. Pressure for more effective international co-operation and implicit faith in 
domestic criminal systems facilitated the erosion of some of these traditional 
safeguards.502 The weakening of the traditional State-exercised protection scheme has 
been accompanied by an increased protection of individual human rights in 
internationallaw.503 The growing importance of the human rights doctrine was 
reflected in the introduction of the fair treatment clause in the 1973 New York 
Convention. Later, the Hostages Convention specifically made reference in the 
preamble to the right to "life, liberty and security" as set out in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR. The importance of human rights increased both under general international 
law as well as within the counter-terrorism regime among others with direct reference 
of the rights of individuals in the Bombing Convention. This development finally 
culminated in Article 17 of the Financing Convention, which provides that: 
"Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings 
are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of 
all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is 
present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law." 
The following will provide an overview of the most important protective principles 
relevant to the counter-terrorism instruments. 
Due process ~ The New York Convention was the first counter-terrorist 
instrument to introduce a due process requirement by specifying that the State Party in 
whose territory an alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, 
"without undue delay", the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. This amendment was retained in later instruments. The ILC pointed out 
that the phrase sought to ensure that the alleged offender would not be kept in 
preventive custody longer than was reasonable and fair.504 Preventive custody is not 
per se prohibited under international law, but it must not be arbitrary, and it has to be 
502 N. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions', 2 Human Rights Law 
Review (2002) 203. 
503 See A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed., (2003) 375. 
504 L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: 
Prevellfion and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, ( 1975) 103. 
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based on grounds and procedures established by law.505 Moreover information of the 
reasons must be given and court control of the detention must be available.506 
In relation to the ECHR, it is worth first recalling the distinction between detention 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution on the one hand and extradition on the other, 
Articles 5(l)(c) and 5(l)(f) respectively. There is no absolute time limit to the time 
proceedings may last under Article 5(l)(f). Instead it is a test of diligence appropriate 
to the circumstances.507 The leading case, Chahal, concerned Mr. Chahal, an Indian 
citizen, who had illegally entered the UK in 1971.508 In 1990 the Home Secretary 
decided to deport Mr. Chahal because his presence was contrary to public good, for 
reasons of national security and the international fight against terrorism. Mr. Chahal 
was subsequently detained but challenged his deportation on the basis that his 
political involvement in Sikhism presented him with a real risk of inhuman and 
degrading treatment if returned to Punjab, India. The ECtHR found, having given 
regard to all the facts, that there was a real risk. In relation to his detention from 6th 
August 1990, (when Mr. Chahal was first detained with a "view to deportation") to its 
determination on 3rd March 1994, (when the domestic proceedings ended) the Court 
noted: 
"Mr Chahal has undoubtedly been detained for a length of time which is bound to give rise to serious 
concern. However, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the facts that the national 
authorities have acted with due diligence throughout the deportation proceedings against him and that 
there were sufficient guarantees against the arbitrary deprivation of his liberty, this detention complied 
with the requirements of Article 5 para. I (t)." 
Thus in the matter of deportation proceedings, the Court did not find that detention for 
more than three years and four months constituted a breach of Article 5(1)(f). This 
leads to the conclusion that detention with a view to deportation may be of 
considerable duration without infringing the ECHR as long as the authorities handle 
the case with due diligence. 
505 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (Sixteenth session, 1982), U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1 \Rev .I at 8 ( 1994 ). 
506 Ibid. 
51J? D. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, (1995) 
128. 
51JB ECtHR, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 October 1996. 
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The political offence exception- was present in many of the earlier counter-
terrorism instruments. Importantly, this safeguard was removed from the Bombing 
Convention and later instruments, which seems to imply that states were willing to 
surrender this traditional safeguard for the benefit of more effective criminal co-
operation. This was, however, not the case: as illustrated above, the exclusion of the 
political offence exception was followed by stronger human rights safeguards. 
Christine Van den Wijngaert notes in this regard: 
"The reluctance of states to subscribe to treaty provisions excluding certain crimes from the political 
offence exception results from the fact that such provisions create an automatic duty to extradite. Since 
they would oblige states not to consider the crimes concerned as political offences, extradition would 
occur almost automatically. States' reluctance with respect to such an automatic duty to extradite is not 
only based on upon political consideration, but also originates from basic concerns for the individual, 
i.e. their wish to avoid being bound to extradite to all states without discretion, even to those who do 
not offer the minimum safeguards for fair trial."509 
Even the 1977 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which is only 
open for accession to members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and consequently 
requires ratification of the ECHR, contains in Article 5 a protection against 
persecution.510 Thus while States might have been willing to accept that certain types 
of conduct should be criminalised without regard to the location of the offence or the 
motive of the offender, they were not willing to bind themselves to extraditing all 
offenders to States which did not respect fundamental human rights. This holds true 
even for members of the CoE, which are all members of the ECHR and therefore 
presumably have the same minimum standard of human rights protection. The 
exception to extradition is even more strongly asserted in the 2005 Convention for the 
Suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), where Article 16 states: 
"Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford 
mutual legal assistance if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to 
509 C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political offence exception to Extradition, ( 1980) 161. See J. J.. Lambert, 
Terrorisi1i mid Hostag~s in 1nternafimial lAw, A commentary on the Hostages Convention, (i 990) 192. 
510 See also the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005), which explicitly 
allows for reservation to the exclusion of the political offence exception, Article 20. See further 
Explanatory Report, at 211. 
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such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request 
would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons." 
This seriously challenges the assertion of a belief of States that extradition in some 
circumstances can be rendered obligatory. In fact, there is much evidence that suggest 
that States will not accept an absolute obligation to extradite. This seems to be 
sustained by the lack of practice and extensive normative status attributed to the 
political offence exception. 511 
Consular protection- is not strictly speaking a human right but it may be of 
paramount importance to ensuring the protection of human rights and it is therefore 
relevant to the present discussion. The obligation to provide consular protection is, 
moreover, found in all of the counter-terrorism instruments. 
There is no general obligation in international law to provide consular protection 
and this area of the law is generally regulated by the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations. In some States municipal law may, however, provide for an 
obligation to provide consular protection.512 This does not, however, reflect general 
international law. The obligation under the counter-terrorism instruments to ensure 
consular communication thus affords broader protection than is required by customary 
international law and in some respects also a broader protection than is afforded by 
the 1963 Vienna Convention. As mentioned above, the unequivocal language of some 
of these provisions may even give rise to individual rights with direct effect in 
nationallaw.513 This is regardless of whether they may be considered a human right. 514 
It is uncertain what consequences may be inferred from the breach of such individual 
rights, but it would clearly amount to an international wrongful act and the State of 
511 Cf. for instance the reservation of Belgium to the absence of a political offence exception in the 
Hostages Convention, CM 6676, p. 63. 
512 This is for instance the case in Germany where the Federal Constitutional Court in the Rudolph Hess 
case accepted that the Federal Republic were under a constitutional duty to provide diplomatic 
protection to German nationals.Rudolph Hess (Case number 2 B VR4 19/80), 90 International Law 
Reports 386. Contrary to this, is the position in the United Kingdom, where the Court of Appeals in the 
Abassi case held that it could only order the Government to give due consideration to the facts of a 
given case. Beyond this, the Court did not believe it possible to make any general proposition. [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1598, para. 104-105. 
513 LaG rand, ICJ Reports (200 l) l. 
514 Ibid., para. 78. 
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nationality may thus exercise diplomatic protection.515 There is, however, no general 
obligation under international law to provide diplomatic protection. The commentary 
to the ILC's draft articles on Diplomatic Protection states: 
"A State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or 
obligation to do so. The internal law of a State may oblige a State to extend diplomatic protection to a 
national, but international law imposes no such obligation."516 
The ILC's draft Articles thereby maintain the so-called "Mavrommatis principle"517 or 
"Vattelian fiction" according to which an injury to a national of a State is an injury to 
the State itself.518 Hence the injury does not confer any right upon the individual. 
Other than the principles explicitly protected within the instruments, the evolution 
of general human rights has also to some extent limited the ability of States to co-
operate in counter-terrorism measures. This is especially so in relation to the so-called 
Soering principle. 
The Soering principle - More important t~an integrated human rights protection in 
the counter-terrorism instruments was the development in general human rights 
protection. The most profound development in regard to criminal co-operation was 
the decision of the ECtHR in the Soering case.519 Here the Court pronounced that it 
would be incompatible with Article 3 of the ECHR for a contracting State knowingly 
to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for 
believing that there was real risk that he would submitted to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment. 520 The UN Human Rights Committee endorsed this approach in 
the N g v Canada. 521 It noted, "if a state party extradites a person within its jurisdiction 
in such circumstances, and if, as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under 
the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party may be in 
515 Cf. ILC Report on Diplomatic Protection, Report of the fifty-second session (2000) A/55/10, p. 144. 
516 ILC Fifty-sixth Session (3 May to 4 June and 5 July to 6 August 2004), UN Doc. A/CN.4/536, 
Chap. 7, p. 28. 
517 Mavrommatis Palestine Concession case, P.C./.1. Series A, No. 2 1924, p. 12. 
518 For a discussion of this notion, and the criticisms directed at it, see the First Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, document A/CN .4/506, paras. 61-7 4. 
519 ECtHR, Soering case, Judgment of7 July 1989. 
520 Ibid., at para. 88. 
521 UNCHR, Ng v Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991. 
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violation of the Covenant".522 In addition, the 1984 Torture Convention specifically 
provides in Article 3 that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."523 
The ECtHR further left open the possibility that the flagrant denial of fair trial 
could also present an obstacle to extradition under the ECHR.524 The increasingly high 
standard required in the area of protection of human rights further indicates that other 
human rights also demand this protection today.525 Life imprisonment without any 
possibility of early release may raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.526 
This further implies that human rights other than the prohibition on torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment could also represent a bar to extradition were there was a real 
risk of a flagrant violation of the very essence of the respective right. 527 
Human Rights and effectiveness 
Human rights undoubtedly hamper the effectives of international criminal co-
operation.528 This is nevertheless unavoidable because recourse to the criminal model 
for response to terrorism means that States are obliged to attend to the human rights of 
those caught up in the investigatory and prosecutorial processes. The international 
treaties through which the counter-terrorism process has been conducted have to some 
extent reflected this. They have struck an incrementally changing balance between the 
increasing scope of the terrorist offences and the obligation of States to protect human 
522 Ibid., para 14.2 See also General Comment 20, 10 March 1992, para 9, and General Comment 31, 
26 May 2004, para 12. 
523 See also Committee Against Torture, General Comment I, Communications concerning the return 
of a person to a State where there may be grounds he would be subjected to torture (article 3 in the 
context of article 22), U.N. Doc. A/53/44, annex IX at 52 (1998). 
524 ECtHR, Soering case, Judgment of7 July 1989, para. 113. 
525 ECtHR, Case of Selmuni v. France, Judgment of 28 July 1999, A no. 25803/94, para 10 I. 
526 See ECtHR, Einhorn v France, Appl. No. 71555/01, Oct. 2001, para 27. 
527 For an overview and analysis of ECtHR jurisprudence see [2004] UKHL 26 were it was accepted in 
principle by the Law Lords that Article 2, 4~ 5, 6, 8 and 9 in principle could constitute a bar to 
extradition. This position was later confirmed in principle in regard to Article 8 in [2004]UKHL 27. 
528 See I. Cameron, General Human Rights Principles Relevant to US-EU Counterterrorism 
Cooperation, in C. Fijnaunt, J. Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against 
Terrorism- A Transatlantic Dialogue, (2004) 350. 
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rights during the implementation of these treaties, even though some would say that 
they have not gone far enough.529 
The use of international criminal law against terrorism naturally encounters certain 
obstacles, not least because of its often transnational character. The co-operation of 
States is therefore an essential element in the successful implementation of a universal 
criminal program. This co-operation might have been made more complicated by 
increased and diverse human rights protection.530 It does not, however, seem plausible 
to conclude that commitment to human rights and the rule of law itself is too 
demanding for an effective response to terrorism.531 Effective criminal co-operation is 
not antithetical to human rights. That human rights may be attributed to an individual 
already shows evidence of the effectiveness of the criminal system. It is therefore 
more likely that existing regimes have been obstructed by the unwillingness of some 
States to co-operate, either because they sympathised with the ideology of the terrorist 
or simply because they did not have the resources to respond to a threat that might not 
even affect them directly. 
The traditional criminal approach has however been questioned. Whether it is 
because of its transnational character or because of inherent difficulties in the 
prosecution of terrorist offences, States have argued that the criminal process needs 
modification to be effective; innovation, which may lead to conflict with human rights 
standards.532 At the margins, States maintain that it is necessary to declare emergency 
regimes to provide mechanisms to meet the threat of terrorism, which would be 
incompatible with the full protection of human rights. From a human rights 
perspective this is problematic because it raises the classical question of how far a 
liberal society can itself breach liberal values to ensure it own survival. 
529 N. Boister, 'Human Rights Protection in the Suppression Conventions', 2 Human Rights Law 
Review (2002) 215-216. 
530 See D. Freestone, 'Legal Response to terrorism', in J. Lodge (ed.) Terrorism: a challenge to the 
State, (1981) 195-224. 
531 SeeR. Currie, 'Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension', 
II Criminal Law Forum 2 (2002) 143-181. 
532 See for instance Prime Minister, Tony Blair, "Let no-one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are 
changing ... " 5 August 2005, www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp 
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Practice 
So far the thesis has analysed the counter-terrorism instruments and commented on 
their theoretical effectiveness. In some instances it has also mentioned individual 
cases. To assess whether the regime is efficacious as a whole, a more thorough 
analysis is necessary. There are, however, no comprehensive statistics on extradition 
or prosecution under these instruments. The thesis therefore resorts to the writings of 
commentators to provide an overview of existing practice under the counter-terrorism 
instruments. 
Abramovsky early noted that the absence of a mandatory obligation to prosecute or 
extradite, or even the lack of will, significantly impedes the effectives of the counter-
terrorism system. 533 According to him, for the instruments concerning offences 
committed against civil aviation to become effective they must be acceded to by 
almost all nations.534 This is true not only for the ICAO instruments but for all 
counter-terrorism instruments that seek to eliminate safe-havens for offenders. Even 
the smallest number of States could undermine their effectiveness by actively to 
supporting or condoning the criminalised conduct. 535 This was in fact the case. 536 
Evans cited in a study concerning the years from 1960 to 1977, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya and Tunisia as States which, despite being members of at least one of the ICAO 
instruments, did not respect the obligations contained therein at least in on one form 
or another. 537 Evans also drew the conclusion that, in cases concerning extradition and 
prosecution of so-called international terrorism, some States consider that factors such 
as foreign and domestic politics impinge upon the fulfilment of international 
obligations.538 Other countries such as Algeria, Cuba, Kuwait, Syria and Yemen 
(Aden), which were not party to the respective instruments but to the Chicago 
Convention, which provides the basis for the facilitation of international aviation, also 
533 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference 




536 A. Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft- Part lll: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a Multilateral Air Security 
Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 14 (i975) 452. 
537 A. E. Evans, Aircraft and Aviation Facilities, in A. E. Evans and J. F. Murphy, Legal aspects of 
International Terrorism (1978) 37. 
538 Ibid. at p. 494. 
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had their role to play in facilitating attacks against international aviation in the early 
years.539 
It is difficult to find any evidence to sustain a general assumption of a not-
uncommon trend of non-compliance. This despite Contracting States' having a duty to 
report any action taken in accordance with the obligation contained in the respective 
conventions. 54{) It nonetheless seems to be the position taken by most commentators. 
Professor Cheng, for instance, has expressed the view that: 
"Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal 
Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them failing to comply with their obligations 
under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to 
prosecute after blank refusal to extradite."541 
Anthony Aust remarks: "Although comprehensive statistics on extradition and 
prosecution pursuant to the conventions are not easy to find, extradition of alleged 
offenders appears to happen rarely, even if the person is a foreigner."542 Professor 
Dershowitz even emphasised it as one of the reasons why terrorism works. In his view 
the pattern is quite discernible: "Terrorist who hijacked, blew up, or otherwise 
attacked commercial airliners would, if captured, quickly be released by most 
countries." According to Dershowitz the message was clear: "Terrorist attacks 
committed outside Israel would go unpunished and would generally achieve the 
desired result."543 There are several individual incidents that confirm such opinions.544 
Given, however, the high number of terrorist attacks and the difficulty of acquiring 
information, and not least verification, of the prosecution or other dispositions in such 
cases, any conclusion can only be speculative. In an examination relating to the 
customary status of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, Bassiouni and Wise 
reached the following conclusion: 
539 Ibid. at p. 37. 
540 See the Hague Convention Article 13 and the Montreal Convention Article 12. 
541 B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Air Transport- The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Conceming Unlawful Violence at 
International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of Air and Space Law 
(1997) 25 
542 A. Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, (2002) 8. 
543 A. M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, (2002) 40 
544 Cf. Generally D. Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage since 1930, (1997). 
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"If the question is whether State practice supports the assertion that the principle aut dedere aut 
judicare has become a customary norm, the answer may well be no. Contemporary practice furnishes 
"far from consistent evidence" of the "actual existence" of a general obligation to extradite or prosecute 
with respect to international offences."545 
A similar conclusion was reached in relation to hostage taking by Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick in the Pinochet case, where he stated that "[n]otwithstanding the wide terms 
of the Torture Convention and the Taking of Hostages Convention, State practice does 
not at present support an obligation to extradite or prosecute in all cases. "546 
Evans suggested in 1980 that extradition was not the most popular way of 
establishing rendition in cases of terrorism: 
"Extradition may be the established method of rendition, but it is by no means a convenient method or, 
indeed, a popular method. In a recent study of 231 instances of rendition of persons charged with 
international terrorist offences, it was found that only 6 out of 87 extradition requests were granted; on 
the other hand, 145 terrorist were expelled by states. "547 
In relation to terrorism this finding is further sustained by the relatively late removal 
of the political offence exception, although, as explained above, this did not signify a 
willingness to surrender this traditional safeguard for the benefit of more effective 
criminal co-operation. Most of the above statements do not consider co-operation 
after the 11th of September 200 1. The difficulty of obtaining information on 
extradition and other measures of mutual criminal assistance makes it difficult to 
make any definite conclusion although the above statements still seem to reflect 
current realities. Since the events of 11th September and July 2004, for instance, no 
one was extradited from the United Kingdom in relation to terrorist-related 
activities,548 although as of January 2005, 13 persons were subject to extradition 
proceedings on charges connected to terrorist activities.549 The above seriously 
questions the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism regime, a subject that will be 
examined below. 
545 M. C. Bassiouni and E. M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, ( 1995) 43. 
546 House of Lords, Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte 
Pinochet, [ 1998] UKHL 41 
547 A. E. Evans, 'International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders', 
Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. Proc (1974) 276. 
548 HC Deb 6 July 2004 Vol. 663 cWA 72. 
549 HC Deb 25 January 2005 Vol. 668 cWA149. 
138 
Effectiveness 
Evaluating the effectiveness of counter-terrorism conventions is an extremely 
difficult task. There is neither a yardstick of measurement nor any common definition 
of "terrorism", which leaves the area open for political manipulation.550 It is therefore 
difficult to say anything certain about the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism 
regime, especially given the above-mentioned lack of comprehensive statistics on 
extradition and prosecution. The lack of consistent practice regarding the treatment of 
so-called terrorists further raises questions about the political will and enforcement of 
international obligations. 
The question of enforcement was discussed as early as 1970 when Canada and the 
United States expressed their concern over securing the enforcement of international 
obligations under the ICAO conventions.551 The issue was made even more pressing 
by the Black September hijackings and a draft convention for taking multilateral 
action against States found in breach of their obligations was put forward by Canada 
and the United States.552 The establishment of a special Air Security Enforcement 
Convention nevertheless failed because of the divergent political positions taken by 
different countries.553 The significance of the subject is to some extent reflected in the 
fact that the then Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, proposed the establishment 
of an international tribunal for the prosecution of hijackers.554 The desire for a 
universal enforcement instrument was later expressed in 1978 when the leaders of the 
major industrialised countries555 adopted the so-called "Bonn Declaration".556 While it 
did not impose any legal obligation, it did express a clear intent on behalf of the 
signatories to take counter-measures against noncompliant States.557 During 
550 A. B. Krueger and D. D. Laitin, "Misunderstanding" Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2004. 
551 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, International 
Conciliation', (1971) 76. 
552 Ibid., at 76-77. 
553 See general, A. Abramovsky, supra note 222, at 451-484. 
554 G. F. Fitzgerald, 'Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, International 
Conciliation', ( 1971) 47.76. 
555 Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. 
556 See the Bonn Declaration of July 17, 1978, 17 International Legal Materials 1285 ( 1978). See also 
Subsequent at 20 International Legal Materials 956 ( 1981) or at 25 I.L.M. 1005 (1986). 
557 The-declaration has been invoked against Afghanistan and was reportedly used against South Africa. 
Cf. generally, J. J. Bustti1, 'The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-Binding 
International Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking', 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1982) 474-487. 
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negotiation of the Rome Statute, some States advocated a form of universal 
enforcement, by including violations against the counter-terrorism instruments within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 558 This suggestion was not widely 
accepted and was never adopted in the Rome Statute. 559 
Despite no comprehensive agreement having been reached on the definition of 
"terrorism", the counter-terrorism system has evolved significantly and with the 
conclusion of the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention; most forms of violence that 
might plausibly fall within a general conception of terrorism will fall within the 
several treaties thus far concluded. Nevertheless, Evans concluded in 1978, any 
decline in the incidence of hijacking in the United States since 1972 could largely be 
ascribed to the preventive measures taken and only to a lesser extent to the 
enforcement of anti-hijacking legislation.560 
Without going into the complex matter of causation between international treaties 
and terrorist acts it might tentatively be suggested that there seems to be no 
correlation between the coming into force of universal counter-terrorism instruments 
and incidents of terrorist offences (see figure below).561 
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558 See M. P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, American 
Society of International Law Insight 1998 available at <www.asil.org/insights/insigb20.htm>. 
559 Ibid. 
560 A. E. Evans, supra note 19, at 494. 
561 See RAND/MIPT data available at www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/intlterror.html). Note on: 
early to line indicates U.S. DOS data, wheareas the early bottom line indicates RAND/MIPT data. 
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This is a very difficult assessment to make because, as mentioned before, until 
recently the counter-terrorism instruments had far from universal adherence. The 
above figure is moreover misleading because States did not enter into obligations at 
the same time and one cannot therefore expect to see a sharp fall in terrorist incidents 
shortly after the adoption of one of the relevant instruments. It does, however, show 
that the frequency of terrorist attacks has been relatively constant since the late 1960s. 
It is difficult to say whether it is the absence of specific obligation to combat 
terrorism or whether it was non-compliance with treaty obligation that resulted in the 
apparent lack of prosecution and extradition, although the comments of the authors 
cited above seem to suggest that latter. Nevertheless is seems reasonable to conclude 
that the existing counter-terrorism regime has been ineffective attaining its expressed 
aim of preventing and punishing international terrorism. 
Conclusion 
All the analysed instruments essentially concern activities that are considered a 
serious threat to the so-called international community. This is expressly stated in 
most of the preambles and is to some extent evident in the conduct that the 
conventions seek to have criminalised. All the counter-terrorism instruments further 
require an international element, which is not surprising since international criminal 
rules of co-operation (which are to be distinguish from rules on co-existence) 
generally only encompass activities that individual States are not capable of handling 
alone. The conduct so far criminalised moreover seems to imply some kind of 
threshold of seriousness. Nor is this is uncommon since it is the seriousness of the 
threat that explains why States feel that there is a need to resort to international co-
operation instead of prosecuting offenders under existing domestic criminal systems. 
It is not entirely clear whether the conventions imply a distinction between civilian 
and military targets, although this is arguably the case in regard to the Terrorism 
Bombing Convention, whose spatial application, according to S. M. Witten was 
specifically chosen with the aim of criminalising attacks against locations where 
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civilians were most at risk.562 It is, however, certain that States have gone to great 
length to ensure that acts committed by their agents, especially military forces, would 
not be covered by the conventions. The treaties seek only to regulate the behaviour of 
non-State actors. 563 This is evident from the fact that many of them define the 
criminalised conduct by reference to the 'lawfulness' of the conduct, which in most 
circumstances rules out acts by governmental agents. In addition, neither of the ICAO 
instruments applies to aircraft used in "military, customs or police services" and all of 
the other instruments contain a so-called military carve-out which has the effect of 
excluding from the scope of application of the instruments the activities of armed 
forces. 564 A parallel might be drawn to what Michael Bothe calls "safe" and "unsafe" 
law enforcement mechanisms;565 The hypothesis, which was further substantiated by 
Robert Cryer, is that States are more willing to take a wider view of definitions of 
international crimes when they themselves are not subject to their jurisdiction than 
when they are.566 Although not directly applicable to the counter-terrorism regime, 
since it concerned international tribunals, it does give some insight into the reality that 
States are reluctant to confer adjudicative jurisdiction over their own nationals, 
especially State agents. Counter-terrorism conventions do offer prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction to other States but they jealously seek to retain jurisdiction 
over military forces and to a lesser extent State agents, thus sustaining Bothe's 
hypothesis on a broader and more general level. 
Some might consider it wrong not to include acts of States within the notion of 
"terrorism", given the brutality employed by some States. From a more pragmatic 
perspective, however, the agreement reached so far in the existing counter-terrorism 
instruments reflects the conduct that States regard as unacceptable, irrespective of the 
perpetrator and the motive, given the lack of an international agreement on a 
comprehensive definition of international terrorism this represents, the furthest States 
have been willing and able to go.567 
562 S.M. Witten, 'The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings', 92 
American Journal of International Law ( 1998) 776. 
563 A similarly distinction is made in the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article I. 
564 A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, (2005) 292. 
565 M. Bothe, 'International Humanitarian Law and War Crimes Tribunals: Recent Developments and 
Perspectives', inK. Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, (1998) 581 and 593. 
566 R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (2005) 232 et seq. 
567 Cf. A. D. Sofaer, 'Terrorism and the Law', 64 Foreign Affairs (1985-1986) 903. 
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The concept of terrorism has been obfuscated by many complicating elements, 
among others, by the paradox that the very thing that distinguishes "terrorism" from 
crime- the motive- is not an element of the prescribed offence within suppression 
conventions. There is clearly no requirement that the violence prescribed by the 
counter-terrorism instruments be motivated by any specific political aim or ideology. 
In fact, most of the conventions specifically reject this. The purpose of the violence is 
therefore irrelevant. In this respect, it might be added that that the majority of States 
presumably already consider indiscriminate acts of violence, at least against civilians, 
as a crime deserving punishment regardless of motive. The Counter-terrorism regime 
does however clearly exhibit a form of "dual selectivity", which Timothy 
McGormack referred to in relation to international crimes.568 This selectivity is found 
firstly in the acts the international community is prepared to criminalise and secondly 
in relation to the atrocities the international community is collectively prepared to 
prosecute.569 Importantly, terrorism is neither criminalised in international law nor has 
any international tribunal jurisdiction over any such conduct falling short of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes. A parallel may nevertheless be drawn: firstly, 
because the lack of consensus on a comprehensive convention clearly shows 
selectivity in relation to the conduct States are prepared to criminalise; secondly, the 
above mentioned paradox of counter-terrorism- the motive- clearly testifies to 
selectivity on what conduct States are prepared to prosecute, especially when force is 
used with reference to self-determination. 
The question this thesis has so far avoided is why? Keohane has stated that: 
"International co-operation does not necessarily depend on altruism, personal honor, common 
purposes, internalized norm, or a shared belief in a set of values embodied in a culture. At varies times 
and places any of these features of human motivation may indeed play an important role in processes of 
international cooperation; but cooperation can be understood without reference to any of them"570 
This might be so. Motive may, however, provide a prudent reasons for co-operation 
and more importantly, with regard to counter-terrorism, for non-cooperation. Andrew 
Hurrel, for instance, quotes the pursuit of holy wars against infidels, barbarous 
568 
'f. McCormack, 'Selective Reaction to Atrocites', 60 Albany Law Review(l996-1991) 683. 
569 See also R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (2005) 191 et seq. 
570 R. 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches', 32 International Studies Quarterly 
(1988) 380. 
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behaviour of imperialist powers in their treatment of indigenous people and the 
savagery of the fighting on the Eastern Front in the Second World War as striking 
examples of where absence of any shared sense of community has worked to 
undermine co-operative limitations on conflict based on reciprocity and self-
interest. 571 It is easy to add to the list. 
571 A. Hurrell, 'International Society and Regimes, in Regime Theory and International Relations, V. 






















Permanent Court of International Justice 
Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No.7. 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession case, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 2 1924 . 
International Court of Justice 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991 . 
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005 
Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals, Judgment of 31 March 2004. 
Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v . 
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002. 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950. 
LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001 . 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 ( 1970), Advisory Opinion, 
P.I.C.J. Reports 1971. 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004. 
North Sea Continental ShelfCases, I.C.J. Reports (1969) . 
Order of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 1996 case of Aerial incident of 3 
July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). 
Qatar v. Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), I.C.J. Reports (1994) 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports (1949) 
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994. 
U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in the Tehran case (Judgment), I.C.J. Reports 1980 . 
U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in the Tehran case (Provisional measures), I.C.J. Reports 
1979. 
European Court of Human Rights 
Chahal v. the United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 . 
Doorson v. The Netherlands (1996), (unreported) 
Einhorn v. France, Appl. No. 71555/01, Oct. 2001. 












Matthews v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 3 March I 999 . 
Neumeister v. Austria (I 968), I EHRR 9 I . 
Selmuni v. France (I 999), 29 EHRR 403 
Soering case v. The United Kingdom (1989), I I ehrr 439 
Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 . 
Van Meche! en and Others v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 23 April I 997 . 
Wemhoffv. Germany (1986), I EHRR 55 . 
Winterwerp v. Netherlands (1979), 2 EHRR 387 . 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
0 Decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, of ICTY, Prosecutor 
v Milomir Stakic, Judgment of Trial Chamber ll (IT-97-24-T), 3I July 2003. 
• Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999 . 
Domestic Court Decisions 
Canada 
• Suresh v. Canada (Minister of citizenship and education) para. 4I l.L.M. (2002) 954 . 
Germany 
• Rudolph Hess (Case number 2 B VR4 19/80) 
United Kingdom 
• [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin). 




[2002] EWCA Civ I 598. 
[2004] UKHL 56. 
R v Abdul-Hussain [ 1999] Crim LR 570 . 
R v Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809 . 
R v Zardad, Central Criminal Court (old Bailey), (Judgment and Ruling pursuant to a 
preparatory hearing held under s.29 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996), 
Decision of 7 April 2004 and in relation to the Hostages Convention decision of the London 
Central Criminal Court (old Bailey) in R v Zardad (Ruling on the Taking of Hostages Act 
1982), Decision of 5 October 2004. 
146 












Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) . 
lwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) . 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) . 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). 
R. v. Martin [1956] 2 QB 272 or USA v. Cordova U.S. District Court E.D. New York, 1950. 
89 F.Supp. 298. 
United States of America v. Yunis (No 3), ILR Vol. 88, 176 . 
United States v. Chen De Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) . 
United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
United States v. Ni Fa Yi, 951 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) . 
United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1999) . 
United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F. 3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997) . 
United Nations Human Rights Committee 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Estonia, U.N. Doc . 
CCPRJC0/77/EST (2003). 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Israel, U.N. Doc . 
CCPRJC0/78/ISR (2003). 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, New Zealand, U.N. Doc . 
CCPRJC0/75/NZL (2002). 
• Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Republic of Moldova, U.N. Doc . 
• 
CCPRJC0/75/MDA (2002). 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Uganda, U.N. Doc . 
CCPRJC0/80/UGA (2004). 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Yemen, U.N. Doc. 
CCPRJC0/75/YEM (2002). 





A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2005) . 
A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2005) . 
A. Cassese, Terrorism, Politics and Law, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1989). 
• A. D' Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law, (Cornell University Press, New 
York: 1971) 







B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentry, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 2002). 
C. Gearty, Terror (London/Boston, Faber & Faber: 1991) 
C. Gray, International law and the Use of Force, (Oxford University Press: 2000) 
C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross 
Principles in honour of Jean Pictet, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneve/The Haag: 1984) 
C. Towsend, 'Terrorism- A very short introduction' (Oxford University Press: 2002) . 
• C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition, (Kluwer, Deventer the 
Netherlands: 1980). 
• D. Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage since 1930, (Haynes Publications Inc., 
California: 1997). 
• D. Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(Butterwoths, London: 1995) 104. 
• A. E. Evans and J. F. Murphy, Legal aspects of International Terrorism, (D.C. Heath and 
Company Lexington/Massachusetts/Toronto: 1978). 
• G. Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, (1998) 14. 
• G. S. Goodwin-Gill, The refugee in international law (2"d ed.) (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 1998). 
• H-H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafi-echt- Allgemeiner Teil (5.ed.), (Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin: 1996). 
• I. Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law (Cavendish Publishing, London: 
2003). 
• I. Cameron, The Protective Principle of international criminal jurisdiction, (Aldershot, 
Darrnouth: 1994). 
• J. Fijnaunt, Wouters & F. Naert (eds.), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against Terrorism- A 
Transatlantic Dialogue, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden- Boston: 2004). 
• 1. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How Wto Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International law, (Cambridge University Press: 2003). 






















L. M. Bloomfield and G. F. FitzGeral, Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons: 
Prevention and Punishment- An Analysis of the UN Convention, (Praeger Publishers, New 
York, Washington, London: 1975). 
M. C. Bassiouni and E. M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
London: 1995) 43 
M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (Sijthoff-Leyden Oceana 
Publishers, New York: 1974) 
M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1989). 
M. Krausa and A. A. Reznev, Vapour and Trace Detection of Explosives for Anti-Terrorism 
Purposes: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, held in Moscow, Russia, 
I9-2, Moscow, Russia, 19-20 March 2003. (Kiuwer Academics Publishers, Dordrecht: 2004) 
N.D. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an International Crimes, (Oceana Publications Inc., New 
York/Leiden: 1974) 1 
N. Machiavelli, The Prince, (Penguin Books, London: 1985) 
N. Ronzitti (ed.), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London: 1990) 69-90. 
0. Spiermann, Moderne Folkeret, (Jurist- og 0konomforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen : 2004). 
P. Capps, M. Evans and S. Konstadinidis (eds.) Asserting Jurisdiction, (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford: 2003). 
P. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law- a Commentry on the Hostages 
Convention 1979, (Groutius Publications Limited, Cambridge: 1990). 
P. Malanczuk, Akehurst Modern Introduction to International Law 7th ed, (Routledge, New 
York: 1997) 
R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, (Cambridge University Press: 2005). 
R. Higgins, Problem and Process, (Oxford University Press: 1994). 
R. Higgins/M. Flory (ed.), International law and Terrorism, (Routledge, London: 1997) . 
R. Yepes-Enriquez and L. Tabassi ( eds.) Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters -with Special Reference to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002). 
T. Kaptain, in J. P (ed.) Terrorism and International Justice, (Oxford University Press: 2003). 
V. Lowe and C. Warbrick (eds.) The United Nations and the Principles of International Law, 
(Routledge, New York: 1994) 
V. Ritberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 1995). 
W. C. Gilmore, Dirty Money 3rd ed., (Council Of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg: 2004) . 













A Abramovsky, 'Mulitlateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part l: The Hague Convention', Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 13 (1974) 381-406. 
A Abramovsky, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft Part II: The Montreal Convention', Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 14 (1975) 268-300. 
A. Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawfull Seizure and 
Interference with Aircraft- Part III: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a Multilateral Air 
Security Convention, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 14 ( 1975) 451-484. 
A Aust, 'Counter-Terrorism- A New Approach, Max Planck Yearbook of International Law 
5 (200 1) 285-306. 
A Aust, 'Lockerbie: The Other Case', 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2000) 278-296. 
A Cassese, 'Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?', 10 European Journal of 
International Law ( 1999) 23-31. 
A Cassese, 'When May Senior Officials Be tried for International Crimes? Some Comments 
on the Congo v. Belgium Case', European Journal of International Law (2002) 853-877. 
A Costello, International terrorism and the development of the principle of Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare, Journal of International Law & Economics 10 (1975) 483-502 
A D. Sofaer, 'Terrorism and the Law', 64 Foreign Affairs ( 1985-1986) 901-922 . 
A Ward, 'Building capacity to combat international terrorism: The role of the United Nations 
Security Council', Journal of Conflict & Security 8, (2003) 289-305. 
B. Cheng, 'International Legal Instruments to Safeguard International Airtransport -The 
Conventions of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and a New Instrument Concerning Unlawful 
Violence at International Airports, Aviation Security', The Hague, International Institute of 
Air and Space Law ( 1997). 
B. Green, 'Notes- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons: An Analysis', Virginia 
Journal oflnternational Law, 14 (1973-1974) 703-728. 
B. Krueger and D. D. Laitin, "'Misunderstanding" Terrorism', Forreign Affairs 
September/October 2004. 
C. Bassiouni, 'Ideologically motivated offences and the political offence exception in 
extradition- a proposed juridical standard for an unruly problem', De Paul Law Review 
(169). 
• C. Bassiouni, 'International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive 


















C. Bassiouni, 'The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (1983) 27-37. 
C. Greenwood, International Law and the 'war against terrorism', International Affairs, 78 
(2002) 301-318. 
C. Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem International Law, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 36 (1987) 283-306. 
C. Harding, Statist assumptions, normative individualism and new form of personality: 
evolving a philosophy of international law for the twenty first century, I (200 I) Non-State 
Actors and International Law 107-125. 
C.M. Johnson, 'Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism', 39 International Legal Materials 2 (2000) 268-270. 
E. Evans, 'Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done', Amerian Journal of International Law 67 
(1973) 641-671. 
E. Evans, 'International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive 
Offenders', [1980] American Society oflntemational Law Proceedings, (74th Annual 
Meeting). 
E. Malmborg, 'Strategies for World Order: Panel: New Developments in the Law of 
International Aviation: The Control of Aerial Hijacking: Remarks'65 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings (1971) 71-80. 
E. Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter Terrorism Committee, and the 
Fight against Terrorism, 97 American Journal of International Law (2003) 333-341. 
F. Fitzgerald, 'Offences and certain other Acts committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo 
Convention of 1963', Canadian Yearbook oflntemational Law (1964) 191-204. 
F. Fitzgerald, Towards legal suppression of acts against civil aviation, 585 International 
Conciliation ( 1971) 42-82. 
G. Guillaume, 'Terrorism and International Law', 53 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2004) 537-549. 
G. Guillaume, 'Terrorism et Driot International', 215 Hague Rec. 287 ( 1989-III) 371 . 
H. Hu and others, 'Tear gas- harassing agent or toxic chemical weapon?', The Journal of the 
American Medical Association 265 (1989) 5, 660-663. 
I. Bantekas, 'The International Law of of Terrorist Financing', 97 American Journal of 
International Law (2003). 
J. Busttil, The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-Binding International 
Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking, 31 (1982) 474-487. 
J. J. Paust, 'Human Rights Responsiability of Private Corporations', Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law. 38 (2002) 801-825. 
J. Lissitzyn, 'International Control of Aerial Hijacking: The Role of Values and Interests 
Strategies for World Order: Panel: New Developments in the Law of International Aviation: 
The Control of Aerial Hijacking', 65 American Society of International Law Proceedings 
(1971) 80-86. 
151 
• J. Hartmann, 'The Gillon Affair', 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) 
745-755. 




M. C. Wood, 'The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents', International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 (1974) 791-817. 
M. Sossai, 'The Internal Conflict in Colombia and Fight against Terrorism', 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2005) 253-267. 
0 N. Boister, 'Transnational Criminal Law'?, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003) 
953-976. 
o N. Boister, Human Rights Protection in the Suppresion Conventions, 2 Human Rights Law 
Review (2002) 199-227. 
o N. Rostow, 'Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism since September ll'h', 
35 Cornell International Law Journal (2002), 475-490. 
• P. S. Dempsey, 'Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism', 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2003). 
o R. Boylet and R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1964), 3053-55. 
• R. Currie, 'Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assitance: Resolving the Tension', 
II Criminal Law Forum 2 (2002). 
o R. Ginger, 'Violance in the Skies: The right Rights and Liabilites of Air Carriers when 
Dealing with Disruptive Passengers', (1998) Air and Space Law, Vol XXIII Number 3. 
o R.I. R. Abeyratne, 'Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for 
the Management of the Offence of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation', Transport law 
Journal (1998) 118-119. 
• R. 0. Heohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches', 32 International Studies 
Quarterly (1988) 379-396. 
• 
0 
R. P. Boyle and P. Roy, 'The Tokyo Convention on offences and Certain other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircrafts', Journal of Air law and Commerce, 30 (1964 ). 
R. P. Boylet and R. Pulsifer, 'The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1964). 
o S. Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A New Regime?', ICLQ 
(1973) 687-726. 
o S. Shubber, 'Is hijacking ofaircrafts piracy in international law', British Yearbook of 
International Law 22 ( 1968-69), 193-205. 
• S. Shubber, 'The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages', 52 British 
Yearbook of International Law ( 1981 ). 
o T. McGorrnack, 'Selective Reaction to Atrocites', 60 Albany Law Review( 1996-1997) 681-
732. 
152 
• W. Baxter, 'A Sceptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism', Arkon Law Review 7 (19973/74). 
Reports 
• Aust, Implementation Kits for the International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, 
(Commonwealth Secretariat: 2002), available at www.thecommonwealth.org 
• ILC Preliminary report on the obligation to extradite or prosecute ("aut dedere aut judicare"), 
7 June 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/571. 
• ILC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, document A/CN.4/506. 
• REDRESS, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Torture: International Law in the Fight 
against Terrorism, July 2004 available at www.redress.org. 
• Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fourth session, 2 May 





Report of the Secretary-General, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/51/116, 2 July 2003. 
Report of the SG pursuant to paragraph 2 of SC resolution 808 ( 1993), UN Doc. S/25704 . 
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., 22 October 
2002, "Recommendations", No. 10 (a). 
Special Report: Financing Terrorism, The Economist, October 22nd-28th 2005 . 
Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in Particular Terrorism, UN Doc . 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.1. 
Miscellaneous 
• Documents of the Legal Committee, Fourteenth Session, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8302, LC/ 150-2 at 71 
(1963). 
• European Law Enforcement- Why the EU is Unconstitutional, Der Spiegel, 14 March 2005. 
• IMO Resolution A.924 (2001). 
• M. P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, ASIL Insight 
1998 available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh20.htm. 
• Speech of Prime Minister Tony Blair on the threat of global terrorism, 5 March 2005, 






The Bonn Declaration of July 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1285 ( 1978) . 
IMTFE Judgment (English Translation) Chapter II, The Law, pp.25-26. available at 
www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar!PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-2.html 
HC Deb 6 July 2004 Vol. 663 cWA72 . 
HC Deb 25 January 2005 Vol. 668 cWAI49 . 
J. Keegan, 'Saddam deserves the fate of the Nazis', Daily Telegraph 20 October 2005 . 
153 
